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华中科技大学硕士学位论文中国上市公司股权结构与公司业绩的实证研究姓名：吴少凡申请学位级别：硕士专业：企业管理指导教师：夏新平;常亚平20040429IVUVABSTRACTSinceitisaprevalentcharacteristicofownershipstructureinChinesefirmsthatsharesareconcentratedinafewlargeshareholders,investigatingwhetherownershipconcentrationhasimpactoncorporateperformance,andifyes,howwilltheimpactbe,isasignificantissueforownershipstructureresearchesinChinaandhasarosemuchattentionsfromacademe.Thepurposeofthispaperistoproperlyinterpretandgeneralizeempiricalconclusionviaexaminingtheimpactfrommulti-angle,thusprovidedefinitereferenceandinstructionvalueforownershipstructuregovernancemechanismpractice.Thispaper,firstly,introducesthehistory,earlytheoreticalhypothesisandrecentnewlyadvancementofownershipstructureresearch,narratesownershipstructureresearchinUSAseparately,anddoesacomparativestudyonvastworldwideempiricalstudiesonownershipconcentration.Then,viaempiricaltestsonsamples,thispaperexaminestheimpactofownershipconcentrationoncorporateperformanceinshorttermandlongterm,andundervariouscompetitionsituations.Alsothispaperdiscussesonempiricalresultspreliminarilyanddrawsaconclusion.Lastly,basedonanteriorconclusion,thispaperputsforwardfivepolicyproposals.Empiricalstudyshowsthat,inshortterm,thereisaquadraticcurverelationbetweenownershipconcentrationandcorporateperformancemeasuredbymarketindex;Whileinlongterm,theimpactofownershipconcentrationisinsignificant.Itisevidentthatmonitoringandexpropriationeffectoflargeshareholderincreasealternatelyinshortterm,whilemanyotherfactorscouldexertfullysignificantimpactsoncorporateperformanceinlongterm,wheretheimpactofownershipconcentrationistrivial.Underregionallyperfectcompetitionsituation,ownershipconcentrationsignificantlyrelateswithcorporateperformance,buttherelationshipsvarysubstantiallyaccordingtodifferentownershipconcentrationvariables.Undermonopolysituation,thereisUshaperelationshipbetweenownershipconcentrationandcorporateperformance,andimpactsonothercorporateperformancevariablesareinsignificant.Differencesinshareholdingstructureofcorporatetoptenlargeshareholdersandfirmheterogeneity,determinethatthepositionandroleofindividuallargeshareholderdiffers,thusimpactsofownershipconcentrationvary.Takenaboveconclusionintoconsideration,thispaperbringsforwardthefollowingpolicyproposals:Keepproperownershipconcentrationdegree;Evolvemultipleunitequityownershipmainstaywithinlimits;Heightencirculationrateofcorporatestock;Strengthenlegalsystemandsuperviseregulationsonsecuritymarket;IntensifyexternalconstraintofVIcapitalmarketonpubliclistedfirms.Keywords:CorporategovernanceOwnershipstructureOwnershipconcentrationCorporateperformanceIII_____11(OECD)19994(CorporateGovernance)(Stakeholder)(TheController)(CorporateGovernanceMechanism)(BoardofDirectors)(OwnershipStructure)(TakeoverMarket)(Legal/regulatorySystem)(ExecutiveCompensationandIncentives)(ShareholderActivisms)(ManagerialOwnership)(AlignmentandEntrenchmentEffects)(Free-riderProblem)2(SharedBenefitsofControl)(PrivateBenefitsofControl)(GovernmentOwnership)(PrivateOwnership)(Privatization)(CorporatePerformance)(OwnershipConcentration)3WTO19931997A19902002A19992002IPO1999422.1JensenMeckling(1976)[1]2.1.11)52)3)JensenMichael(1986)[2]2.1.21)62)3)(IncentiveAlignment)2.272.2.11776AdamSmithAdolfBerleGardinerMeansJensenMeckling’s(1976)(JournalofFinancialEconomics)JensenRuback(1983)[3](PublicCorporation)DemsetzLehn(1985)[4]HoldernessSheehan(1988)[5]Morck,Shleifer,Vishny(1988a)[6]1988JensenWarnerFaccioLang(2000)[7]Blass,Yafeh,Yosha(1998)[8]XuWang(1999)[9]8ValadaresLeal(2000)[10]2.2.21)BerleMeans(1932)[11]ShleiferVishny(1986)[12](MonitoringHypothesis)HillSnell(1988)[13](Diversification)HillSnell(1989)[14]McConnellServaes(1990)[15]AgrawalMandelker(1990)[16]ShleiferVishny(1986)LeechLeahy(1991)[17](DiscretionaryExpenditure)MudambiNicosia(1998)[18]ShleiferVishny(1997)[19]9(ExpropriationHypothesis)FaccioLang(2000)2)BerleMeans(1932)JensenMeckling(1976)(Convergence-of-InterestHypothesis)JensenMeckling(1976)FamaJesen(1983)[20](EntrenchmentHypothesis)Jensen(1993)[21]Stulz(1988)[22]2.2.31)10Megginson,Nash,VanRandenborgh(1994)[23]197919901861BoubakriCosset(1998)[24]2179LaPortaLopez-de-Silanes(1999)[25]19831991218ClaessensDjankov(1998)[26]199219956354DewenterMalatesta(2001)[27]BoubakriCosset(1998)(VotingControl)Majumdar(1998)[28]19731989MakhijaSpiro(2000)[29]988HingoraniMakhija(1997)[30]Frydman,Pistor,Rapaczynski(1996)[31]ClaessensDjankov(1999)[32]D’Souza,Megginson,Nash(2001)[33]196111199529118(EfficiencyGains)Boubakri,Cosset,Guedhami(2001)[34]32189Claessens(1997)[35]19921993(VoucherDistributionSchemes)ClaessensDjankov(1999)706MegginsonNetter(2001)[36](SelectionBias)DenisMcConnell(2003)[37]2)(EquityOwnership)Rydkvist(1987)[38]6.5%Zingales(1994)[39]82(ControllingInterest)12(VotingCoalitions)Claessens,Djankov,Lang(2000)[40]FaccioLang(2002)[41]ValadaresLeal(2000)Lin(2003)KeiretsuChaebols(Financial-industrialGroups)Kantor(1998)[42]DyckZingales(2004)[43]39Nenova(2003)[44]199718661050Nenova(2003)752.2.41)1113Tobin’sQTobin’sQ2(ROA)(ROE)32)Herfindahl4(CEO)3)(Endogeneity)2T