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摘要I摘要在进场费研究领域，现有的研究成果多是以经济学为切入点来展开对进场费问题的研究，而对于渠道成员交易关系中内生的诸如渠道权力等社会因素的影响则缺乏足够的关注。鉴于此，本研究以渠道权力理论为基础，借鉴政治经济研究框架，构建了一个包括经济学与市场营销学双重研究视角的综合性分析框架，并提出了若干研究命题，从而在传统的经济学分析的基础上，融入了渠道行为研究，为进场费研究提供了一个全新的视角。本文认为：第一，交易形式作为渠道内部的经济因素，对进场费具有直接的影响。这表现为随着交易形式从市场交易、准市场交易过渡到组织内部交易，进场费的收费额度逐步下降，最后在制造商与零售商一体化的情况下，进场费降至零。同时，进场费对交易形式具有一定的反作用。在进场费超过特定临界值时，进场费收费额度的增长会推动交易形式向非市场交易形式过渡。第二，渠道权力结构作为渠道内部的社会因素对进场费也具有直接影响：在零售商处于权力优势地位的情况下，零售商的权力优势地位越显著，进场费的收费额度越高；在渠道权力高度均衡的情况下，进场费的收费额度最低；在制造商处于权力优势地位的情况下，进场费降至零。同样，进场费也可以通过影响渠道绩效而间接地作用于满意度，进而反作用于渠道关系稳定性。第三，供求关系与水平产业结构作为渠道外部的经济因素，通过影响渠道权力结构会间接地作用于进场费。前者表现为随着供求结构由供不应求向供过于求过渡，渠道权力逐步地由制造商向零售商转移，相应的进场费从无到有，并且收费额度递增；后者表现为零售业与消费资料制造业的市场集中度的对比状况决定了渠道权力结构的倾斜方向，进而决定了进场费收费额度的变化。另外，进场费同样反作用于渠道外部的经济因素：进场费收费额度的增长会推动供过于求的商品市场趋于均衡；而进场费的收取会导致制造业与零售业的产业集中度进一步提高。第四，消费者、同行业竞争者及政府规制机构也会通过影响渠道内部权力摘要II结构而作用于进场费实践：制造商与零售商掌握消费者信息更充分的一方，权力优势地位更显著，相应的，进场费收费额度随之调整；制造业（零售业）竞争的激烈程度，决定了零售商（制造商）对特定交易伙伴的依赖水平，进而决定了进场费的收费额度；制造商与零售商与规制机构关系更紧密的一方，权力优势地位更显著，相应的，进场费收费额度随之调整。在上述理论研究的基础上，本文以国美电器与正阳家电的进场费实践为例，对渠道权力结构与进场费之间的作用关系进行了初步的实证检验。研究发现制造商与零售商之间的渠道权力结构对进场费实践具有显著的影响，而进场费实践同时也通过渠道绩效、满意度等中间变量反作用于渠道关系的稳定性。关键词：进场费，政治经济框架，渠道权力结构ABSTRACTIIIABSTRACTInthestudyfieldofslottingallowances,researchesaremostlybasedoneconomicstheory,andthestudyonsocialfactorsisnotadequate.Therefore,theauthorputsforwardanintegrateresearchframeworkandsomepropositionsonthebasisofchannelpowertheoriesandtheframeworkofsocialeconomics.Theintegrateframeworkresearchestheslottingallowancesfrombotheconomicsandmarketingangle,andthereforeitresearcheschannelbehavior,besidestraditionaleconomicanalysis.Theopinionsoftheauthorareasfollows.Firstly,transactionalform,astheinternaleconomicfactor,directlyimpactsonslottingallowances.Astransactionalformchangesfrommarkettransactionstohierarchicaltransactions,slottingallowancesdecreaseandfalltozeroatlast.Inaddition,slottingallowancesalsoimpactontransactionform.Afterslottingallowancesrisetosomelevel,thefurtherincreaseofslottingallowanceswilldrivemanufacturestoturntonon-markettransactions.Secondly,channelpowerstructure,astheinternalpoliticalfactor,alsohasadirectinfluenceonslottingallowances.Ifretailersareinpoweradvantageinachannelofasymmetricalpowerstructure,themoreadvantageous,thehigherslottingallowances;onthecontrary,ifmanufacturesareinpoweradvantage,slottingallowancesdon’texist.Moreover,inachannelofsymmetricalpowerstructure,inwhichretailersandmanufactureshighlydependoneachother,slottingallowancesarethelowest.Atlast,slottingallowancesalsohaveanindirecteffectonthestabilityofchannelrelationsbyinfluencingtheconductsofchannelperformanceandsatisfaction.Thirdly,theverticalstructurebetweensupplyanddemandandhorizontalmarketstructure,whichbothareexternaleconomicfactors,haveanindirectinfluenceonslottingallowancesbyaffectingthepowerstructureofthefocaldyad.ABSTRACTIVOntheotherhand,slottingallowancesalsoimpactexternaleconomicfactors.Theincreaseofslottingallowanceswilldrivethestructureofsupplyoverdemandtoequilibriumandmaketheconcentrationofmanufacturingandretailinghigher.Finally,consumers,competitorsandregulatoryorganizations,whichcomprisetheprimarytaskenvironment,influenceslottingallowancesindirectlybyaffectingpowerstructureofthefocaldyad.Tothefocaldyad,theonewhogainsmoreinformationofconsumersismorepowerful;theonewhosecompetitorsarelessismorepowerful;theonewhobuildscloserrelationshipwithregulatoryorganizationsismorepowerful.Andthechangeofthepowerstructureofthefocaldyadwillleadtothechangeofamountofslottingallowances.Basedonthetheoreticalresearch,theauthortakesGomeandtheZhengyangElectronicAppliancesCompanyassamplestoconductanempiricalstudyoftherelationshipsbetweenchannelpowerstructureandslottingallowances.Itisfoundthatthechannelpowerstructurehasamarkedinfluenceonslottingallowances,andslottingallowancesalsohaveanindirecteffectonthestabilityofchannelrelationsbyinfluencingtheconductsofchannelperformanceandsatisfaction.Keywords:slottingallowances,theframeworkofsocialeconomics,channelpowerstructure目录V目录第一章引言...........................................................................................11.1研究的背景...................................................................................................11.2选题的意义....................................................................................................21.2.1研究的理论意义..................................................................................21.2.2研究的现实意义..................................................................................31.3本文的逻辑框架、方法与创新之处...........................................................31.3.1本文的逻辑框架..................................................................................31.3.2本文的研究方法..................................................................................51.3.3本文的创新之处..................................................................................5第二章文献回顾.....................................................................................72.1进场费问题....................................................................................................72.