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ContractTheory(WS20023/2004)-1-Prof.Dr.KlausM.SchmidtReadingListThissyllabuslistsmanymorepapersthanwecandiscussinclass.However,Iintendtomentionallstareditemsatleastbrie°y.Allitemswithtwostarsormorewillbediscussedinmoredetail.Thepaperswiththreestarsarehighlyrecommendedforyourownreading.Chapters7to10listsomereferencesforthestudentpresentations.Thepaperswiththreestarswillbepresentedindetail.1.BooksandSurveys***Hart,O.,1995,Firms,Contracts,andFinancialStructure,Oxford:ClarendonPress.**Hart,O.andB.HolmstrÄom,1987,\TheTheoryofContracts,inT.Bewley(ed.),AdvancesinEconomicTheory,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.***Laffont,J.J.andD.Martimort,2002,TheTheoryofIncentives:ThePrincipalAgentModel,Princeton,NY:PrincetonUniversityPress.**Laffont,J.J.andJ.Tirole,1993,ATheoryofRegulationandProcurement,Cam-bridge(Mass.):MIT-Press.*Mas-Colell,A.,Whiston,M.,andJerryR.Green,1995,MicroeconomicThe-ory,OxfordUniversityPress:Oxford1995,Chapters13,14and23.*Milgrom,P.andJ.Roberts,1992,Economics,OrganizationandManagement,EnglewoodCli®s,NewJersey:PrenticeHall.*Prendergast,Canice,1999,\TheProvisionofIncentivesinFirms,JournalofEco-nomicLiterature,Vol.37,7-63.*Salani¶e,Bernard,1997,TheEconomicsofContracts,Cambrdige,MA:MIT-Press.***Schmidt,K.M.,1995,Skript:Vertragstheorie,unpublishedmanusscript,Munich(inparticularchapters1-4,6,and7).*Schweizer,Urs,1999,Vertragstheorie,TÄubingen:MohrSiebeck.*Williamson,O.,1985,TheEconomicInstitutionsofCapitalism,NewYork:FreePress.2StaticMoralHazardModels*Fudenberg,D.andJ.Tirole,1990,\MoralHazardandRenegotiationinAgencyContracts,Econometrica,Vol.58,1279-1319.***Grossman,S.andO.Hart,1983,\AnAnalysisofthePrincipal-AgentProblem,Econometrica,Vol.51,7-45.ContractTheory(WS20023/2004)-2-Prof.Dr.KlausM.Schmidt**Hermalin,B.andM.Katz,1991,\MoralHazardandVeri¯ability,Econometrica,Vol.59,1735-1754.**HolmstrÄom,B.,1979,\MoralHazardandObservability,BellJournalofEconomics,Vol.10,74-91.***HolmstrÄom,B.,1982,\MoralHazardinTeams,BellJournalofEconomics,Vol.13,324-340.**Innes,R.,1990,\LimitedLiabilityandIncentiveContractingwithEx-anteActionChoices,JournalofEconomicTheory,Vol.52,45-67.*Jewitt,I.,1988,\JustifyingtheFirst-OrderApproachtoPrincipal-AgentProblems,Econometrica,Vol.56,1177-1190.Lazear,E.andS.Rosen,1981,\RankOrderTournamentsasOptimalLaborCon-tracts,JournalofPoliticalEconomy,Vol.89,841-864.Ma,A.,1991,\AdverseSelectioninDynamicMoralHazard,QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,Vol.106,255-275.Ma,C.A.,J.MooreandS.Turnbull,1988,\StoppingAgentsfromCheating,JournalofEconomicTheory,Vol.46,355-372.*Mirrlees,J.,1974,\NotesonWelfareEconomics,InformationandUncertainty,in:M.Balch,D.McFaddenandS.Wu(eds.)EssaysinEconomicBehaviorunderUncer-tainty,243-58.*Mookherjee,D.,1984,\OptimalIncentiveSchemeswithManyAgents,ReviewofEconomicStudies,Vol.51,433-446.*Rogerson,W.,1985,\TheFirst-OrderApproachtoPrincipal-AgentProblems,Econo-metrica,Vol.53,1357-1367.Sappington,D.,1983,\LimitedLiabilityContractsbetweenPrincipalandAgent,JournalofEconomicTheory,Vol.29,1-21.Shavell,S.,1979,\RiskSharingandIncentivesinthePrincipalandAgentRelation-ship,BellJournalofEconomics,Vol.10,55-73.3DynamicMoralHazardModels**Fudenberg,D.,B.HolmstrÄomandP.Milgrom,1990,\Short-TermContractsandLongTermAgencyRelationships,JournalofEconomicTheory,Vol.51,1-31.***Hellwig,M.andK.M.Schmidt,2002,\Discrete-TimeApproximationsoftheHolm-strÄom-MilgromBrownian-MotionModelofIntertemporalIncentiveProvision,Econo-metrica,forthcoming.***HolmstrÄom,B.andP.Milgrom,1987,\AggregationandLinearityintheProvisionofIntertemporalIncentives,Econometrica,Vol.55,303-328.ContractTheory(WS20023/2004)-3-Prof.Dr.KlausM.Schmidt***HolmstrÄom,B.andP.Milgrom,1991,\Multi-TaskPrincipalAgentAnalyses,JournalofLawEconomics,andOrganization,Vol.7Sp.,24-52.Malcomson,J.andF.Spinnewyn,1988,\TheMultiperiodPrincipal-AgentProb-lem,ReviewofEconomicStudies,Vol.55,391-408.Radner,R.,1981,\MonitoringCooperativeAgreementsinaRepeatedPrincipal-AgentRelationship,Econometrica,Vol.49,1127-48.*Rey,P.andB.Salani¶e,1990,\Long-Term,Short-TermandRenegotiation:OntheValueofCommitmentinContracting,Econometrica,Vol.58,597-619.*Rogerson,W.,1985,\RepeatedMoralHazard,Econometrica,Vol.53,69-76.4AdverseSelektion(a)StaticModelsBaron,D.andD.Besanko,1984,\RegulationandInformationinaContinuingRelationship,InformationEconomicsandPolicy,Vol.1,267-302.**Baron,D.andR.Myerson,1982,\RegulatingaMonopolistwithUnknownCosts,Econometrica,Vol.50,911-30.*Bester,H.andR.Strausz,2001,\ContractingwithImperfectCommitmentandtheRevelationPrinciple:TheSingleAgentCase,Econometrica,Vol.69,1077-1098.***Fudenberg,D.andJ.Tirole,1991,GameTheory,MITPress,Chapter7.Guesnerie,R.andJ.J.Laffont,1984,\ACompleteSolutiontoaClassofPrincipal-AgentProblemswithanApplicationtotheControlofaSelf-ManagedFirm,JournalofPublicEconomics,Vol.15,171-196.*Hart,O.,1983,\OptimalLabourContractsUnderAsymmetricInformation:AnIn-troduction,ReviewofEconomicStudies,Vol.50,3-36.**Laffont,J.J.andJ.Tirole,1986,\UsingCostObservationtoRegulateFirms,JournalofPoliticalEconomy,Vol.94,614-641.**Laffont,J.J.andJ.Tirole,1993,ATheoryofR