可信平台模块实用指南practicalguidetoTPM20(trus

WhyTPM2.0?ReasonsforUpgrade;UseCasesfortheLatestReleaseoftheTPMSpecification06/17/15DaveChallenerLevelSetting:WhatisaTPM?ASecurityCo-ProcessorPublicPrivateKeyOperations–KeyCreation–Keysigning–KeyexchangeNon-VolatileStorage–AccessprotectedSymmetricencryption–HMACoperations–LimitedsymmetricencryptionPurelyPassiveItdoesNOTmonitoryoursystemLevelSetting:WhatisaTPM?1999200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132014todayBeginworkingonEmbeddedSecurityChipforPCFirstSpecRelease,FirstMachineswithTPMsshippedReleaseofTSS1.10ReleaseofTSS1.20ReleaseofTPM1.20SpecificationReleaseofTSSFAPIfor2.0forPublicreviewReleaseofTSSSAPIfor2.0withCodeReleaseofTPM2.0Specification;FirstdeviceswithinternalTPM2.0ReleaseofTPM1.20asISOSpecificationTwoQuestionsWhywastheSpecificationupgradedfrom1.2?Over1BillionservedWhydoIcare?HowcanImakeuseofTPMstosolvemycurrentproblems?WhytheChangefrom1.2?SecurityTPM1.2wasbuiltaroundSHA-1–Thealgorithmwasembeddedinallstructures–Therewasn’troomenoughtosimplychangetoSHA256ComplexityTPM1.2hadgrown“organically”after1.1bItwasunnecessarilycomplicatedEaseofuseTPM1.2washardtouseComplexityofauthorizationNewFunctionalityAlgorithmflexibilityUnifiedAuthorizationFastKeyloadingFredBrooks:“Themanagementquestion,therefore,isnotwhethertobuildapilotsystemandthrowitaway.Youwilldothat.[…]Henceplantothrowoneaway;youwill,anyhow.”WhyUseaTPM2.0?Problemsthatcanbesolved/amelioratedwithTPMsPoorentropyleadingtoweakkeysSupplychainrisks/CounterfeithardwareKeepingbadguysoffofyourinternalnetworkKeepingmalwareinfectedhardwareoffofyourinternalnetworkMassivepassworddatabasereleasesMulti-factorauthenticationEmailSecurityFIPScertified/CommoncriteriacertifiedencryptionenginesSecuringyourrootcertificatesMergingphysicalandlogicalcontrolsWhyUseaTPM2.0?Problemsthatcanbesolved/amelioratedwithTPMsPoorentropyleadingtoweakkeysSupplychainrisks/CounterfeithardwareKeepingbadguysoffofyourinternalnetworkKeepingmalwareinfectedhardwareoffofyourinternalnetworkMassivepassworddatabasereleasesMulti-factorauthenticationFIPScertified/CommoncriteriacertifiedencryptionenginesSecuringyourrootcertificatesMergingphysicalandlogicalcontrolsPoorEntropySourcesLeadtoWeakKeysFrom“HowNottoGenerateRandomNumbers”VastmajorityofweakkeysgeneratedbynetworkdevicesNetworksecuritydevices/RoutersServermanagementcardsIndustrial-gradefirewalls50manufacturersTaiwanesesmartcardsproduceweakkeysMostcommonfactorappears46times!DebianweakkeysHardwareRandomNumberGeneratorBetterseedingfortheOSRNGAlsoavailablein1.2GoodforserverswhenfirstbootedGoodforembeddeddevicesWhyUseaTPM2.0?Problemsthatcanbesolved/amelioratedwithTPMsPoorentropyleadingtoweakkeysSupplychainrisks/CounterfeithardwareKeepingbadguysoffofyourinternalnetworkKeepingmalwareinfectedhardwareoffofyourinternalnetworkMassivepassworddatabasereleasesMulti-factorauthenticationEmailSecurityFIPScertified/CommoncriteriacertifiedencryptionenginesSecuringyourrootcertificatesMergingphysicalandlogicalcontrolsSupplyChainRiskManagementTPM2.0comeswithaCertificate,whichmatchesakeythatcanberegeneratedinsidetheTPM!CertificatesignedbymanufacturerProofitisagenuineTPMIDevIDcanalsobeprovidedbyanequipmentmanufacturerWithOEMcertificateCanprovechipwasonmotherboardwhenitlefttheOEMfacilityCanbeusedforwarranteeCanbeusedforcreationofLDevIDsWhyUseaTPM2.0?Problemsthatcanbesolved/amelioratedwithTPMsPoorentropyleadingtoweakkeysSupplychainrisks/CounterfeithardwareKeepingbadguysoffofyourinternalnetworkKeepingmalwareinfectedhardwareoffofyourinternalnetworkMassivepassworddatabasereleasesMulti-factorauthenticationEmailSecurityFIPScertified/CommoncriteriacertifiedencryptionenginesSecuringyourrootcertificatesMergingphysicalandlogicalcontrolsVPNpasswordcompromiseHackedViaRDP:ReallyDumbPasswordsUsePublic/privatekeyforauthentication!TPMcangeneratekeys,whichdon’tleavethemachineLDevID:IEEE8021-DEVID-MIB-LMSC,LAN/MANStandardsMaketheCompanyOwnedassetthe“Thingyouhave”TwofactorauthenticationWhyUseaTPM2.0?Problemsthatcanbesolved/amelioratedwithTPMsPoorentropyleadingtoweakkeysSupplychainrisks/CounterfeithardwareKeepingbadguysoffofyourinternalnetworkKeepingmalwareinfectedhardwareoffofyourinternalnetworkMassivepassworddatabasereleasesMulti-factorauthenticationFIPScertified/CommoncriteriacertifiedencryptionenginesSecuringyourrootcertificatesMergingphysicalandlogicalcontrolsAdvancedPersistentThreatsMBRbasedmalwareishardtofindItgetsinbeforetheanti-virusandcanhideUEFIfirmwareisevenhardertofindSMMbasedmalwareisevenhardertofindAllhavebeencompromisedTPM1.2&2.0+NewattestationmodelsIntelhardwarebasedmeasurementofbootblockoffirmwareFirmwaremeasuresrestoffirmware(including,SMM,UEFI,MBR)MeasurementsarestoredinTPMPCRsviaonewayfunctionTPMcanuseaninternalprivatekeytoattesttobootsequence1.2:AIK(AttestationIdentityKeys)2.0:Restri