基于绩效的配电价格管制研究

南京航空航天大学硕士学位论文基于绩效的配电价格管制研究姓名：王宁宁申请学位级别：硕士专业：技术经济及管理指导教师：谭清美20080301iCOS/ROR,iiABSTRACTSincetheearly1980’s,manycountrieshaveimplementedelectricitysectorreforms.Manyofthesereformshaveunbundledgeneration,transmission,distribution,andretailactivities.Theyhaveintroducedcompetitioningenerationandretailandadoptedincentiveregulationtopromoteefficiencyimprovementinthenaturalmonopolyactivities—transmissionanddistribution.Thenaturalmonopolyofdistributionisthecauseofregulationandthecoreofregulationisinthesideofprice.Theregulationofdistributioninthepastisbasedonthecostregulation,namelycost-of-serviceorrate-of-return(COS/ROR)regulation.Withthedevelopmentofelectrictitysectorreforms,morecountriesadoptincentiveregulation,namelypriceorrevenuecaps,tocontrolthepriceoftheserviceofdistribution.Utilitycouldearnhigherprofitsbycostreductionsandefficientmanagement.InChina,therestructureofpowerindustryhadunbundledthegenerationandnetwork.Butthetransmission,distributionanddetailactivitiesarestillbundledinthepowergridcompany.Itissurethatdistributionwillbeunbundledfromtransmissionandretailactivitiesinfuture,anditisimportanttoimplementincentiveregulationondistribution.Soweproposetobuildacompatibleregulationmechanismondistribution.Therefore,thispaperdiscussestheapplicationofincentiveregulationtodistributionelectricityinChina.Firstly,thepaperbeginswiththeelementarytheoriesofnaturalmonopolyandexpoundsitsdefinition,economiccharacters.Thenthepaperintroducesthegoalandprincipleofpriceregulationtopowerdistribution.Secondly,thispapergivesanintroductionofregulation,andanalysestheexperiencesandlessonsofpriceandrevenuecaps,whichareappliedwidelyinthesereforms.Profitsfromthemethodsoftheoverseaselectricpowerregulationsimultaneouslyaccordingtotheourcountrypowerdistributionmarketactualcondition,wedesignedapriceregulationmodelwhichissuitedforfuturepowerdistributionmarketofourcountry.Fortheaccurateformulationpowerdistributionprice,thispaperexhaustivelyinstructsthemethodhowtodecidetheefficiencyfactorinthemodel,andhasproducedtherealdiagnosisandcalculatestheexample.Finallybrieflyintroducedtheconclusionsandthedeficiencyofthepaper.iiiKeyWords:naturalmonopoly,PBR,rateofreturnregulation,pricecap,revenuecap,yardstickcompetition,DEAvi2.1MR=MC.......................................................................................133.1A-J.....................................................................................193.2.......................224.1..........................................................................................324.2matlab..............................................................324.3DEA........................................................................36()1111118019811988198919901991199219931992199219931993199319931/4204030%25%1/103:2112PBRPerformance-BasedRegulation3121212060StiglerStigler1989Williamson1966thePeak-loadPricing1982BaumolPanzarWillingAverchJohnson(Stiger,GeorgeJ.):1989Williamson,OliverE.1966.PeakLoadPricingandOptimalCapacityunderIndivisibilityConstraints.AmericanEconomicReview56(September):810-82742090SappingtonWeisman1996ProfitSharingRegulationLittlechild1983PriceCapRegulation,Shleifer1985YardstickRegulation1968DemsetzFranchiseBiddingBayesianMechanismDesign122(1999)2000199952005200020052004DEA61371.1821211T(Subadditivity)9123104212MarketFailureRegulationRegulationFailureDeregulationRe-regulationContestableMarketTheory,PerfectContestabilityTheory11,DestructiveCompetition12200013222212.1MCACMRDDMC=MRP0STR2.1MR=MCDDMRSACTRMCQ0QPP0014222223232312321523323416IncentiveRegulationPerformance-BasedRegulationCOS/ROR,costofservice/rateofreturn31311()()():(,)()RPQCSRB=+(3.1)(n):1()()ntttRCSRBQP==+∑t=1,,n(3.2):RC()17SRB(RateBase)()(P)(R)(Q)P=R/Q()()CSRB312313(S)S(originalcostmethod)18()314AJAverchJohnsonAJAJ3.3(,)RKLwLrK=−−∏(3.3)[(,)]/RKLwLKS−≤(3.4)RKLwrSAJSrSrS=rH(,)[(,)]HRKLwLrKRLKwLSKλ=−−−−−(3.5)MRLMRKLK(3.5);[()]/(1)MRLwMRKrSrλλ==−−−[()]/(1)aSrλλ=−−/()/MRKMRLraw=−(3.6)0119LMNLEPFLQ=QOKNKMPK3.1A-J3.1Q=Q*Q*Q*Q*3.6=00r-rMMNNr/wPP(r-)/wQ*EENNFPPA-J322080Littlechild,1983321201(1)ttPPRPIXZ−=∗+−±t=1,,n(3.7)PtPt-1RPIRetailPriceIndexRPIXX-factorZ,RPI-XRPICPIConsumePriceIndextt-13223-5tt-1t-1t-2X21A-J323X35200020042006X333311()(1)ttCGACRRFNIXZ−•=++−+V(3.8)tRtCGAF/CNVIXZRPCRevenuePerCustomerCGAFRPCCGAF033222DemandSideManagementL3.2ARADBPRACRDBLPP3.233319921996RORXXefficiencybenchmarking2334(YardstickCompetition)Shleifer1985341[()]()PCzQpzTπ=−−+PC(z)zQ(P)PTziiCiz1111ijjiiijjiPCiCNTzzN≠≠==−==−∑∑(3.9)ijjzjjCN(1)iijPkCkC=+−(3.10)iPk,,,1,(1)()NititjjtjjiPkCkfC=≠=+−∑,itPti,jtCtjfShleifer,A.,1985,ATheoryofYardstickCompetition,RandJournalofEconomics16:319-327.24342ShleiferC=+CPowellSzymanski343101219892535351,1,,1,(1)()mititijjtjjiPCRPIXSfRB+=≠=+−+∗∑1,1mjjjif=≠=∑(3.11),1itP+i,itCiRPIRetailPriceIndexRPIiXiS,jtRBjjfj,(1)itiCRPIX+−,itC,itCRPI×iX,itCX352261,itC,itCi,0iC2RPIRPIRPIRPIRPIRPI3iXiXBenchmarkingModeliX4SS5,jtRB,jtRBoriginalcostmethod6jfjfjjf27735353,itCRPI×,itCX,itCRPI×,itCXRPIiXiXA-JXX2829XX(DEA)X41DEA411X:(PRI-X)XXXX;:(Front