企业所得税纳税筹划

AswathDamodaran1ValueInvestingAswathDamodaranAswathDamodaran2Whoisavalueinvestor?QTheConventionalDefinition:Avalueinvestorisonewhoinvestsinlowprice-bookvalueorlowprice-earningsratiosstocks.QTheGenericDefinition:Avalueinvestorisonewhopaysapricewhichislessthanthevalueoftheassetsinplaceofafirm.AswathDamodaran3TheDifferentFacesofValueInvestingTodayQPassiveScreeners:FollowingintheBenGrahamtradition,youscreenforstocksthathavecharacteristicsthatyoubelieveidentifyundervaluedstocks.ExampleswouldincludelowPEratiosandlowpricetobookratios.QContrarianInvestors:Theseareinvestorswhoinvestincompaniesthatothershavegivenupon,eitherbecausetheyhavedonebadlyinthepastorbecausetheirfutureprospectslookbleak.QActivistValueInvestors:Theseareinvestorswhoinvestinpoorlymanagedandpoorlyrunfirmsbutthentrytochangethewaythecompaniesarerun.AswathDamodaran4I.ThePassiveScreenerQThisapproachtovalueinvestingcanbetracedbacktoBenGrahamandhisscreenstofindundervaluedstocks.QInrecentyears,thesescreenshavebeenrefinedandextended.Thefollowingsectionsummarizestheempiricalevidencethatbacksupeachofthesescreens.AswathDamodaran5A.BenGraham’Screens1.PEofthestockhastobelessthantheinverseoftheyieldonAAACorporateBonds:2.PEofthestockhastolessthan40%oftheaveragePEoverthelast5years.3.DividendYieldTwo-thirdsoftheAAACorporateBondYield4.PriceTwo-thirdsofBookValue5.PriceTwo-thirdsofNetCurrentAssets6.Debt-EquityRatio(BookValue)hastobelessthanone.7.CurrentAssetsTwiceCurrentLiabilities8.DebtTwiceNetCurrentAssets9.HistoricalGrowthinEPS(overlast10years)7%10.Nomorethantwoyearsofnegativeearningsovertheprevioustenyears.AswathDamodaran6HowwelldoGraham’sscreen’sperform?QAstudybyOppenheimerconcludedthatstocksthatpassedtheGrahamscreenswouldhaveearnedareturnwellinexcessofthemarket.QMarkHulbertwhoevaluatesinvestmentnewslettersconcludedthatnewslettersthatusedscreenssimilartoGraham’sdidmuchbetterthanothernewsletters.QHowever,anattemptbyJamesReatorunanactualmutualfundusingtheGrahamscreensfailedtodeliverthepromisedreturns.QGraham’sbestclaimtofamecomesfromthesuccessofthestudentswhotookhisclassesatColumbiaUniversity.AmongthemwereCharlieMungerandWarrenBuffett.AswathDamodaran7TheBuffettMystiqueFigure8.1:BerkshireHathaway$0.00$200.00$400.00$600.00$800.00$1,000.00$1,200.00$1,400.00$1,600.00$1,800.0019881989199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001YearValueof$100invested12/88BerkshireHathawayS&P500AswathDamodaran8Buffett’sTenetsQBusinessTenets:•Thebusinessthecompanyisinshouldbesimpleandunderstandable.•Thefirmshouldhaveaconsistentoperatinghistory,manifestedinoperatingearningsthatarestableandpredictable.•Thefirmshouldbeinabusinesswithfavorablelongtermprospects.QManagementTenets:•Themanagersofthecompanyshouldbecandid.Asevidencedbythewayhetreatedhisownstockholders,Buffettputapremiumonmanagershetrusted.•Themanagersofthecompanyshouldbeleadersandnotfollowers.QFinancialTenets:•Thecompanyshouldhaveahighreturnonequity.BuffettusedamodifiedversionofwhathecalledownerearningsOwnerEarnings=Netincome+Depreciation&Amortization–CapitalExpenditures•Thecompanyshouldhavehighandstableprofitmargins.QMarketTenets:•Useconservativeestimatesofearningsandtherisklessrateasthediscountrate.•InkeepingwithhisviewofMr.Marketascapriciousandmoody,evenvaluablecompaniescanbeboughtatattractivepriceswheninvestorsturnawayfromthem.AswathDamodaran9BelikeBuffett?•MarketshavechangedsinceBuffettstartedhisfirstpartnership.EvenWarrenBuffettwouldhavedifficultyreplicatinghissuccessintoday’smarket,whereinformationoncompaniesiswidelyavailableanddozensofmoneymanagersclaimtobelookingforbargainsinvaluestocks.•Inrecentyears,Buffetthasadoptedamoreactivistinvestmentstyleandhassucceededwithit.Tosucceedwiththisstyleasaninvestor,though,youwouldneedsubstantialresourcesandhavethecredibilitythatcomeswithinvestmentsuccess.Therearefewinvestors,evenamongsuccessfulmoneymanagers,whocanclaimthiscombination.•ThethirdingredientofBuffett’ssuccesshasbeenpatience.Ashehaspointedout,hedoesnotbuystocksfortheshorttermbutbusinessesforthelongterm.Hehasoftenbeenwillingtoholdstocksthathebelievestobeundervaluedthroughdisappointingyears.Inthosesameyears,hehasfacednopressurefromimpatientinvestors,sincestockholdersinBerkshireHathawayhavesuchhighregardforhim.AswathDamodaran10ValueScreensQPricetoBookratios:Buystockswhereequitytradesatlessthanoratleastalowmultipleofthebookvalueofequity.QPriceearningsratios:Buystockswhereequitytradesatalowmultipleofequityearnings.QPricetosalesratio:Buystockswhereequitytradesatalowmultipleofrevenues.QDividendYields:Buystockswithhighdividendyields.AswathDamodaran111.Price/BookValueScreensQAlowpricebookvalueratiohasbeenconsideredareliableindicatorofundervaluationinfirms.QTheempiricalevidencesuggeststhatoverlongtimeperiods,lowprice-bookvaluesstockshaveoutperformedhighprice-bookvaluestocksandtheoverallmarket.AswathDamodaran12LowPrice/BVRatiosandExcessReturnsLowest23456789Highest1927-19601961-19901991-20010.00%5.00%10.00%15.00%20.00%25.00%PBVClassFigure8.2:PBVClassesandReturns-1927-20011927-19601961-19901991-2001AswathDamodaran13Evidencefrom