税收、交易权和交易成本[文献翻译]

原文：Taxes,TradableRightsandTransactionCostsWithrespecttomarket-basedpolicyapproaches,itisawidelyheldviewthatcorrectivetaxationentailssubstantial.Thisconclusiononlyholdsifset-upcostsaresingledout.Itisarguedthattheprevalenceoftransactioncostsislargelydependentonthedesignofthepolicyinstrument,respectivelythetaxbaseorthetradingregimechosen.Comparativeanalysisfurthershowsthatacap-and-tradeprogramofemissionpermitsdistributedforfree,tradedonabrokeredmarketandmonitoredupstreamisnotonlymoreeffective,butalsolikelytoentailfewertransactioncoststhanenvironmentaltaxes.Anyattempt,inturn,tosavethehugeinformation,enforcementandcompliancecostsincurredbycorrectivetaxationimpairsitsefficacybyseveringthelinkbetweentheenvironmentalexternalityandthetaxbase.Basically,thereexistfourpolicyinstrumentstocurbpollution:directregulation,environmentalliability,ecologicaltaxesandtradableemissionrights.Thelattertwoaresimilarinthesensethattheyaremarket-basedinstrumentsthatusethepricesystemtointernalizeenvironmentaldamages.Theycomparefavorablytothetwoformerapproachesbecausetheyareflexibleandcost-effectiveasformallydemonstrated.Despitetheirsimilarity,mostcountriesrelyontaxesinsteadoftradablepermits.SincetheKyotoProtocol,however,thereisarenewedpoliticalandscientificinterestintradableemissionrights.Withthisriseinpublicinterest,theallegedcomplexityofthesystemandsubsequenttransactioncostsareunremittinglycriticized.Inthisarticle,wewillassessthemeritsofthiscriticism.Taxestypicallycarrybothanincentiveandfinancialeffect.AlthoughthepurposeofPigouviantaxationistobringaboutachangeinactivityandpollutionlevels,environmentaltaxescanbeeasilyconceivedasjustanalternativesourceofrevenueforthegovernment.Assumingalowtreasurypreference,publicsupportmayhavetobewonbyanenvironmentaltaxreformthatbalancesenvironmentaltaxrevenueswithtaxcutselsewhereorprovidestaxincentivesforpollutionreduction.However,thisdoesnotsolvethesystemicinformationproblem.Whenenvironmentaltaxesaresettoolow,suboptimalemissionreductionswillresult.Alternatively,hightaxeswillcauseunwarranteddeadweightlosses.Moreover,ithasbeenrecognizedthatthemereexistenceofanexternalitydoesnotinitselfmeritcorrectivestateaction.Coase(1960)convincinglyarguedthat,undercertaincircumstances,thereductionofspill-overeffectscanbeachievedviaprivatenegotiations.Thisinsighthasledtothedevelopmentofanewpolicyinstrument.Transactioncosts:ThequestfortaxonomyTransactioncostsarenowadaysfrequentlyinvokedtoexplaininstitutional,non-marketphenomena.Manydifferentdefinitionsappearintheliterature,offeringvariousconceptualinsightsthathavenotbeentranslatedyetintostandardcostcategories.Therefore,wefirsttakeanotherlookatthedifferentdefinitionsofferedbyvariousauthorsfromwhichwewillderiveanoperationalandpossiblycompletetaxonomy.TheconceptoftransactioncostswasintroducedbyCoase(1937)toexplainwhyfirmsexistasanalternativefororganizingeconomicactivitybymeansofexchangetransactionsacrossthemarket.Theansweristhatfirmsarisebecausetherearesubstantialcostsinvolvedinusingthemarket.Manydifferentdefinitionsappearintheliterature,offeringvariousconceptualinsightsthathavenotbeentranslatedyetintostandardcostcategories.Coasewasnotveryexplicitaboutwhathemeantbythesetransactioncosts.Sincedifferenttypesofcostsmaybebornebydifferentplayersatdifferentpointsinthepolicyprocess,aproperclassificationoftransactioncostcategoriesisimportanttoassurethatallrelevantcostsareaccountedfor.Whencomplete,transactioncosttaxonomymayalsobehelpfulinimprovingpolicydesignandmanagement.AccordingtoDahlman(1979),transactioncostsinclude:–searchandinformationcosts,–bargaininganddecision-makingcosts,–monitoringandenforcementcosts.Theeconomicrationaleofinstitutionsliesinthereductionofthosecosts.Thismustbeinterpretedcarefully.However,althoughinstitutionsare,inprinciple,designedtoreducetransactioncostsbydiminishinguncertainty,theymaynotsucceedso.Neworchanginginstitutionsmaygenerate,atanypointintime,inconsistenciesbetweencompetinginstitutionsaswellasuncertaintyoverfutureinstitutionalchangeswhich,inturn,arelikelytoleadtoincreasingtransactioncosts(Meyer,2001).MilgromandRoberts(1992)distinguishbetweentwocategoriesoftransactioncosts.Thefirsttypearisesfrominformationasymmetriesandincompletenessofcontractsamongparties.Thesecondtypestemsfromimperfectcommitmentsoropportunisticbehaviorofparties.TheOECDhasclassifiedtransactioncostsintotwocategories:–non-policyrelatedtransactioncosts,whichareincurredbypartiestovoluntary(market)transactions,–policyrelatedtransactioncosts,whichareassociatedwiththeimplementationofpolicies.Theformerincludethecostsassociatedwithgatheringinformation,negotiatingprices,ascertainingqualities,establishingexclusionmechanisms,organizingcollectiveactionsandsoon.Thelattercoverthecostsincurredbygovernmentingatheringinformation,planninganddesigningpolicies,collectingrevenues,distributingpayments,andmonitoringtheoutcomeofpolicies.AccordingtoFurubotnandRichter(1997),transactioncostsinvolvetheuseofrealresourcesthatcouldbedeployedalternativelyelsewhereintheeconomyorthesocioeconomicsystem.Transactionco