NBERWORKINGPAPER反腐运动对中国奢侈品进口的影响

TheImpactofXiJinping’sAnti-CorruptionCampaignonLuxuryImportsinChina(PreliminaryDraft)NancyQianyandJayaWenzApril2,2015AbstractThispaperinvestigatestheeffectsofanationalanti-corruptionpol-icyinChinafocusedonreducingbribesandluxuryconsumptionofgov-ernmentofficials.Wedocumentthatitreducedtheimportsofluxurygoodsthatareeasilyobservedbythepublicbyapproximately55%,194million2012USD,whilehavingnoeffectongoodsthatcanbeconsumedawayfrompublicview.Keywords:Corruption,PoliticalEconomy,DevelopmentJEL:P15,D73WethankAbhijitBanerjee,RayFismanandMikhailGolosovandtheeconomicsfacultyatFudanUniversityandSUFEfortheirinsights.yCorrespondingAuthor:[e-mail]@yale.edu1IntroductionItiswidelybelievedthatcorruptionhindersgrowth(e.g.,FismanandSvens-son2007;Mauro1995;Murphy,ShleiferandVishny1993),andthatthelevelsofbureaucraticcorruptionarehigherincountrieswithnon-democraticgovern-mentsbecauseofweakerpoliticalcompetitionandpublicpressure(LaPorta,Lopez-deSilanes,ShleiferandVishny1999;ShleiferandVishny1993)andwhengovernmentrevenuesarehigh(e.g.,Brolloetal.2013).Thiscanbepar-ticularlyproblematicintransitioneconomieswheregovernmentofficialshaveconsiderablediscretionoverdeterminantsofeconomicactivity,likeprivatiza-tionofstateassetsandaccesstolicensescriticalforentrepreneurialventures(Shleifer1997).Themainpolicytoolforcombattinglarge-scalecorruptionisgovernmentpolicy.However,thereislittleevidenceontheeffectivenessofsuchpolicies.1Weaddressthisimportantquestionbystudyingtheeffectivenessofana-tionalanti-corruptioncampaigninChina.Chinahasbeenoneoftheworld’sfastestgrowingeconomyforthreedecadesasittransitionedfromaplannedtoamarketeconomy,andhasalloftheconditionsforhighcorruptionthatwede-scribedearlier.OfficialcorruptioninChinaisbelievedtobewidespread,whileenforcementisbelievedtobeweak.2Theoddsofjailsentenceforacorruptofficialisestimatedtobelessthanthreepercent(Pei2007).3Thereisacon-1Seetheconclusionintheliteratureoverviewby?OlkenPande2012).2Forexample,theCentralCommissionforDisciplineInspection,theCommunistParty’santi-corruptiongroup,foundthat106,000officialswereguiltyofcorruptionin2009(BBC(2010)),andthemedianbribeamountpercaserosefrom$121,000in2000to$250,000in2009(inconstant2012U.S.Dollars).Pei(2007)estimatedthatthetotaldirectcostsofcorruptionin2007couldtotal$86billion.3Prosecutionsforcorruptionareuncommon,althoughtherehavebeenseveralprominent1sensusamongacademicsandpolicymakersthatcorruptionisoneofChina’slargestobstaclestocontinuedeconomicgrowth,whichhassloweddownto7.5in2015,thelowestpacesince1990(e.g.,Oster,2014;Feldstein2012,Pei2007).Attheendof2013,CommunistPartySecretaryXiJinpingintroducedconcretemeasuresforincreasingtheinvestigationofandthepunishmentforcorruption.Relativetopreviousanti-corruptioncampaigns,thisdifferedinitsfocusonreducingcorruptionatalllevelsofgovernmentratherthanfocusingonlyonafewhigh-profilecasesofextremecorruption.Thisintensificationwasviewedasasignificantpolicyshiftandasthegovernmentmakingaconcreteandlong-runcommitmentagainstcorruption.Thenumberofinvestigationsincreasedbyaround30%to182,000injustoneyear.Theplanplacedspecialemphasisonthetypesofcorruptionmostlikelytosparkpublicprotests,suchasbribe-taking,wasteandextravagance.ThisfollowedintensepresscoverageofgovernmentofficialswearingexpensiveEuropeanluxurybrandsofitemssuchasjewelryandclothing.4Thesuccessofthepolicyisunclearexante.Ontheonehand,unlikemanycountrieswithhighcorruption,Chinaisknowforitshighstatecapacity.Thismakesthethreatsofinvestigationandpunishmentcredibleandfacilitatestheimplementationofcentralgovernmentpolicies.Ontheotherhand,detectionandwell-publicizedcases.OneprominentexampleisBoXilai,theex-partychiefofthecityofChongqing.Hewaschargedforreceivingovertwentymillionyuaninbribesandembezzlinganadditionalfivemillionyuan,andwassentencedtolifeinprisoninSeptember2013(Reuters(2013)).AnotherexampleoccurredinOctober2014.AretiredcommanderofthePeople’sLiberationArmy,Gen.XuCaihou,confessedtotakingbribesforfavorsandpromotions(NYT(2014a)).4SeeSection2foradetailedbackgrounddiscussion.2iscostlyanditisdifficultforthegovernmenttoconductin-depthinvestiga-tionsgiventhattheyaretargetingsuchalargenumberofpotentiallycorruptofficials.Amodernproverbamongstgovernmentofficialsadvisesoneto“eatquietly,takegentlyandplaysecretly”(Jacobs,2013).Thissuggestthatoffi-cialsmaybeabletoevadedetectionbyreducingonlythemostconspicuouscorruption.Theprincipalgoalofthispaperistoexaminetheeffectivenessofthein-tensificationofanti-corruptionpoliciesattheendof2013.Specifically,weexaminewhetherthepolicyledtoadifferentialreductioninconspicuouscon-sumption.Giventhelimitedavailabilityofconsumptiondata,weproxyforconsumptionwithimports.Weclassifyjewelryasconspicuousandotherlux-urygoodsknownascommongiftsgivenasbribes,butwhichcanbeconsumedoutsideofthepubliceyeasinconspicuous(e.g.,expensivefoodsandalcoholconsumedatbanquets,art,etc.).5Tointerprettheempiricalresults,weprovideasimpleconceptualframe-work,whereanti-corruptionpoliciesareataxonconspicuousconsumptionsincetheyaremoreeasilydetected.Thereformeffectivelyreducesincomeandtheconsumpt