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NicoletaAncutaDr.PhilippGoedekingBoostingsaleswiththe“SalesUp!”programAprogramtotapunexploitedsalesopportunitiesSalesUp!RBSalesUpengl_S.1-1617.08.200110:50UhrSeite12|3|SalesUp!“SalesUp!”AprogramtocombatwastedsalesopportunitiesThepoweroffocusandpushItwasasimpleexercisewithsurprisingresults:ourworkshopparticipants,allofthemsalesmanagerswithaglobalcorporation,wereaskedtotakeouttheirappoint-mentdiaryforthenextweekandnotedownonacardwhichcustomerstheyplan-nedtovisit,howmuchtimetheywouldbespendingwitheachofthesecustomers,andhowmuchtimetheywouldbespendingintheoffice.Thecardswerecollectedandquicklycomparedwithpreparedcustomerdata.Thedireresult:notonlydidthemanagerswanttospendaroundhalftheirtimeintheoffice.Theyplannedtheir“active”timemainlyforcustomerswithwhomtheyhadalwaysdonebusiness,oftenindependentlyoftherealmarketimportanceofthesecustomers.Hardlyanyofthemanagerswereplanningtospendtimewith“difficult”customerswithwhomtheydidalowproportionoftheirbusiness.“There'snopointspendingtimewiththemanyway,”wastheuniversalexplanation,evenifthesecustomersaccountedforlargesalesvolumesinabsoluteterms.Thebehaviorofourworkshopparticipantsiscertainlynotunique.Thedilemmaisclear:hardlyanybodycanachievedynamicgrowthwheretheyalreadyhaveahighmarketshare.Insalesinparticular,wehaveobservedinourconsultingpracticeaspectacularpent-updemandforfocusandgenuinesalespressureonmarketsegmentswithconsiderableuntappedgrowthpotential.Alltoooften,timeandmoney(com-missionfees!)aredistributedindiscriminately,insteadofconcentratingthemonthemostpromisingpartsofthemarkets.Thisishowcompaniessquanderpotentialanddonotevencomeclosetothemarketsharestheywouldbe“entitledto”iftheirsalesteamswereworkingefficientlyinthemarket.Theideabehind“SalesUp!”Our“SalesUp!”programisdesignedtotacklethisclassicsalesproblem.Infact,thereareonlytwofactorsthatdeterminesalessuccessorfailure[Figure1]:Figure1:Theideabehind“SalesUp!”–focusandpushWhat“SalesUp!”canachieveSaturatedmarkets?Zerogrowth?Onthecontrary:mostcompaniessquandersalespotentialbecausetheydonotfocustheirsaleseffortsefficientlyandthereforedonotmanagethesignificantgrowthmarketsandcustomerswiththerequiredpersistence.The“SalesUp!”programhelpssalesmanagerstofindtherightfocusanddeveloptheoptimalleverageinthetargetsegments.Salesinthetargetmarketscanthengrowby20to40percent.“Focus”and“Push”arethetwodecisiveleversforsalesteamswhowanttoincreasetheirsalessuccess.The“SalesUp!”program,whenconsistentlyapplied,usuallydeliverssalesincreasesof20to40percent.Focus!Focus!Focus!OnthemarketsegmentswiththehighestpotentialforincreasingsalesPush!Push!Push!ConcentrateenergyandideasongrowthareasRBSalesUpengl_S.1-1617.08.200110:50UhrSeite25|SalesUp!Figure2:“SalesUp!”highlightssalesweaknessesthatmostoftenleadtocompaniesnotexploitingmarketpotential“SalesUp!”helpscompaniestoachievemarketsharesthathavebeensquanderedforsometimebecauseofsalesweaknesses.Theonlyaspectsthattheprogramdoesnotaimtochangearethequalityofproductsandservices,andtheprices.4|1.Focus:Focusingtherightsalesmeasuresonthesaleschannels,accounts,productsandmarketswiththehighestpotentialforgrowth.2.Push:Mobilizingandconcentratingallresourcesspecificallyonthesekeymarketsegments.Inalargenumberofsalesprojectsinavarietyofindustriesandonallcontinents,boththeselevershaveprovedtobekey.Otherfactorsmayalsoberelevant,buttheyarefarlessimportantthanFocusandPush.“SalesUp!”producesincredibleresults:AtaEuropeanairlinewithaworldwidenetwork,itbroughtaboutasalesincreaseof20to30percentinsomenationalsalesmarkets.OneofthelargestFrenchtradingfirmsused“SalesUp!”andraisedsalestoitsnewlydefined“A”customersby40per-cent,asdidaEuropeanmediacompanyandaChineseconsumergoodsdistributor.Iftheseleversaresoeffective,whythendosomanysalesorganizationscontinuetoworkinanunfocusedwayandwithdiffuse,andthereforetoolittle,salespressure?Whydotheyleaveuntappedsomuchofthemarketthattheyare“entitledto”throughsloppysalespractices[Figure2]?Ourexperienceshowsthatthereasonsforthisaresimilarinallcases:1.Lackoffocus:Marketsegmentationsthatmayhavebeencorrectinthepast,arere-tainedbysalesmanagersassupposedlybeing“proven”,andareneverreviewed.Atoneinternationaltradingfirm,wewereevenconfrontedwithasegmentationdatingfrom1995–whichdidnotparticularlybotherthemanagement.Customerswhowererankedas“A”inthepastwillprobablystillbe“A”today.Thosewhowereranked“C”inthepastdon'tmeritanyattentiontodayeither.Onlyrarelycanthesalesdivisionstatepre-ciselywhichproductsshouldbesoldtowhichcustomersusingwhichsaleschannels.2.Insufficientsalespressure:Salespeopleprefertospendtheirtimewith“nice”customers,i.e.thosewithwhomtheyhavealwaysdonegoodbusiness,whereevery-thingrunssmoothly,wherethemarketshareispleasing,andwhichjustifiesanicemealwithfinewineeveryonceinawhile.Salespeopletypicallydislikespendingtimewiththosecustomers“whowon'tbuyanythinganyway”,thosewhodospendalot,butunfortunatelywithothersuppliers.Thesalesstaffoverlooksthefactthattheirfavoritecustomersofferfewopportunitiestoincreasesalesvolumes,incontrasttothesupposedlydifficultcustomers.PossiblemarketshareWrongproduct/servicesInadequate