CHAPTER08INFLATION,DISINFLATION,ANDDEFLATIONWhatYouWillLearninthisChapter:WhyeffortstocollectaninflationtaxbyprintingmoneycanleadtohighratesofinflationHowhighinflationcanspiralintohyperinflationasthepublictriestoavoidpayingtheinflationtaxTheeconomy-widecostsofinflationanddisinflation,andthedebateovertheoptimalrateofinflationWhyevenmoderatelevelsofinflationcanbehardtoendWhydeflationisaproblemforeconomicpolicyMoneyandInflationBetween1985and1995Brazildemonstratedwhatreallyseriousinflation—uptoalmost3,000%peryear—lookslike.MoneyandPricesAccordingtotheclassicalmodelofthepricelevel,therealquantityofmoneyisalwaysatitslong-runequilibriumlevel.MoneySupplyGrowthandInflationinBrazilTheInflationTaxTheinflationtaxisthereductionintherealvalueofmoneyheldbythepubliccausedbyinflation,equaltotheinflationratetimesthemoneysupply,onthosewhoholdmoneyTherealvalueofresourcescapturedbythegovernmentisreflectedbytherealinflationtax,theinflationratetimestherealmoneysupplyTheLogicofHyperinflationToavoidpayingtheinflationtax,peoplereducetheirrealmoneyholdingsandforcethegovernmenttoincreaseinflationtocapturethesameamountofrealinflationtaxInsomecases,thisleadstoaviciouscircleofashrinkingrealmoneysupplyandarisingrateofinflation,leadingtohyperinflationandafiscalcrisisIn1923,Germany’smoneywasworthsolittlethatchildrenusedstacksofbanknotesasbuildingblocksMoneyandPricesinBrazil,1985-1995EffectsofInflationWinnersandLosersfromUnexpectedInflationThenominalinterestrateisequaltotherealinterestrateplustheinflationrateTheexpectedinflationrateisaccountedforinthenominalinterestrateonaloanInflationthatishigherthanexpectedbenefitsborrowersandhurtslendersInflationthatislowerthanexpectedbenefitslendersandhurtsborrowersEffectsofInflationExpectedInflationandInterestRatesAccordingtotheFishereffect,expectedinflationraisesthenominalinterestrateone-for-one,sotherealinterestrateremainsunchangedTheFisherEffectTheCostsofInflationShoe-leathercostsaretheincreasedcostsoftransactionsthatarisefromthepublic’seffortstoavoidtheinflationtaxMenucostsarethecostsofchangingpricesUnit-of-accountcostsarecoststhatarisebecausemoneyceasestobeareliablemeasureofvalueAlthoughthereareargumentsforanegativerateofinflation(deflation),inpracticepolicy-makerstendtoaimforlowbutpositiveratesofinflationInflationandNominalInterestRatesinCanadaModerateInflationandDisinflationEvencountriesthatdon’tneedtoprintmoneytocovergovernmentdeficitscanstillexperiencemoderateinflationrates:EitherbecauseofpoliticalopportunismOrbecauseofwishfulthinkingModerateInflationandDisinflationWhenmoderateinflationhappens,gettingitbackdowncanbedifficultbecausedisinflationcanbeverycostly,requiringthesacrificeoflargeamountsofpotentialoutputandimposinghighlevelsofunemploymentThecostsofdisinflationcouldbereducedifpolicy-makersexplicitlystatetheirdeterminationtoreduceinflationSupplyShocksAnotherfactorthatcontributedtotheriseofCanada’sinflationinthe1970sanditsdeclineinthe1980swasaseriesofsupplyshocks,firstnegativeandthenpositiveTheGreatDisinflationofthe1980sEffectsofDeflationUnexpecteddeflation,likeunexpectedinflation,producesbothwinnersandlosers—butintheoppositedirectionLenders,whoareowedmoney,gainbecausetherealvalueofborrowers’paymentsincreasesBorrowerslosebecausetherealburdenoftheirdebtrisesTheoveralleffectofunexpecteddeflationistoreduceaggregatedemand,whichcanintensifyaneconomicdownturnThereductioninaggregatedemandcausedbydeflationiscalleddebtdeflationEffectsofUnexpectedDeflationEffectsofDeflationThereisazeroboundonthenominalinterestrate:ItcannotgobelowzeroAsituationinwhichmonetarypolicycan’tbeusedbecausenominalinterestratescannotfallbelowthezeroboundisknownasaliquiditytrapAliquiditytrapcanoccurwheneverthereisasharpreductionindemandforloanablefundsEffectsofExpectedDeflationJapan’sTrap