不完全信息条件下中介组织信息服务的定价模型

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135Vol.13,No.5200410OPERATIONSRESEARCHANDMANAGEMENTSCIENCEOct.2004:2004203217:(79990580):,;(19772),,1,1,2(1.,200030;2.,102300):,,,,-(CIP),::;;2;:F49:A:100723221(2004)0520086205ResearchintothePricingProblemforInformationServiceofIntermediaryOrganizationundertheConditionofIncompleteInformationCHENZhong1,CAIXiao2yu1,CAIXiao2dong2(1.ShanghaiJiaotongUniv.,Shanghai200030,China;2.BeijingMentougouTVUniv.Beijing102300,China)Abstract:Atpresent,thepricingtowardsinformationserviceproductofintermediaryorganizationisshortofscientificpricingmethodathome.Takingaimatthisproblem,theauthorputsforwardtheconsumer2intermediarypricingmodel(CIPM)basedontheinformationeconomicsandtransactioncosttheory,whichpresentsscientificcalculationmethodforthecommissionofinformationservicetowardsconsumersofintermediaryorganization.Weholdthatthepricingofinformationserviceisdeterminedbybothpricingspreadanddemandrule.Keywords:informationservice;thepricingofinformationservice;consumer2intermediarypricingmodel;intermediaryorganization0,,,,,,;,,,(),,,,,,,,,122:,21.1:;:pq,():,,U(x)=U1(x)+yx,mxXy():(),x,:5U()/5y=1y1A,AB,:maxxU(x)=U1(x)+ys.t.qx+y=m(1)(FOC):dU1(x3)dx3=P(2)Umax(x3),1f,,,:f[0,1],c(f)(f)p,c(f)0,c(f)0,(f)0.,:maxxU(x)=U1(x)+ys.t.px+y+c(f)=mUEUmax(x3)(3)FOC(2),U1(x)=2Ax,A0,cf=f2/2,(2)(3)p:Umax=m+A2/p-f2/2(4)785,::1.HalRVirian()(),19974,2002102.:,20014,200111,329330,,,:UmaxEUmax(x3)=m+A2/q,fFA2(1/p-1/q)(5),,q,:maxxU(x)=U1(x)+ys.t.qx+y+c(f)=m(6):U1-max=m+A2/q-f2/2(7),,,(f)=f,:maxfUE(x)=(f)Umax+(1-(f))U1-maxs.t.UmaxEUmax(x3)(8):maxfUE(x)=m+A2/q-f2/2+fA2(1/p-1/q)s.t.UmaxEUmax(x3)(9)FOC:f=A2(1/p-1/q),0FfF1(10)A2(1/p-1/q)E1,(5),:f3=1,UEmax=UE(f)=m+A2/p-1(11)A2(1/p-1/q)1,,:f3=A2(1/p-1/q)UEmax=UE(f)=m+A2/q+A4(1/p-1/q)2/2(12)2A2(1/p-1/q)(9)21.2UEmaxUmax(x3):UEmaxEUmax(x3),:f3,c(f3),,,UEmax,,,,,:maxxU1(x)=U1(x)+ys.t.px+y+t=mU1EUEmax(13)FOC(2),:U1max=m+A2/p-t(14)(11)(12)U1EUEmax,:t[t0,1/2],A2(1/p-1/q)E1(15)t[t0,A2(1/p-1/q)(1-A2(1/p-1/q)/2)],A2(1/p-1/q)1(16)88200413t0,tt0,,;,,,(15)(16):A2(1/p-1/q)E1,(1/2),,,(),,(15);,A2(1/p-1/q)F1/21,,,,1/2FA2(1/p-1/q)1,,,,(16),:1:,:,;,:,,c(f3)c(f3):c(f3),c(f3)tc(f3),,ff3,tc(f3),,,,,c(f3),,((15)(16)),,,:t0t,p1=t0+t,t,p1,,,,()(),.,p1,t,,,1.3,:p1=t0+tmax,,,:D(p1)=b-a(-0)p1a,,,(),,,(),,,0,:,-0=0,,=q-p,p1,t0,,:maxp1=p1D(p1)-t0(b-a(-0)p1),p1t0(17)FOC:p31=(b+t0a(-0))/2a(-0)(18)985,:1.42:-00,p31:p311/2,A2(1/p-1/q)E1:p31A2(1/p-1/q)(1-A2(1/p-1/q)/2),A2(1/p-1/q)1,:p1=1/2,A2(1/p-1/q)E1p1=A2(1/p-1/q)(1-A2(1/p-1/q)/2),A2(1/p-1/q)1(19):p1=p31,,,p31,,(19)3:-00,p1(15)(16),,:p1=p314:-0=0,,,(16),2-3,(-00),p1,p1-0,,,(15)5:t0Eb/aEp1(),p31t022,,,,,,,,2,,,,,,2,,,,[1]HelmutBester.Bargaining,searchcostsandequilibriumpricedistributions[J].ReviewofEconomicStudies,1988,55:2012214.[2]DiamondDW.FinancialIntermediationandDelegatedMonitoring[J].ReviewofEconomicStudies,1984,51:3932414.[3]ChanY.OnthePositiveRoleofFinancialIntermediationinAllocationofVentureCapitalinaMarketwithImperfectInformation[J].JournalofFinance,1983,38:154321568.[4]FranklinAllen,AnthonyMSantomero.TheTheoryofFinancialIntermediation[J].JournalofBanking&Finance,1988,21:146121485.[5]GurleyJG,ShawES.FinancialIntermediariesandtheSavingInvestmentProcess[J].JournalofFinance,1956,11(2,May):2572276.09200413

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