搜索
3012Vol130No112200412JournalofFinanceandEconomicsDec12004,(,200052):,,,,:;;;:F832148:A:100129952(2004)1220028206,,,,,,,,KaplanStromberg(2001),,Chan(1990)Hellmann(1998),CEO,Kirilenko(2000),,,AghionBolton(1992)Tirole(2001),,,:2004209201:(1973-),,,;(1961-),,,,82K,AK,K-A,,12H0,0,Pr(H|1)=q,Pr(H|2)=0,0q1,,1,1ph,p1,b0a1a2,a1,a21q+,2,0q,q+1,c1c212a1=a3(1)a2=a3(2),(q+)H-c1qH,0H-c2c2Hc1,,,,:11,w(,0wH),01,wc1,a1;2,a2,wc2,[phq+(1-ph)]w[plq+(1-pl)]w+bwb(q-)p^w=Max{b(q-)p,c2},^wwH,a2,(pledgeableincome)92:Re=[phq+(1-ph)](H-^w)-M(1)M,ReK-A,,,,,,0,K-A,A=0,[phq+(1-ph)]H-MK[phq+(1-ph)](H-^w)-M,21,,a2,[ph(q+)+(1-ph)]w[p1(q+)+(1-p1)]w+bwbqp,Rv=ph+qqH-bp-M(2)RvK-A,(1),ReRv,,,,2a2,^w,,K-A,,31(contingentcontrol),1,,a1;2,,a2,[phq+(1-ph)]w[p1q+(1-p1)]w+bRc=ph+q-(q-)H-bp-M(3)RcK-A,,,,ReRcRv,03200412,,,,,,,1,2;a1,CEO,,a2,CEO,,,;,,CEO,,,,,CEO,,,,;,CEO,,,,,,,,,,,,,(),,,,KaplanStromberg(2001),,,,,,,,9Rc/9ph0,9Rc/9H0,(ph)(H),13:,,,,,,(),,()KaplanStromberg(2001),6,25%,,14%,61%KaplanStromberg(2001),,53%,41%,CEO,,(2002)35,,:,;3521,133,,3528,138,3,,,,23200412,:[1],.[A].:(GFC2002)[C].:,2002.[2]AghionP,PBolton.Anincompletecontractsapproachtofinancialcontracting[J].ReviewofEco2nomicStudies,1992,v59n3:473494.[3]ChanYS,DSiegelA,Thakor.Learning,corporatecontrolandperformancerequirementsinven2turecapitalcontracts[J].InternationalEconomicReview,1990,v31n2:365381.[4]HartO.FinancialContracting[J].JournalofEconomicLiterature,2001,v39n4:10791100.[5]HellmannT.Theallocationofcontrolrightsinventurecapitalcontracts[J].RANDJournalofE2conomics,1998,v29n1:5776.[6]KaplanSP,Stromberg.Financialcontractingtheorymeetstherealworld:Anempiricalanalysisofventurecapitalcontracts[J].ReviewofEconomicStudies,2003,v70n2:281315.[7]KirilenkoA.Valuationandcontrolinventurefinance[J].JournalofFinance,2001,v56n2:565587.[8]TiroleJ.Corporategovernance[J].Econometrica,2001,v69n1:135.TheContingentAllocationofControlRightsandFinancingofEntrepreneurialFirmsLAOJian2dong,LIZhan(SchoolofManagement,ShanghaiJiaotongUniversity,Shanghai,200052,China)Abstract:Theallocationofcontrolrightsisthekeyofentrepreneurialgover2nance.Thepaperestablishesanallocationmodelcontainingmoralhazardproblem,andanalyzesthreeallocationstructure.Itpointsoutthatinentrepreneurialfirms,own2ershipandcontrolrightsareallocatedindependently,whileallocationofcontrolisre2liedonventurecapitalistsinvestmentconstraints.Thecontingentallocationofcontrolrightsishelpfultoentrepreneurialfirms.Keywords:venturecapital;asymmetricinformation;allocationofcontrolrights;contingentcontrol33: