PhenomenologicalSociologyContent•Schutz’sPhenomenologicalSociology•PeterBergerandLuckmann:SociologyofKnowledgeinPhenomenologicalPerspective•BourdieuonPhenomenologyandEthnomethodology•Garfinkel:EthnomethodologySchutz:meaningfulstructureoftheworldofdailylifeSchutz’sintellectuallifewasaconcernforthemeaningfulstructureoftheworldofdailylife,theeverydayworkingworldintowhicheachofusisborn,withinwhoselimitsourexistenceunfolds,andwhichinitsmassivecomplexity,tooutlineandexploreitsessentialfeatures,andtotraceoutitsmanifoldrelationshipswerethecompositepartsofhiscentraltask,therealizationofaphilosophyofmundanereality,orinmoreformallanguage,ofaphenomenologyofthenaturalattitude.Theunderstandingoftheparamountrealityofcommon-senselifeisthecluetotheunderstandingoftheworkofSchute.Intersubjectivity•Thestudyofintersubjectivityseekstoanswerquestionssuchasthese:Howdoweknowotherminds?Otherselves?Howisreciprocityofperspectivespossible?Howismutualunderstandingandcommunicationpossible•Intersubjectivityexistsinthe“vividpresent”inwhichwespeakandlistentoeachother.Wesharethesametimeandspacewithothers.“Thissimultaneityistheessenceofintersubjectivity,foritmeansthatIgraspthesubjectivityofthealteregoatthesametimeasIliveinmyownstreamofconsciousness.Andthisgraspinsimultaneityoftheotheraswellashisreciprocalgraspofmemakespossibleourbeingintheworldtogether.•Thoughbothfocusedonsubjectivity,phenomenologicalphilosopherswithintherealmofconsciousnessandSchutzinthesocialworld.Thecommon-senseworld•“Thecommon-senseworld,”“worldofdailylife,”“every-dayworld”,”everydayworkingworld”,“mundanereality”arevariantexpressionsfortheintersubjectiveworldexperiencedbymanwithinwhatHusserltermsthe“naturalattitude”.Thecommon-senseworldisthearenaofsocialaction;withinitmencomeintorelationshipwitheachotherandtrytocometotermswitheachotheraswellaswiththemselves.Allofthis,however,istypicallytakenforgranted,andthismeansthatthesestructuresofdailylifearenotthemselvesrecognizedorappreciatedformallybycommonsense.Rather,common-senseseestheworld,actsintheworld,andinterpretstheworldthroughtheseimplicittypifications.Biographicalsituation•Common-senseworldisgiventousallinhistoricalandculturalformsofuniversalvalidity,butthewayinwhichtheseformsaretranslatedinanindividuallifedependsonthetotalityoftheexperienceapersonbuildsupinthecourseofhisconcreteexistence.Theactor’sactualsituationhasitshistory;itisthesedimentationofallhisprevioussubjectiveexperiences.Theyarenotexperiencedbytheactorasbeinganonymousbutasuniqueandsubjectivelygiventohimandtohimalone.•TheexampleofstrangerStockofKnowledgeatHand•Atanymomentinhislifetheindividualhasastockofknowledgeathand.Thisstockismadeupoftypificationsofthecommon-senseworld.•This“stockpiling”oftypificationsisendemictocommon-senselife.Fromchildhoodon,theindividualcontinuestoamassavastnumberof“recipes”whichthenserveastechniquesforunderstandingoratleastcontrollingaspectsofhisexperience.•Finally,thetypificationswhichcomprisethestockofknowledgearegeneratedoutofasocialstructure.Hereaseverywhere,knowledgeissociallyrooted,sociallydistributed,andsociallyinformed.Yetitsindividualexpressiondependsontheuniqueplacementoftheindividualinthesocialworld.Actionasthestartingpointforamethodologyofthesocialsciences•Schutzstresseduponactionasthestartingpointforamethodologyofthesocialsciences.Itisaninsistenceonthequalitativedifferencebetweenthekindsofrealityinvestigatedbynaturalscientistsandsocialscientists.Itisapleaforappreciatingthefactthatmenarenotonlyelementsofthescientist’sfieldofobservationbutpreinterpretersoftheirownfieldofaction,thattheirovertconductisonlyafragmentoftheirtotalbehavior,thatthefirstchallengegiventothosewhoseektounderstandsocialrealityistocomprehendthesubjectivityoftheactorbygraspingthemeaninganacthasforhim,theaxisofthesocialworld.Knowledgeandconstruct•Allourknowledgeoftheworld,incommon-senseaswellasinscientificthinking,involvesconstructs,i.e.,asetofabstractions,generalizations,formalizations,idealizationsspecifictotherespectivelevelofthoughtorganization.Strictlyspeaking,therearenosuchthingsasfacts,pureandsimple.Allfactsarefromtheoutsetfactsselectedfromauniversalcontextbytheactivitiesofourmind.Theyare,therefore,alwaysinterpretedfacts,eitherfactslookedatasdetachedfromtheircontextbyanartificialabstractionorfactsconsideredintheirparticularsetting.Ineithercase,theycarryalongtheirinterpretationalinnerandouterhorizon.Thisdoesnotmeanthat,indailylifeorinscience,weareunabletograsptherealityoftheworld.Itjustmeansthatwegraspmerelycertainaspectsofit,namelythosewhicharerelevanttouseitherforcarryingonourbusinessoflivingorfromthepointofviewofabodyofacceptedrulesofprocedureofthinkingcalledthemethodofscience.Theconstructsofthenaturalscience•Itisuptothenaturalscientiststodeterminewhichsectoroftheuniverseofnature,whichfactsandeventstherein,andwhichaspectsofsuchfactsandeventsaretopicallyandinterpretationallyrelevanttotheirspecificpurpose.Thesefactsandeventsareneitherpreselectednorpreinterpreted;theydonotrevealintrinsicrelevancestructures.Relevanceisnotinherentinnatureassuch,itisth