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、*200234。。。F830．6A1005－130920114－0063－0082011－02－20*“”。。。。。。。、“”。、2003。—36—20114··。。relationshipbanking。、。Boot2000。。①。Sharpe1990。。。。。、2001。2002、。。。。。Freixas2005。BootThakor1994。PetersenRajan1995。。vonThadden2001hold－upproblem。Rajan1992。—46—··20114①relationshiplending。。。Sharpe1990。。、。。、“”。ex。ex。sy。s。①。u0u0e1tx1t。e1tmtx1t。s2t+1。u0e2t+1x2t+1mt+1。mex。Um1te1tx1t+δUm2t+1e2t+1x2t+10≤δ≤1。Umex=um－ve－cxum=mvecxex。HLeieHeLxixHxLveH=vcxH=cveL=cxL=0。xHxLsHsL。s1t=sL。。Nn1n2—56—20114··①。take－it－or－leave－itoffer。。Yt=n1*ye1ts1t+n2*ye2ts2tπt=Yt－n1m1t－n2m2t。max∑∞t=1ρt－1jπtρj01f。。、、。。。e1t=eHmH1e2t+1s2t+1=eHsHmH2e2t+1s2t+1=eHsLmL2。Kanemoto＆MacLeod1989。SCE。x1t=x2t+1=xLeHw0eL。πS=NyeHsL－w0。。ICE。x1t=xHx2t+1=xLmH1=w0mL2=w0mH2umH2=uw0+cxH/δ。w0。w0bb⑴uw0+b=uw0+cxH/δ1。bcxHδ。。πS=2nyL－w0πI=nyL+yH－2w0－b。πI≥πSΔy≥b。、。。—66—··20114。Moriguchi2003^n“”。。nb≤ρ1－ρ^nΔy－bΔy≥1－ρn+ρ^nρ^nb。Δy=yH－yL=yeHsH－yeHsL。1－ρn+ρ^nρ^n＞1Δy。ρ≥nbnb+^nΔy－bICE。ρ*=nbnb+^nΔy－b2ρj＞ρ*ICEρj＜ρ*SCE。1、ρ*⑵1ρ*、、。^n=0。^n=nρ*^n/nρ*。。0。ρ*^n=nρ*=b/Δy。ρ*。ρ*。b1ρ*ρ*/b＞0。cxHb。bρ*。Δyb—76—20114··ρ*。b。ρ*。。ρ*。、。ρ*ρ*。ρ*。ff'2。ρ*ρ*。ρ*ρ*L。。。δ。。。。。23ff″3ρ*f″ρ*fρ*Hf″。—86—··20114ρ*Hf″ρ*fρ*ρ*H。。。3。ρ*Lρ*H。。。。。、。。。20083．37%20091、2。。①。。“”“”、、。。。。—96—20114··①《2008～2009》2009。＇。□1．BerlinMitchell．ForBetterorForworseThreeLendingRelationshipJ．BusinessReviewFederalReserveBankofPhiladelphia1996December3－12．2．BootArnoud．RelationshipBankingWhatDoWeKnowJ．JournalofFinancialIntermediation200097－25．3．FreixasXavier．DeconstructingRelationshipBankingJ．InvestigacionesEconómicas2005XXIX3－31．4．KanemotoY．andMacLeodB．．Optimallaborcontractwithnon－contractiblehumancapitalJ．JournaloftheJapaneseandInternationalEconomies19893385－402．5．MoriguchChiaki．ImplicitcontractsthegreatdepressionandinstitutionalchangeacomparativeanalysisofU．S．andJapaneseemploymentrelations1920－1940OL．2003WorkingPaper9559http//．nber．org．6．RajanRaghuram．InsidersandOutsidersTheChoicebetweenRelationshipLendingandArmsLengthDebtJ．JournalofFinance471367－1400．7．SharpeSteven．AsymmetricInformationBankLendingandImplicitContractAStylizedModelofConsumerRe-lationshipJ．TheJournalofFinance1990451069－1087．8．vonThaddenErnst－Ludwig．AsymmetricInformationBankLendingandImplicitContractsTheWinner＇sCurseJ．FinanceResearchLetters2004111－23．9．．J．2001110－18．10．．－－J．2003768－75．11．．J．2002632－37．LendingTechniquesEconomicFluctuationandSME＇sFinancingWangXiangFinanceCollegeShanghaiNormalUniversityAbstractBasedonimplicitcontractandrelationshipbankingtheorythispapermodelsthemecha-nismofbuildingstablelendingrelationshipbetweenbankandSME．Firstbankchooseoptimallong－to－shortcontractrationunderreputationmechanism．ThestablelendingrelationshipwillencourageSME＇sinnovations．Secondeconomicfluctuationwillaffectthebank＇sexpectationontheoptimaldiscountrateofloans．WeconcludethatnotonlytheSMEsneedfinancialsupportwhentheeconomyisindepressionbutalsowhentheeconomyisinboom．KeywordsSME＇sFinancingRelationshipBankingImplicitContractLendingTechniquesEco-nomicFluctuation—07—··20114