苏宁公司、国美公司商品价格博弈研究——以液晶电视为例

南京航空航天大学硕士学位论文苏宁公司、国美公司商品价格博弈研究——以液晶电视为例姓名：马颜青申请学位级别：硕士专业：企业管理指导教师：曹锟生20080201iiiABSTRACTIntherecentyears,homeappliancechainindustrydevelopedveryfastandhasbecomeoneofthefastest-developedindustry.Asthetwolargestcompanies,SuningshopandGomeshophavebuilttheirgreatcommercekingdomwithinthepastdecade.AccordingtotheChainmanagementtheory,thePricecompetitiontheory,andtheGametheoryandsoon,thisthesistakestheSuningshopandGomeshopforresearchingobjectandtakestheLCD-TVastheexampletobuildcorrelativemodels.TheauthoralsoanalyzestheSuningshopandGomeshop’sLCD-TVprice,andpointsoutthebestcommoditypricestrategy.Firstly,thethesisdescribesthedevelopingcomplexionofhomeappliancechainindustry,LCD-TV,SuningshopandGomeshop.Then,byanalysingtherelationshipbetweenthetwocompaniesandproducers,theauthorbuildstheBargaininganddickeringmodelandfindoutthetwocompanies’bargaininganddickeringability.AccordingtoBertrandmodelanditsamendingmodel,thecommoditysellingresearchiscarriedoutinthethirdparttoanalysethecompetingabilityofcommoditybetweenSuningshopandGomeshop.Onthefoundationoftheaboveanalysis,theauthorsummarizesthetwocompanies’pricecompetingpredominanceandtheirbeststrategy.Theauthoralsopointsoutthesignificanceofresearchingconclusionforotherindustries.ThethesisendswiththeexpectationoftheGametheory’sfuture.ThisthesishascertainreferencemeaningsforthedecisionmakerofSuningshopandGomeshoptomaketheircompanybetter,byresearchingSuningshopandGomeshop’scommodityprice.What’smore,itwillplayapositiveroleonthesimilarenterpriseandindustryinourcountry.KeyWords:Homeappliancechainindustry,Gametheory,Chainmanagementtheory,Pricecompetition,LiquidCrystalDisplay-TV(LCD-TV)v1.1...............................................................................................74.1.............................................................................384.2—.....................................402.1.............................................................................................132.2.............................................................133.1.............................................................................233.2.................................................................................263.3.................................................................................27,11.11.1.119701226301944211994Nash“”2005SchelingAumann2006720071214361.1.2370TCL241.21.2.13(1883)4(Kreps)(1929)(1979)(1998)(1929)4551930(1998)41.2.2(1999)Bertrand6(2001)62002200461.31.3.11.3.21271.3.31.11.3.4182392.178912342.218591509010101050112.32.3.1GameTheory6CooperativegameNon-cooperativegameBindingagreement611122.3.2183818832019281944120405019501950MelvinDresherMerrillFlood1952-1953L.S.ShapleyD.B.Gillies1250701954-19551959501960ThomasC.Schelling60196519751967-196819737028090ElonKohlberg1981KrepsWilson198219881991FudenbergTirole1994NashJohnHarsanyiReinhardSelten1219962005RobertJAumannThomasCSchelling2005SchelingAumann132.3.32.1StaticgameDynamicgame132.11232.22.2114n1214Dominant-strategyequilibriumDominantstrategyis−()()iiiiiissussu−−′,,**iiisss≠′∀∀−*isii*isi()**1*nsss⋅⋅⋅=Iterateddominanceequilibrium15is′is′′iiiSs∈′iiSs∈′′is−iis′is′′()()iiiiiissussu−−′′′,,is−∀is′is′′is′is′′is′′is′()**1*nsss⋅⋅⋅=n{}nnuuSSG⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅=11()***1*nissss⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅=i*is()**1*1*1*niiisssss⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅=+−−i()()***iiiiiissussu−−≥iSsii∀∈∀*is()**1*1*1*maxargniiiiSsisssssusii⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅∈+−∈ni⋅⋅⋅=2116n{}nnuuSSG⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅=11iK{}ikiissS⋅⋅⋅=1()ikiiσσσ⋅⋅⋅=1i()ikiksσσ=iikSKk⋅⋅⋅=110≤≤ikσ11=∑ikKσ12niS()suiis3niS()sui21965SubgameperfectNashequilibrium1217Gx()xT1x(){}xxh=2()xTx∈1()1xhx∈′′()xTx∈′′()***1*nissss⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅=123121967Nature,12BayesianNashequilibriumnnΘ⋅⋅⋅Θ1npp⋅⋅⋅1()()nnAAθθ⋅⋅⋅11()()nnnnaauaauθθ⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅1111iiiΘ∈θ()iiiippθθ−=iθiiiθθ−−∈{}nnnnuuppAAG⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅=1111θθn{}nnnuuPAAG⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅=111θθ18(){}niiia1*=θiiθ()iia−−θ*iν()()()nnaaaθθ*1*1*⋅⋅⋅=i()iiiAaθ∈()()()()iiiiiiiiiaiiaaupai−−−−∑∈θθθθθθmaxarg4()()()nnsssθθ*1*1*⋅⋅⋅=()nppp~~~1⋅⋅⋅=Pih()()()iiiihiiisiiissuapssiiθθθθ−−−−∑−∈~maxarg*B()hiiiap−−θ~()iiipθθ−hia−*is−P()niiisssss⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅=+−−111i()hiiiap−−θ~ihB152.3.4191617182.4192.4.12.4.220202.4.3()212.518,()2122223.180200012000200613220003000202036603.1.1(3.1)90200023190(3CAGR50%)(30%)3.1/2242510123.1.2()3.1.31233.1.4252004200360920049485013.919.535TCL23242526273.23.2.13C200710128190600900002006610100500595001010050100“15”200472100202420058420“”263.21990-1993199012262001993-1996199331996-19981998281999-200360.342004720048446200491.073.2.2LG2000200430.261.5(108.96)(177.9)(238.32)20022005195.7330520058212005275005001031987112408002003200615200420067,1214363.31987-19931993-1999199319968001999-2003200572082003-20031182004200473.3LCD28CRTCRTCRT12CRT200220062004332317240%2005134452.3%2006380,284%,10.6%ITPCTFT-LCD2003200420042005TCLLGIT294.11228294.1.1130TFT37L16HC3716:91366×7685000:14msUSB226kgSSPPSmax{,}SPS−SPSPSSPSSPSSPSS31SS1sP=SS4.11(,)sP+∞DPDPDPmax{,}DPD−DDPPDDPDDPDDPDDDDd1PDD4.2∞d1-,P1sPd1P1sP≤d1P321)sPd1P2TFT37L16HC1(,)sP+∞SPSP1PS+SiSiSSiSiPSPSiSiSPSiSiSSiSiSmaxSmax11max{,,,}SSSS−⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅−⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅ii33PSmaxSmax{}SPSPSS−+−maxmax{}SP