U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONApril2009REGULATORYGUIDEOFFICEOFNUCLEARREGULATORYRESEARCHTheNRCissuesregulatoryguidestodescribeandmakeavailabletothepublicmethodsthattheNRCstaffconsidersacceptableforuseinimplementingspecificpartsoftheagency’sregulations,techniquesthatthestaffusesinevaluatingspecificproblemsorpostulatedaccidents,anddatathatthestaffneedsinreviewingapplicationsforpermitsandlicenses.Regulatoryguidesarenotsubstitutesforregulations,andcompliancewiththemisnotrequired.MethodsandsolutionsthatdifferfromthosesetforthinregulatoryguideswillbedeemedacceptableiftheyprovideabasisforthefindingsrequiredfortheissuanceorcontinuanceofapermitorlicensebytheCommission.Thisguidewasissuedafterconsiderationofcommentsreceivedfromthepublic.Regulatoryguidesareissuedin10broaddivisions:1,PowerReactors;2,ResearchandTestReactors;3,FuelsandMaterialsFacilities;4,EnvironmentalandSiting;5,MaterialsandPlantProtection;6,Products;7,Transportation;8,OccupationalHealth;9,AntitrustandFinancialReview;and10,General.ElectroniccopiesofthisguideandotherrecentlyissuedguidesareavailablethroughtheNRC’spublicWebsiteundertheRegulatoryGuidesdocumentcollectionoftheNRC’sElectronicReadingRoomat’sAgencywideDocumentsAccessandManagementSystem(ADAMS)at(DraftwasissuedasDG-1132,datedJune2007)QUALIFICATIONOFSAFETY-RELATEDCABLESANDFIELDSPLICESFORNUCLEARPOWERPLANTSA.INTRODUCTIONThisguidedescribesamethodthatthestaffoftheU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)considersacceptableforcomplyingwiththeCommission’sregulationsforthequalificationofsafety-relatedcablesandfieldsplicesfornuclearpowerplants.TheregulationsestablishedbytheNRCinTitle10,Part50,“DomesticLicensingofProductionandUtilizationFacilities,”oftheCodeofFederalRegulations(10CFRPart50)(Ref.1)requirethatstructures,systems,andcomponentsthatareimportanttosafetyinanuclearpowerplantmustbedesignedtoaccommodatetheeffectsofenvironmentalconditions(i.e.,remainfunctionalunderpostulateddesign-basisevents(DBEs)).Towardthatend,GeneralDesignCriterion(GDC)1,“QualityStandardsandRecords,”GDC2,“DesignBasesforProtectionAgainstNaturalPhenomena,”GDC4,“EnvironmentalandDynamicEffectsDesignBases,”andGDC23,“ProtectionSystemFailureModes,”ofAppendixA,“GeneralDesignCriteriaforNuclearPowerPlants,”to10CFRPart50containthegeneralrequirements.Augmentingthosegeneralrequirements,thespecificrequirementspertainingtothequalificationofcertainelectricalequipmentimportanttosafetyarecontainedin10CFR50.49,“EnvironmentalQualificationofElectricEquipmentImportanttoSafetyforNuclearPowerPlants.”Inaddition,CriterionIII,“DesignControl,”ofAppendixB,“QualityAssuranceCriteriaforNuclearPowerPlants,”to10CFRPart50requiresthat,whenatestprogramisusedtoverifytheadequacyofaspecificdesignfeature,thetestprogrammustincludesuitablequalificationtestingofaprototypeunitunderthemostsevereDBE.Thisregulatoryguidecontainsinformationcollectionrequirementscoveredby10CFRPart50thattheOfficeofManagementandBudget(OMB)approvedunderOMBcontrolnumber3150-0011.RG1.211,Page2TheNRCmayneitherconductnorsponsor,andapersonisnotrequiredtorespondto,aninformationcollectionrequestorrequirementunlesstherequestingdocumentdisplaysacurrentlyvalidOMBcontrolnumber.B.DISCUSSIONTheInstituteofElectricalandElectronicsEngineers,Inc.(IEEE)Standard383-2003,“IEEEStandardforQualifyingClass1EElectricCablesandFieldSplicesforNuclearPowerGeneratingStations,”waspublishedJune10,2004(Ref.2).ThestandardwasdevelopedbytheWorkinggrouponCables(Subcommittee(SC2.4))oftheNuclearPowerEngineeringCommitteeoftheIEEEandwasapprovedbytheIEEEStandardsAssociationonDecember12,2003(Reaffirmedin2008).Itprovidesgeneralrequirements,direction,andmethodsforqualifyingsafety-relatedcables,fieldsplices,factorysplices,andfactoryreworkforserviceinnuclearpowerplants.Categoriesofcablescoveredincludethoseusedforpower,control,andinstrumentationservices,includingsignalandcommunicationcables.Mostimportantly,IEEEStandard383-2003requiresthatthesafety-relatedcablesandfieldsplicesmustmeetorexceedspecifiedperformancerequirementsthroughouttheirinstalledlifeandbesubjectedtoaqualityassuranceprogramthatincludesdesign,qualification,andproductionqualitycontrol.Theobjectivesofequipmentqualificationaretoensurethatsafety-relatedcables(single,multiconductor,andmultiplex,aswellascoaxial,triaxial,andtwinaxial)andfieldsplicescanbedemonstratedtoperformtheirsafetyfunctionsunderpostulatedDBEs,andthatnofailuremechanismexiststhatcouldleadtocommon-causefailuresunderpostulatedserviceconditions.Itisthedegradationovertime,followedbyexposuretotheenvironmentalextremesoftemperature,pressure,humidity,radiation,mechanicalstress,orchemicalspray(oracombinationthereof)resultingfromDBEs,thatpresentsapotentialforcommon-causefailuresofsafety-relatedcablesandfieldsplices.Asaresult,itisnecessarytoestablishaqualifiedlifeforcablesandsplicesthatareinstalledinharshenvironmentsandmustperformasafetyfunctionduringandfollowingaDBE.Theseobjec