英文版产业经济学教程第5章纵向约束

Chapter5VerticalRestraintsECNUOrientalRealEstateCollege5.1Introduction•VerticalRelationsmeansthefore-and-aftrelationsinvaluechainbetweentwofirms.Oneisupstreamfirm(markedwithM,manufacturer),theotherisdownstreamfirm(markedwithR,retailer).•IOmakesresearchnotonsinglemarket,butonmultiplemarketstheyaffectseachother；VerticalRelationsisthetypicalmodeofmultiplemarketswithinteractiverelations.•Themiddleprocessinverticalrelationsisdrawnintoforspecialization,butbringsintosomenewquestionsatthesametime.•Inthischapter,wediscussreasonswhyanupstreamfirmmightwanttoestablishcontractualtermsdifferentfromthoseofasimpleper-unitconstantpricecontract.Thesecontractualclausesarefrequentlyknownasverticalrestraintsbecausetheynormallyrestrainthedownstreamfirminsomeway.•一般的，纵向约束是指非纵向一体化的厂商与上下游厂商签订长期的、具有约束力的合同，包括列明零售价格、销售数量、销售区域等条款或行为方式等。其目的是希望能达到一体化的效果，同时又能避免一体化的成本。Traitsofverticalrelations•Verticalrelationsamongfirmsisdifferentfromtherelationwithconsumers：1、Thefirmthatsellsdirectlytotheconsumernormallycontrolsmostofthevariablesthatdetermineconsumerdemand：price,quality,advertising,salesservice,andsoon.Thesameisnottrue,howerer,foramanufacturerwhosellsthrougharetailer：therearemanydeterminantsoffinaldemandthatfallbeyondthemanufacturer’scontrol.2、Competitionexistsamongtradesmengenerallywhilebeingnotamongconsumers.3、Thenumberofintermediatefirmsisamall,whereasthenumberoffinalconsumersislarge.•Popularmanaginginstrumentsappliedbymanufacturersinpatentleechdommarket,automobilemarket,booksmarket,andjeansmarket.etc.•Appliedbykindsoffirmssuchasnewfirmsholdingsmallmarketshare,firmsinpreponderantstate,andduoupolyfirmsinmarketwithmediumconcentration.Researchpremise•Inthischapter,wewilltakenoconsideroftransactioncost,incompletecontracts,ownershipandotherfactorsimportanteveninperfectcompetitionmarket.•Wewillfocusonmonopolycausationofverticalrelations,namelythosefactorscausingverticalcontrolonlywhenmidding-productmarketbeingnocompetitive(Tirole,p217).Policymeaning•Accordingtotraditionalexplanation,verticalrestraintsistoolsbothofshowingmarketpowerandrectifyingmarketfailure.Thereisdifferentpolicymeaningbetweenthesetwoviewpoints.•Ifverticalrestraintsisamodeoffranchisertostrengthselfmarketpower,ortoinducemanufacturerskeepacartel,thenthiskindsofrestraintsshouldberestricted.•Ifverticalrestraintsmakemanufacturersgetservicesfromfranchisersthatcannotbeobtainedfromothers,weneedprovethattheserestraintswillreducesocialwelfarewhenbeingagainstit.•Inroutineofpapersofindustrialorganizations,ifthediscussedupstreamfirm(directlyorindirectly)controlsalldecisionsinitsverticalstructure,wesaythefirmisverticalintegrated.•“Verticallyintegratedprofit”meansthemaximalamountofaggregateprofitgainedbytheverticalstructure,namelygeneralprofittheverticalstructurecangetwhenalldecision-makingvariablescanbeobserved,confirmed,andwrittenincontractwithnocost.•Thesekindsofcontractarrangementiscalledresumptivelyas“verticalrestraints”.(Tirole,p217)FundamentalframeworkCommoncontractform：•Linearprice(线性价格)——paymentoffranchiserstomanufacturer,T(q)=wq,wastradeprice,andqaschoicevariablesoffranchisers.•Franchisefee(特许费)A——paymentchangedasT(q)=A+wq•Resale-pricemaintenance(RPM，转售/卖价格限制)——regulationsonfranchisers’saleprice.Ceilingprice(价格上限)andfloorprice(价格下限)aretwovariationofRPM.CeilingpriceplusfloorpriceisjustRPM.•Quantityfixing(数量定额)——rulesfranchisers’quantityq.•Quantityforcing(数量强销)andquantityrationing(数量配给)aretwovariationofquantityfixing.•Ifdemandisknownandonlydependonfinalprice,andfranchiserscannotthrowawayproducts,thenquantityforcingisequaltoceilingpriceandquantityrationingisequaltofloorprice.qqqqEnvironmentconditions•Simplecase：deterministicenvironment•Complexcase：randomandinformationasymmetry.•Importantviewpoint：bundleofverticalrestraintsusedinpracticedependsoncorrelativeinformationenvironment——dependsonwhatmanufacturercanobserveandwhatitcanenforce.Distinguishincompetitivetraits•Competeinbrand——monopolymanufacturerandcompetitivefranchisers.•Competeamongbrands——competitivemanufacturers,franchiserscansellproductsnotlimittoprovidedbycertainmanufacturer.•Severalinput——downriverfirmsproducefinalproductusingseveralinputs.5.2Doublemarginalization(双重加价Spengler,1950)Assumption：•Demandonfinalproduct(producedbyfirmR)isD(p),andfirmRismonopolyinthismarket.•Produceunitfinalproductusingoneunitmidding-product(producedbyfirmM),firmMisalsomonopolyinitsmarket.•FirmRpaysonlytradepricewtosupplierM•MarginalcostoffirmMisconstantProfitmaximizationinverticalintegration•Heretradepricewistransferprice,whichdeterminesmarginalcostoffirmR.•Profitfunction：π=(p-c)D(p),markaspriceofprofitmaximization.•Togetaggregateprofitmaximization,tradepriceshouldbesetasw=c•ThenprofitoffirmMis0MpSolutioninverticaldisintegration•FirmMdeterminestradeprice,andaccordingtowhichfirmRdeterminespurchasingamount.•Togetprofit,firmMwillsetpricewc.•ThenMCoffirmRbew(assumefirmMsetw=),sothepriceofprofitmaximizationis(seechart4.1)•Andthepricemustbehigherthanpriceinverticalintegration,namelyp.MpRpMpchart4.1DoublemarginalizationRpMpRqDMCcMqRMProblemofdou