我国工程质量保证保险风险分担机制研究

华中科技大学博士学位论文我国工程质量保证保险风险分担机制研究姓名：陈兴海申请学位级别：博士专业：工程管理指导教师：丁烈云20090526I2006919IIIIIAbstractIthasbeenpuzzledownerforlongtimethattherightscannotbeprotectedeffectivelywhenthequalityproblemsincurredinthecourseofusing.Inordertosolvethecontradictions,theMinistryofConstructionP.R.China(CIN),theChinaInsuranceRegulatoryCommission(CIRC)andthePeople’sInsuranceCompanyofChina(PICC)starteduptrialoftheConstructionQualityInsuranceSystem(CQI)onSeptember19,2006.However,theCQIhasbeenlaunchedforabouttwoyears,thereisstillnotasuccessfulinsurancecaseinChina.Theunreasonablerisk-sharingmechanismbetweentheinsuerandtheresponsiblepartiesofprojectistherootcausethattheCQIisinthedilemma.Therefore,howtobuildareasonablerisk-sharingmechanismbetweentheinsuerandtheresponsiblepartiesofprojectisthekeyproblem.Thethesiscommencesrisk-sharingamongtheinsurerandeachresponsibleentity,andsetsupthemodelofrisk-sharingwithmulti-period,multi-levelandmulti-participantonthebasisofthegameandprincipal-agenttheory.Theobjectofthestudyistosetupamechanismofrisk-sharinginwhichtheriskofCQIcouldallocatereasonablyamongtheeachmainparticipant,andtomakeimprovementonthesystemofCQIconsideringtheearthquakerisks.Itsmaincontentsincludedthreepartssuchasstatusanalysis,theoreticalresearchandsuggestionsofsystemimprovement.Fromthestatusanalysis,thethesisanalysestheforeignengineeringqualityinsurancesystem.Onthisbasis,thethesisfurtheranalysesthecharacteristicsandclassificationofengineeringqualitydefectsandtherelationsamongeachparticipantintheCQIandtheadvantagesanddisadvantagesoftheShanghaimodel,FujianmodelandGuangdongShundemodelinChina.Fromthetheoreticalresearch,inthisthesistheriskfacedbytheinsurerinthecontractingphaseisanalysedandtherisk-sharingincentivecontractmodelbetweentheinsurerandthecontractorissetupbythegameandprincipal-agenttheorybasedontheIVresult.Theconclusionsshowthatmoreefficientcontractorsarewillingtochooseahigherpoweredincentivecontractandexerthighereffortattheoptimumwithsingle-stage,andtheintrinsicmotivationhasmoreremarkableeffectonexcitingtheeffortlevelofcontractorthanextrinsicincentivewhenthecontractors’intrinsicmotivationisconsidered.Thentheinsurercanpredictthelossdistributionofnextyearaccordingtotheconstructionqualityproblemoccursin1yearafterthefinalacceptance,andcanjudgeoptimaleffortlevelofthecontractoranddeterminethefinalpremiumwithmulti-stagedynamicrisk-sharing.Onthisbasis,thisthesisgivesoutthemodelofproportionofoptimalreinsurancebetweentheinsurerandthereinsurer.Whentheexistenceofrent-seekinginthecontractorandriskmanagementinstitution,theinsurercouldtakethepreventionstrategythatheincentsriskmanagementinstitutionandeliminatesthedifferenceofthepremiumbenefitsprofitbetweenthelazybehaviorandtheunobservedinformationofthecontractor.FortheirregularitiesofinsurertocarryouttheCQI,thisthesisputsforwardtheinsurancesupervisiondepartmentsshouldtaketheoptimalregulatorystrategywithhigherefficiencyofsupervisionandheavierpenalty.Andforthefraudofinsured,thisthesisputsforwardtheinsurershouldtaketheoptimalstrategywithheavierpenalty.Inthisthesis,basedontheanalyzingontherisksoftheunderwritingstageoftheresponsiblepartiesoftheCQI,thegamemodeloftheinsurerandtheresponsiblepartiesissetup.Theinsurerwillenhancetheprobabilityandamountofrecoverytopromotetheresponsiblepartiestoworkhard.Fromthesuggestionsofsystemimprovement,accordingtotheproblemthattheCQIdoesnotcoverthelossofhousingasaresultoftheearthquake,thethesisproposessettingupthemodelofcomprehensiveearthquakeinsuranceofbuildingbasedontheCQIfromfourpartsasfollows:thelegalfoundation,theriskassessment,actuarialandcontrolsystem,financialriskdispersionmechanismandclaimmanagementsystem.KeywordsConstructionqualityinsurancemulti-playergamerisk-sharingintrinsicmotivationearthquakeinsurance2009___20092009111.11.1.12080101(1997-11-1)(1999-8-30)(2000-1-30)(2002-6-29)[1]19971116222000130405221999200162.13%69.96%19992001148551448116221123[2]13234220021031AAA43%~5%1220903A2004720051151~23A123420058[2005]133620069191475123841.1.291.21.2.1[3]8090MelchersR.E.AtkinsonA.R.SunyotoA.10[4-6]KnockeJensKeelingR.[7,8]HammarlundY.LaversA.[9,10]StephenR.Mysliwiec[11]ShapiroCliffordJ.[12]ManiloffRandyJ.[13]TylisShustermanFrankel[14-16]RobinsonR.DePadua[17-19]DetenW.S.[20]GeorgiouJ.[21]LampertG.[22]SmithScottRayHughey11[23,24]2000AnthonyLaversPRRESProtectionofrealestatedevelopersandusersagainsteconomiclossarisingfromdefectsinconstruction[25]IMIA20019InherentDefectInsurance[26]121.2.2[27-29][30,31][32-34],[35-37][38][39-41][42-44]13[45-47][48][49-51][3]1.2.3121431.31[52]15[52]Arrow1963[53]ArnottStiglitz[54]JohannaJ.[55]1976RothschildStiglitz[56][57-59]16JohnR.,ChassagnonA.ChiapporiP.A.[60,61]BorchK.[62]2000DionneG.[63]WilliamJ.ChiapporiP.A.SalanieB.[64,65][66-68][69-73][74,75]17[76,77][78-80]1-1181-12191.41.4.1123456201.4.21231-2211-2123452261.4.3123231.52422.12.1.1180417922270179231978LoiSpinetta1019805903025[25]123[26]2.1.2[25,30]1231%4262.1.320012001HIH2002[25,81]1231.22.2.41982199927623200041[26]123[29,82]19994292002AAA2.22.2.1128[3,83]2[47,84]1234292.2.22-12-12-13