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John7:Conway,ChairmanA.J.Eggenberger,ViceChairmanDEFENSENUCLEARFACILITIESJohnE.MansfieldSAFETYBOARDR.BruceMatthews625IndianaAvenue,NW,Suite700,Washington,D.C.20004-2901(202)694-7000June12,2003TheHonorableSpencerAbrahamSecretaryofEnergy1000IndependenceAvenue,SWWashington,DC20585-1000DearSecretaryAbraham:TheDefenseNuclearFacilitiesSafetyBoard(Board)anditsstaffhavebeenevaluatingtheadequacyofthesafetybasesfortheK-AreaMaterialStorage(KAMS)facility,Building235-F,andFB-LineattheSavannahRiverSite.ThisreviewispartofanoverallsafetyassessmentundertakeninresponsetothePublicLaw107-314,Section3183,StudyofFacilitiesforStorageofPlutoniumandPlutoniumMaterialsatSavannahRiverSite.Intheenclosedreport,theBoard’sstaffhasidentifiedseveralissuesthatrequireclarificationoractionbytheDepartmentofEnergy(DOE)toensurethatthesefacilitieswillbeadequatefortheirstoragemission.TheBoardiscontinuingtopursuetheoverallsafetyassessmentmandatedbyPublicLaw107-314,Section3183,butbelievestheseissuesmeritnear-termDOEattention.Thepresentlydefinedmissionandtheassociatedsafetybasesforsomeofthesefacilitiesdonotappeartobeconsistentwiththelong-termstorageactivitiesplannedbyDOE.Inparticular,Building235-Fwasanticipatedtobeshutdowninthenearfuture,butnowisplannedtobeusedforlong-termstorageandrelatedoperations.Futureactivitieswillrequiresignificantnewanalysisandphysicalmodificationstoensuresafeoperation,asrequiredbyDOEdirectives.Additionally,theenclosedstaffreportnotes:00aPlannednewconditionsinKAMSwillrequiretheventilationsystemtooperateduringcertainfirescenariosinordertoprotectthepublicfromexposuresexceedingtheevaluationguidelineestablishedbyDOE.Thedraftdocumentedsafetyanalysis,however,doesnotidentifytheventilationsystemandassociatedsystemsassafetyclassconsistentwithDOErequirements.Themajorityofthefiredetectionandalarmsystemsinallthreefacilitieshavebeendeactivated,basedinpartontheirexpectedshort-termmission.Firedetectionandalarmsystemswouldnormallybeexpectedfordefense-in-depthpurposesconsistentwithDOEdirectives.Theriskfromseveralhazardshavebeenacceptedratherthaneliminated(e.g.,combustibleinactivecablesinKAMSandplutonium-238contaminationinBuilding235-F).TheHonorableSpencerAbrahamPage2Theenclosedstaffreportdiscussestheseissuesinmoredetail.Pursuantto42U.S.C.Q2286b(d),theBoardrequestsareportwithin60daysofreceiptofthisletterthatinformstheBoardofactionsorfurtherevaluationsthatDOEmayundertakeontheaboveissues.Sincerely,c:TheHonorableJessieHillRobersonMr.MarkB.Whitaker,Jr.EnclosureDEFENSENUCLEARFACILITIESSAFETYBOARDStaffIssueReportMay7,2003MEMORANDUMFOR:J.K.Fortenberry,TechnicalDirectorCOPIES:BoardMembersFROM:R.KasdorfSUBJECT:SafetyBasesReviewofPlutoniumStorageandSupportFacilitiesatSavannahRiverSiteInPublicLaw107-314,Section3183,StudyofFacilitiesforStorageofPlutoniumandPlutoniumMaterialsatSavannahRiverSite,CongresstaskedtheDefenseNuclearFacilitiesSafetyBoard(Board)toconductastudyoftheadequacyoftheK-AreaMaterialStorage(KAMS)facilityandrelatedsupportfacilities,suchasBuilding235-FattheSavannahRiverSite(SRS)forthestorageofdefenseplutoniumanddefenseplutoniummaterialsinconnectionwiththeDepartmentofEnergy(DOE)fissilematerialsdispositionprogram.ThisreportdocumentsaportionoftheongoingreviewbeingconductedbytheBoard’sstafftoevaluatetheadequacyofthesafetybasesforthisplannedplutoniumstoragemissionforKAMS,Building235-F,andFB-Line.TheDOEcontractoratSRSeitherhassubmittedorisintheprocessofsubmittingdocumentedsafetyanalyses(DSAs)totheDOESavannahRiverOperationsOffice(DOE-SR)forthesefacilitiestocomplywithTitle10,Part830oftheCodeofFederalRegulations(10CFRPart830),NuclearSafetyManagement.Thesesafetybasesdonotaccountforsomeofthefutureactivitiesthatwillbeneededtosupporttheplannedlong-termstoragemission.Building235-FisbeingstudiedforincreasedcapacityforstoringplutoniumpackagedinaccordancewithDOE-STD-3013,Stabilization,Packaging,andStorageofPlutonium-BearingMaterials;additionofaplutoniumstabilizationandrepackagingcapability;andlimitedsamplingactivities.NoneoftheseactivitiesareaddressedintheapprovedSafetyAnalysisReportforBuilding235-F.ThesafetybasisforFB-Linedoesnotreflecttheplutoniumoxidestabilizationprocessbeingadded,althoughthestaffexpectsthattheexistingsafetybasiscontrolswillbesufficient.Additionally,thedurationoftheplannedstoragemissionforKAMSsignificantlyexceedsthe10yearsoriginallyexpected.DOE-SRrecognizesthatthesafetybasisforthesefacilitiesmustbechangedtosupporttheplannedlong-termplutoniumstoragemission.K-AreaMaterialStorageFacility.ThedraftDSAforthisfacilityhasbeensubmittedtoDOE-SRforapproval.TheBoard’sstaffreviewedthisdraftdocumentsinceitwaspertinenttothemissionofthefacilityforlong-termstorageofplutoniummaterials.ThefacilityiscurrentlyoperatingusingaBasisforInterimOperation(BIO)asitssafetybasis.TheBIOdoesnotauthorizestorageofthequantityofplutoniumthatwouldberequiredshouldDOEdecidetoconsolidatealltheexcessplutoniumfromtheDOEcomplexatSRS.ThedraftDSAisbasedonapresumptionthatanymaterialreleaseinthefacilityhasunacceptableconsequences.Accordingly,thedraftDSArequiresplutoniumtobestoredinDOE-STD