斯洛文尼亚后私有化时代的管理层持股与公司业绩[文献翻译]

原文：ManagerialOwnershipandCorporatePerformanceinSlovenianPost-PrivatizationPeriodAbstractWhileSlovenianpost-privatizationperiodhasbeencharacterizedbyadeclineintheownershipofthenon-managerialowners(employees),managershavebeenincreasingtheircontrol.Moreover,giventhattheoptimalownershipstake(asstatedbythemanagers)intheyear2002exceededtheiractualshareby10.8percentagepoints,weexpectthemanagerstocontinueconsolidatingtheirownershipalsointhefuture.TheaimofourpaperistodescribethemaintrendsintheownershipofSloveniancorporationsinthepost-privatizationperiodandtoprovideananswertothebasiceconomicquestion:whatistheinfluenceoftheongoingconsolidationofmanagerialownershipontheperformanceofSlovenianfirms.Theempiricalanalysistestingthisrelationshipisbasedonapanelof182Slovenianfirmsintheperiod1995-99anddoesnotproviderelevantevidenceonpositiveeffectsoftheincreasingmanagerialcontrolontheperformanceofSlovenianfirms.Ifany,positiveincentiveeffectisobservedonlyinthefirmswithmanagers’holdingsexceeding10-percent,onlywithregardstofirmfinancialperformance(butnottotalfactorproductivity)andonlyinfirmsthatarenotlistedonthecapitalmarket.Furthermore,thenegativeeffectofthecurrentgapbetweentheoptimalandactualmanagerialownershipseemstoprevailoveranypositiveincentiveeffectarisingoutofmanagerialownership.IntroductionTheincreasingmanagerialownership,apartfromthereductionintheownershipofState-controlledfundsandemployees,representoneofthemainfeaturesthatcharacterizetheownershipchangesintheSlovenianpost-privatizationperiod.Mostprominentaretheincreasesinmanagerialstakesinnon-listedfirms,inwhichthetransferofownershiprealizesatrelativelylowpricesandmostlyremainpubliclyundisclosed.Moreover,giventhatSlovenianmanagersstillclaimtobeunsatisfiedwiththeircurrentownershipstakes(attheendof2002theoptimalownershipstakeofanaverageSlovenianmanagerexceededhisactualownershipstakeby10.8percentagepoints),weexpecttheobservedtrendsintheevolutionoftheownershipandcontrolofSloveniancorporationstocontinueinthesamedirectionalsothefuture.TheaccumulationofownershipinthehandsofmanagersisfurthermotivatedbytherelativelylowtransparencyoftheownershiptransfersinSlovenia.Inanycase,itisnottheaimofthispapertodiscussthefairnessoftheobservedredistributionoftheprivatizedcapital,neithertodealwiththeimportanceofsuchredistributionforthepreservationofthedomesticownership，butrathertoprovideananswertothebasiceconomicquestion,namelytodeterminetheimpactoftheobservedincreasesinthemanagerialownershipontheperformanceofSlovenianfirms.Westartinthesecondsectionwithanoverviewofthemanagerialownershipasacorporategovernancemechanisminthedevelopedmarketeconomies.ThirdsectionprovidesfurtherevidenceontheroleofthemanagerialandinsiderownershipintransitioneconomiesandespeciallyinSlovenia(section4).FifthsectionstatesthemainhypothesesontheinfluenceofthemanagerialownershiponfirmperformanceinSlovenia.Themainempiricalmodelsunderlyingtheanalysisoftherelationbetweenmanagerialownershipandfirmeconomicefficiencyandfinancialperformancearepresentedinthesixthsection.Thelastsectionstatesthemainempiricalresultsandconcludes.ManagerialownershipasacorporategovernancemechanismBlockholdingsrepresentoneofthemainfactorsofdistinctionbetweentheinsider(ContinentalEuropean)andoutsider(Anglo-Saxon)systemsofcorporategovernance.WhiletheownershipandcontrolstructureofmostofthecorporationslistedintheUnitedKingdomandintheUnitedStatesstillmostlyreflectthetypicalBerleandMeanscorporationandthemarketforcorporatecontroloneofthemainmechanismsalleviatingtheconflictofinterestsbetweenthemanagers(agents)andowners(principal),largeblockholdersintheContinentalEuropegaincontrolovertheiragentsthroughconcentratingtheirownershipandvotingrights.Inanycase,blockholderscanbefoundintheoutsidergovernancesystemaswell.Forexample,halfofthefirmslistedontheNewYorkandNASDAQStockExchangesonaveragehavethreeshareholderswithatleast5percentownershipblocks.However,onthecontrarytotheContinentalEurope,institutionalinvestorsorboardmembersholdmostoftheseblocks.Whiletheformerusuallystaypassiveanddon’tinterveneinthefirms’decision-making,managersnormallyholdbetween20and40percentofthevotingrightsanddecisivelyparticipateinthegovernanceandconsequentlyinfluencetheperformanceofthefirmstheyown(Becht,2001;HoldernessandSheehan,2001).Similarly,forasampleof4200USAlistedcorporationsHolderness,KrosznerandSheehan(1999)report21percentaveragemanagerialstakes;since1935theshareofcapitalheldbythemanagersincreasedbyapproximately8percentagepoints.Otherempiricalstudiesconfirmthat,uponthepracticeofboardremunerationswithsharesandstockoptions,managerialownershipcharacterizesmostoftheUSAcorporations.Moreover,managerialblockholdingscanbefoundinEuropeaswell;boardmembersofthefirmslistedontheLondonStockExchangeforexamplerepresentthesecondmostimportantgroupofblockholdersand,assuch,onaveragehold11percentofthevotingrights,amongwhichabout65percentisheldbychiefexecutives(GoergenandReeneboog,2001).Theinfluenceofmanagerialownershiponfirms’valueisrelatedtotheperspectivethatfirms’valuedependsonthedistributionofownershipbetween