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:1001-4098(2010)03-0040-06纪汉霖(,200000):在空间hotelling模型框架下考虑了双边市场平台的定价策略和选址问题,首先梳理了用户部分多归属的数种典型结构,随后在三种用户归属结构之下考虑了平台的定价策略,研究表明平台企业往市场中点移动会提高平台的定价和市场份额,两边用户之间网络外部性强度的提高一般会降低平台企业的利润,随后选择上海大型超市选址和银行卡平台定价这两个案例进行印证分析。:双边市场;部分多归属;网络外部性强度;定价;选址:F062:A,,,20081464.27,200768%,20084.19,:(1):;(2):;(3):,,,,1,SH(SingleHoming),PMH(Partiallymultihoming)1(SP)SH,SH,PMHPMH,SHPMH,PMH,,PMH,PMHPMH51jobPMH,,Hotelling:,Hotelling,CaillaudJullien(2002)[1]GabszewiczWauthy(2004)[2],283(195) 系 统 工 程Vol.28,No.320103SystemsEngineeringMar.,2010:2009-11-20;:2010-01-28:(J50504);2007(slg-07015):(1971-),,,,,:,,,ArmstrongWright(2004)[3]Roson(2005)[4],,,PoolsombatVernasca(2006)[5],,,Hotelling(1929)[6]Bertrand(2007)[7],,,,,:;[0,1];1 模型1.1[0,1],ij,i,j=1,2,,km,k,m=1,212uikujkkij,pik.()t,t,t=1.ij,v0.niknjkkij,Nikki,i11021ab.1.21,1-a-b.xk1,k1:v1k=v0-p1k-x+n1m(1)(1)k11,,1,k1,1m1,k2:v2k=v0-p2k-(1-a-b-x)+n2m(2),1AB,,,v1k=v2k.(1)(2),i,:,0a1b;1-a-b,:1=p11(a+n11)+p12(a+n12)2=p21(b+n21)+p22(b+n22)(3)i(pi1,pi2,pj1,pj2),i,(pj1,pj2)(pi1,pi2),01,,(3),:p1ss1=p1ss2=(1-)(a-b+3)3p2ss1=p2ss2=(1-)(b-a+3)3(4)413:(4)ss,:n1ss1=12-56a-16b=n1ss2n2ss1=12-16a-56b=n2ss2(5)ab:1ssa=19(a-b+3)(1+),2ssb=19(b-a+3)(1+),0a,b12,1ssa0,2ssb0,,ab12,,,,(12,12)1.3,,1,2,1,22,1-a-b,:N1k+n2k=1-a-b,N2k+n1k=1-a-b.21,1.2,n11,n21.2,21x,1:v12=v0-p12-x+n11(6)21y,k2:v22=v0-p22-(1-a-b-y)+n21(7)2:v122=v0-p12-p22-(1-a-b)+(1-a-b)(8)(8),,,(1-a-b)(8)1212,12,(6)(7)(8),12:1=p11(a+n11)+p12(a+N12)2=p21(b+n21)+p22(b+N22)(9),01,,(9)1p11p12,2p21p22:p1sm1=1-6[(2-)a-2(1+)b+6(1+)]p2sm1=1-6[(2-)b-2(1+)a+6(1+)]p1sm2=a2(1-)p2sm2=b2(1-)(10)(10)sm1,2,:n1sm1=12-56a-16bn2sm1=12-16a-56bn1sm2=1-2-(1-6)a-(12-3)bn2sm2=1-2-(12-3)a-(1-6)b(11)422010,1a,2b,1.2:,1.41.21.3,:1=p11(a+N11)+p12(a+N12)2=p21(b+N21)+p22(b+N22)(12),01,(12)p11p12p21p22:p1mm1=p1mm2=1-4-2[(2-2)a-b+2+2]p2mm1=p2mm2=1-4-2[(2-2)b-a+2+2](13)ab,1.21.3:,2 模型的结论2.1,,p1ss1a=1-3,(0,1),p1ss1a0,,,1a+n1ss1=12+16a-16b,2b+n2ss1=12-16a+16b,ab,,,121-2+6a-(12-3)b1-2-(12-3)a+6b,,1.21.31.4,,,1:1,,,,2.2,,,,n1sm2=-12+a6+b30,n2sm2,,N1k+n2k=1-a-b,,2:2,,,,,,:p1ss1=-a-b+330,p2ss1=-b-a+330,p1sm1=-a2-3(6-a-2b)0,p2sm1=-b2-3(6-2a-b)0,p1sm2=-a20,p2sm2=-b20,,3:3,,3 案例分析1:,,2500,35,,,,433:,200912,107(),,,(),4.5,2119(),,,22()20.440.420.440.4520.820.931.421.72,,,,2()400,,,12:,,,,,,,,,,,,,1020,:,,(36),,,200431,,,,2008200768%,,,,,,,,,,34 结论和未来研究拓展方向,,442010:,:,,,,,,,,hotelling,,(x2),:[1]CaillaudB,JullienB.Chicken&egg:competitionamongintermediationserviceproviders[EB].IDEI,2002.[2]GabszewiczJJ,WauthyXY.Two-sidedmarketsandpricecompetitionwithmulti-homing[EB].IDEI,2004.[3]ArmstrongM,WrightJ.Two-sidedmarketswithmultihomingandexclusivedealing[EB].IDEI,2004.[4]RosonR.Platformcompletitionwithendogenousmultihoming[EB].IDEI,2005.[5]PoolsombatR,VernascaG.Partialmultihomingintwo-sidedmarkets[EB].DiscussionPaperoftheUniversityofYork,2006.[6]HotellingH.Stabilityincompetition[J].EconomicJournal,1929,39(153):4157.[7].Hotelling[J].,2007,37(22):2631.HotellingsCompetitioninPricingandLocationSelectionofTwo-sidedMarketPlatformsWhenUsersPartiallyMultihomingJIHan-lin(SchoolofManagement,UniversityofShanghaiforScienceandTechnology,Shanghai200000,China)Abstract:Thispaperconsidersproblemsofpricingandlocationoftwo-sidedmarketsplatformswhenuserspartiallymulti-homing.Firstweclassifyseveralclassicalstructuresofusersaccordingtotheirbehaviorsofpartiallymultihoming,andthenconsiderpricingstrategyoftwo-sidedplatformsunderthreestructuresofpartialmultihoming.Theresultsshowthatmovementtothemiddleofmarketplacewillraisepriceandmarketshareofplatforms,andthattheriseinnetworkexternalitiesparameterswilldecreasetheprofitsofplatformsnormally,thenweusetwocases-locationofshoppingmallsofShanghaiandpricingofcreditcardstovalidatetheresultsofthemodel.Keywords:Two-sidedMarkets;PartialMultihoming;NetworkExternalityParameters;Pricing;LocationDecisionSelection453: