1ChapterObjective•ThischapterdealswiththeinternationalcapitalstructureandthecostofcapitalofaMNC.2•CostofCapital•CostofCapitalinSegmentedvs.IntegratedMarkets•DoestheCostofCapitalDifferAmongCountries?•Cross-BorderListingsofStocks•TheEffectofForeignEquityOwnershipRestrictions•TheFinancialStructureofSubsidiaries.ChapterOutline17-23Maincontents:–CostofCapitalinSegmentedvs.IntegratedMarkets–Cross-BorderListingsofStocks–TheFinancialStructureofSubsidiaries.4Keywords•Capitalassetpricingmodel•Capitalstructure•Costofcapital•Integratedworldcapitalmarkets资本资产定价模型资本结构资本成本一体化世界资本市场5Keywords•Worldsystematicrisk•Worldmarketportfolio世界系统风险世界市场投资组合6Introduction•Recently,manymajorfirmsthroughouttheworldhavebeguntointernationalizetheircapitalstructurebyraisingfundsfromforeignaswellasdomesticsources.•Asaresult,thesecorporationsarebecomingmultinationalnotonlyinthescopeoftheirbusinessactivitiesbutalsointheircapitalstructure.7IntroductionIfinternationalfinancialmarketswerecompletelyintegrated,itwouldnotmatterwhetherfirmsraisedcapitalfromdomesticorforeignsourcesbecausethecostofcapitalwouldbeequalizedacrosscountries.If,ontheotherhand,thesemarketsarelessthanfullyintegrated,firmsmaybeabletocreatevaluefortheirshareholdersbyissuingsecuritiesinforeignaswellasdomesticmarkets.81.CostofCapital•Thecostofcapitalistheminimumrateofreturnaninvestmentprojectmustgenerateinordertopayitsfinancingcosts.•Foraleveredfirm,thefinancingcostscanberepresentedbytheweightedaveragecostofcapital.91.1WeightedAverageCostofCapitalWhereK=weightedaveragecostofcapitalKl=costofequitycapitalforaleveredfirmi=pretaxcostofdebtcapitalt=marginalcorporateincometaxrate=debt-to-total-market-valueratioitλKλKl)1()1(101.2TheFirm’sInvestmentDecisionandtheCostofCapitalInvestment($)IRRKglobalKlocalIlocalIglobalAfirmthatcanreduceitscostofcapitalwillincreasetheprofitablecapitalexpendituresthatthefirmcantakeonandincreasethewealthoftheshareholders.112.CostofCapitalinSegmentedvs.IntegratedMarkets•Thecostofequitycapital(Ke)ofafirmistheexpectedreturnonthefirm’sstockthatinvestorsrequire.•ThisreturnisfrequentlyestimatedusingtheCAPM:)(fMifiRRβRR)Var(),Cov(MMiiRRRβwhere122.CostofCapitalinSegmentedvs.IntegratedMarketsClearlyintegrationorsegmentationofinternationalfinancialmarketshasmajorimplicationsfordeterminingthecostofcapital.(example17.1))(fUSUSifiRRβRR)(fWWifiRRβRR133.DoestheCostofCapitalDifferamongCountries?•Theredoappeartobedifferencesinthecostofcapitalindifferentcountries.(Exhibit17.5)•Whenmarketsareimperfect,internationalfinancingcanlowerthefirm’scostofcapital.(Caseonpp423)•Onewaytoachievethisistointernationalizethefirm’sownershipstructure.144.Cross-BorderListingsofStocks•Cross-borderlistingsofstockshavebecomequitepopularamongmajorcorporations.•ThelargestcontingentofforeignstocksarelistedonU.S.exchanges.•TheLondonStockExchangeattractedthenextlargestcontingentofforeignstocks.154.1BenefitofCross-Border4.1.1Thecompanycanexpanditspotentialinvestorbase,whichwillleadtoahigherstockpriceandlowercostofcapital.4.1.2Cross-listingcreatesasecondarymarketforthecompany’sshares,whichfacilitatesraisingnewcapitalinforeignmarkets.164.1BenefitofCross-Border4.1.3Cross-listingcanenhancetheliquidityofthecompany’sstock.4.1.4Cross-listingenhancesthevisibilityofthecompany’snameanditsproductsinforeignmarketplaces.174.1BenefitofCross-Border4.1.5Cross-listingsharesmaybeusedasthe“acquisitioncurrency”fortakingoverforeigncompanies.4.1.6Cross-listingmayimprovethecompany’scorporategovernanceandtransparency.184.2CostofCross-Border4.2.1Itcanbecostlytomeetthedisclosureandlistingrequirementsimposedbytheforeignexchangeandregulatoryauthorities.4.2.2Onceacompany’sstockistradedinoverseasmarkets,therecanbevolatilityspilloverfromthesemarkets.194.2CostofCross-Border4.2.3Onceacompany’sstockismakeavailabletoforeigners,theymightacquireacontrollinginterestandchallengethedomesticcontrolofthecompany.Onaverage,cross-borderlistingsofstocksappearstobeaprofitabledecision.So,Thebenefitsoutweighthecosts.205.TheEffectofForeignEquityOwnershipRestrictions•Whilecompanieshaveincentivestointernationalizetheirownershipstructuretolowerthecostofcapitalandincreasemarketshare,theymaybeconcernedwiththepossiblelossofcorporatecontroltoforeigners.•Insomecountries,therearelegalrestrictionsonthepercentageofafirmthatforeignerscanown.•Theserestrictionsareimposedasameansofensuringdomesticcontroloflocalfirms.215.1Pricing-to-MarketPhenomenon•Supposeforeigners,ifallowed,wouldliketobuy30percentofaKoreanfirm.•Buttheyareconstrainedbyownershipconstraintsimposedonforeignerstopurchaseatmost20percent.•Becausethisconstraintiseffectiveinlimitingdesiredforeignownership,foreignanddomesticinvestorsmayfacedifferentmarketshareprices.•Thisdualpricingisthepricing-to-marketphenomenon.Copyright©2007byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.17-22Nestlé’sForeignOwnershipRestrictions12,00010,0008,0006,0004,0002,000011203191824Source:FinancialTimes,November26,1988p.1.Adaptedwithpermission.SFBearershareRegisteredshareCopyright©2007byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrig