移动应用安全保障公共安全MobileApplicationSecurity

MobileApplicationSecurityforPublicSafetyMichaelOgataComputerScientist,[e-mail]roductsmaybementionedduringthispresentation.InnocasedoessuchidentificationimplyrecommendationorendorsementbytheNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,nordoesitimplythattheproductsarenecessarilythebestavailablefortheirstatedpurpose.Disclaimer/Disclosure•Whatarewegoingtodiscuss?NIST’seffortsindefiningandunderstandingmobileapplicationsecurityasitrelatestopublicsafety•Whoisinvolved?PublicSafetyCommunicationsResearch(PSCR)•NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology(NIST)•TheNationalTelecommunicationsandInformationAdministration(NTIA)FirstResponderNetworkAuthority(FirstNet)Federal,state,andlocalpublicsafetyorganizationsIntroduction•MiddleClassTaxReliefandJobCreationActof2012Nation’sfirstinteroperablePublicSafetyBroadBandNetwork(PSBN)LongTermEvolutionLTEnetwork•Manypublicsafetyorganizationalreadyuseappsoncommercialnetworks•PublicsafetyhasspecificdomainneedsandrequirementsIntroduction–WhyMobileAppSecurity?TheChangingLandscapeLMRPSBN•EngagingpublicsafetyprofessionalsWorkshopI:PublicSafetyMobileApplicationSecurityRequirementsWorkshopWorkshopII:IdentifyingandCategorizingDataTypesforPublicSafetyMobileApplications•MobileApplicationVettingServices•FutureWorkDiscussionTopics•Allocationoffiniteresources•Localcontrolandfinegrainconfiguration•Definingrolebasedneeds/profilesCommonThemesIdentifyingPublicSafety’sSecurityRequirementsforMobileAppsWorkshopI•HeldFebruary2014•NISTIR8018publishedJanuary2015•Identifysecurityconcernsspecifictopublicsafety•50publicsafetycommunitymembersLawenforcementEmergencyResponseApplicationDevelopersPublicSafetyMobileAppSecurityRequirements•PSBNwillempowerfirstresponders•PSBNcanbenefitfrommobileapplicationecosystem•PSBNwillhavedomainspecificsecurityrequirements•DevelopersmustbeempoweredbytheseImpetus•Identifymobileapplicationsecurityrequirementsforpublicsafety•IdentifyareasofrequiredfurtherresearchWorkshopGoalsAPCOKeyAttributesforPublicSafetyandEmergencyResponse•Operability•UserSupport•Security•Privacy/Confidentiality•Content•LocationInformation•UserExperience•Communicatingwith9-1-1•SendingDatatoPSAPS•InterfacingwithPSAPShttp://appcomm.org/wp-content/themes/directorypress/thumbs/AppComm_Key_Attributes.pdf•InscopeMobileapplicationdevelopmentpracticesMobileapplicationfunctionalrequirements•OutofscopeDevicemanagementApplicationwhitelistingDevicelevelanti-malware/anti-virustechniquesNetworksecurityrequirementsWorkshopScope•BatteryLife•UnintentionalDenialofService•DataProtection•LocationInformation•IdentityManagement•MobileApplicationVettingWorkshopDiscussionTopicsBatteryLifeBatteryLife•Impaired/varyingnetworkavailability•Requirementsforlocationservices•Highbandwidthmediastreams•Extensivefieldtime•ExtremetemperaturesDomainSpecificConsiderationsBatteryLife•DifferentRoleshavedifferentneeds•DifferentSituationshavedifferentneedsDomainSpecificConsiderations•Maximizingbatterylifeisessentialforpublicsafety•Improvingbatterytechnologywillhelp•Measuringapplicationbatteryimpactisnon-trivialApplication’sconstructionResidenthardwareHostoperatingsystemBatteryLifeBatteryLife•Applicationsshouldreportusageusingbatterymetrics•Batteryintensiveapplicationsshouldbeconfigurable•Powermanagementprofiles•Remotely•OndemandbyuserRecommendationsBatteryLife–NextSteps•Evaluateexistingbatteryusagemetrics•Evaluateeffectivenessofpowermanagementprofiles•EvaluatefeasibilityofremotepowermanagementNextStepsUnintentionalDenialofService•Asituationwhereaccesstoawebsite,server,orserviceisdenied,notduetoadeliberateattack,butasaresultofasuddenorsustainedspikeinusertrafficUnintentionalDenialofService(DoS)VoiceVideoLocationUnintentionalDoS•LocalcontrolRemotemonitoringandmanagementThrottleindividualapplicationsStratifyusersbycurrentneed•LTEQualityofServicefeaturesUnintentionalDoSUnintentionalDoS•PSCRPSBNresearchwork:identifyingthelimitationsofthenetwork•Modelingandmeasuringthroughput•ExtendingtherangeofLTEdeployments•Researchingmodelsfornetworkcongest•EvaluatingQoSfeaturesforondemandnetworkcontrolNextStepshttp://www.pscr.gov/projects/broadband/700mhz_demo_net/meetings/stakeholder_mtg_062015/index.htmUnintentionalDoS•Applicationsmustprovetheyusethenetworkinanefficientandresponsiblemanner.•Actionablemetricwhenselectingapps•Targetforappdevelopers•AidesprofilebasedmanagementstrategiesRecommendationsDataProtection•DividedintothreecategoriesConfidentialityIntegrityAvailability•RequirementsmotivatedbylawandpolicyHealthInsurancePortabilityandAccountabilityAct(HIPAA),CriminalJusticeInformationServices(CJIS)SecurityPolicyEvidenceProvenanceDataProtectionDataProtection-BaselineDatatypesFunctionsRolesDataProtection–TieredApproachDataProtection•Dataprotectionspecification•Pros:•EvaluateSDKsforcompliance•Evaluateappsforcompliance•Cons:•AppsmustbetestedImplementationStrategyDataProtection•Developadatadictionary•Applicationsshoulddeclare•Dataconsumed•Datastored•DatatransmittedRecommendationsLocationInformation•Anydatacol