天津大学PPT模板

目录1.Introduction2.LiteratureReview3.Model3.1RepairProcessandInventoryPolicy3.2CostStructure3.3InformationStructure3.4ContractTypesandPayoffs3.5SignalingGame4.Benchmark:First-BestUnderCompleteInformation5.SignalingwithVerifiableInventory5.1Resource-BasedContract5.2Performance-BasedContract6.SignalingwithUnverifiableInventory6.1Resource-BasedContract6.2Performance-BasedContract7.Extensions:EfficiencyEnhancementStrategies7.1EndogenizingInventoryVerifiability7.2PoolingInventoryAcrossMultipleBuyers8.Conclusions1.Introduction供货商买方产品PBCRBC可靠性私有信息使用备用库存维护背景介绍文献回顾2.LiteratureReviewPBCforoutsourcedservicesasymmetricinformationinoperationsmanagementtheuseofwarrantiesasasignalingmechanism建模3.Model3.1RepairProcessandInventoryPolicyN:identicalcopies;B:inventorybackorder;s:inventory;TheexpectedbackordersinsteadystateisAvailabilityisequalto建模3.2CostStructureEachtimeaproductfailureoccurs,thebuyerincursafixedcostr≥0.Thebuyer’sexpectedcostisequaltoThevendor’sexpectedcostisequalto建模3.3InformationStructureWeassumethattheproductofferedbythevendorisoneoftwopossibletypes,LorH,whereLdenoteslowreliabilityandHdenoteshighreliability.Hazardrateordering（危险率序）:Excesswealthordering（剩余财富序）:建模3.4ContractTypesandPayoffsWecanwritethebuyer’sexpectedpayoffasThevendor’sexpectedpayoffisgivenbyRBC:PBC:建模3.5SignalingGameWeassumethatthevendor,whopossessesprivateinformationaboutthereliabilityofanewlydevelopedproduct,choosescontracttermsandproposesthemtothebuyer.Thebuyerthenacceptsthecontracttermsifhisexpectedpayoffexceedsanoutsideoptionvaluedatθ.WeseekaperfectBayesianequilibrium(PBE)thatisalsorenegotiation-proof.建模4.Benchmark:First-BestUnderCompleteInformationGiventhevendortypeτ,thefirst-bestoutcomeisobtainedbysolvingtheoptimizationproblem.建模5.SignalingwithVerifiableInventoryWenowconsiderthesettinginwhichthevendorpossessesprivateinformationaboutproductreliability.5.1Resource-BasedContractThevalueofαsetbythevendorinhercontractmayrelayinformationaboutwhetherornottheproductisreliable.建模5.1Resource-BasedContractInsummary,successfulsignalingbythereliablevendorispossibleunderRBCwhenherinventorychoiceisverifiable,butitcomesatacostsincethevendorhastoleavepositivesurplustothebuyer.建模5.2Performance-BasedContractTherefore,successfulsignalingbythereliablevendorcanbedoneunderbothRBCandPBCwhentheinventoryisverifiable.However,PBCpresentsanadvantagebecauseitsrisksharingmechanismismoreamenabletosignalingthanthatofRBC.建模6.SignalingwithUnverifiableInventory6.1Resource-BasedContractWithinventorynolongerverifiable,thepayofffunctionsforthevendorandthebuyerunderRBCremainthesameasthoseoftheverifiableinventorycase.Anunderinvestmentininventorycauseseconomicinefficiency.建模6.2Performance-BasedContractThereliablevendoroverinvestsininventoryinequilibrium.Overall,wefindthattheinteractionbetweenthevendor’sdiscretionaryinventorychoiceandhersignalingincentivecreatessubtledynamicsthatimpacttherelativeefficiencyofafter-salesservicecontractsinnontrivialways.建模Whichcontracttypewillthereliablevendorprefer?Thus,thereliablevendorfindsthattheabilitytosignalhertypewithPBCmorethancompensatesforthecostassociatedwithoverinvestmentininventoryandanybenefitpresentedbyRBC,whichdoesnotimproveuponapoolingoutcome.扩展7.Extensions:EfficiencyEnhancementStrategiesEndogenizingInventoryVerifiabilityPoolingInventoryAcrossMultipleBuyers结论8.ConclusionsSuggestions:Thekeytobringefficiencytothesupplychainisinventorytransparency.Analternativewaytobringefficiencyistoutilizeinventorypooling,incasethevendormanagesinventoriesacrossmultiplebuyers.谢谢！