供应链下游成员合作利润分配方法研究

江苏科技大学硕士学位论文供应链下游成员合作利润分配方法研究姓名：周嫄媛申请学位级别：硕士专业：管理科学与工程指导教师：王利20080301λ1/2λ=1λ=ShapleyNash1λ=λ=5/6[0,1]λ∈[0,2/3]λ∈(2/3,1]λ∈0ShapleyNashStackelbergIShapleyNashShapleyNashStackelbergABSTRACTResearchonCooperativeProfitAllocationMethodsinDownstreamSupplyChainABSTRACTIntoday’smarketingeconomicenvironment,competitionsevolvegraduallybecomingthecompetitionsbetweensupplychainandsupplychain.Insupplychainenvironment,inordertogainstrongercompetitivestrengthandprofit,theenterprisedecision-makingoughttobesetofffromoptimumangleofentiresupplychaincooperationandrealizetheoverallsituationoptimizationandreachwin-win.Meanwhile,distributingchannelrevolutionhasbroughtaboutenormouschannelorganizationformchange.Andtheauthorityleaderinchannelmayalsochange.Membersinthedownsteamsupplychainstruggleforthechannelpowerandmorecooperativeprofitsduringthecooperation,whichseriouslyaffectstheefficiencyandeffectivenessofthewholechannel,eventhestabilityandevolutionofsupplychain.Soitisnecessarytoallocatecooperativeprofitreasonablyamongmembersinordertomakesureeverymember’sownprofitwillincreasewhilethewholechannelprofitisthemaximum,whichisalsoverysignificanttoimprovethecooperativerelationshipbetweenmembersandmaintainthestabilityofsupplychain.Thisdissertationanalyzesanddiscussesthecooperativeprofitgamemodelofthetwo-stageandthethree-stagedownstreamsupplychain.Anditalsoanalyzesanimpactoftheeconomiccooperationrelationshipcoefficientovereveryvariableparameter,namelywhetherthefurtherrelationshipcaninfluenceeverymemberandthewholechannelprofit.Whenthechannelprofitreachesthemaximum,thecooperativeprofitisallocatedamongthemembers,inordertostabilizethecooperationrelation,liftentirechannelcompetition,realizetheentiretyandpartoptimum.Firstly,itdescribestheconnotationofcooperationrelationshipandpointsoutthatinthisdissertationcooperationrelationshipreferstotheeconomicrelationaboutprofitwhichisoneaspectofcooperationrelationship.Itdiscussesthepositionandeffectofcoreenterpriseinthesupplychain.Andthecoreenterpriselocationchangehasalsobeenanalyzed.Thereasonsofchannelpartnerscooperationrelationshipformingandtheeffectsofchannelauthoritytocooperationarediscussed.Andthetransferringwayofchannelauthorityisdescribedwhichisrelatedtocoreenterpriselocationchange.Thenasmallcaseisusedtoexplainthetheorypart.Then,thisdissertationstudiesfurtheronthecooperativeprofitgamemodelofthetwo-stage“double-directionandprincipal-subordinate”supplychain,includinghowtheothervariablesABSTRACTchangefollowingthecooperationrelationshipcoefficientwhenthecorememberliesindifferentpositionandthechannelpowerisownedbydifferentmember.Wecangetconclusionsasthatwhencooperationrelationcoefficientλbecomeslarger,salesvolumeisabletospeedupenhancingunceasingly;thechannelismoreandmoreunimpeded;retailpricedecreasesunceasingly;theconsumerhavegainedmorewelfare;thecoreenterpriseprofitincreasesspeedily;butthenon-coreenterpriseprofitdecreasesspeedily.Thechannelprofitwillincreasebutatthepointof1/2λ=,theincreasingspeedwillbecomeslowerandwhen1λ=itreachthemaximum.Fromtheentireoptimum,cooperativeprofitshouldbeallocatedinthecompletelycooperationsituation.Then,ShapleyValueandNashNegotiationModelisusedtoallocatethecooperativeprofit.Thesameallocationresultistestifiedandanalyzedthroughanexample.Next,bybuildinganexpandingcooperativeprofitgamemodeloftwo-stagesupplychain(onemanufacturerandtwodistributors)anddothesimilaranalysisonit,wecangetsomerelevantconclusionswith“one-one”model.Butthechannelprofitincreasingspeedwillnotchangethatisthedifferentpoint.Sotheconclusionsof“one-one”modelspreadsto“one-two”model.Finally,bybuildingancooperativeprofitgamemodelofthree-stage“muti-directionandprincipal-subordinate”supplychain(onemanufacturer,onedistributorandoneretailer)anddothesimilaranalysisonit,wecangetsomerelevantconclusions:Nomatterwhoiscoreenterpriseandwhohaschannelauthority,channelprofitreachesthemaximumat1λ=,namelywhencompletelycooperation,andatthe5/6λ=increasingspeedwillbecomeslower.Thecoreenterpriseprofitincreasesspeedily.Thenon-coreenterprisewhichmakesdecisionfirsthaslessprofitthanthenon-coreenterprisemakesdecisionlaterandthetwoenterprisesprofitchangeinthesamewayintheinterval[0,1]λ∈,andwhen[0,2/3]λ∈theprofitisincreasing,whiledecreasingwhen(2/3,1]λ∈untildecreaseto0at1λ=.Byanalyzingthetwo-stageandthethree-stagecooperativeprofitgamemodelandcostimprovement,theexternaleconomicexistingincostimprovementofsupplychainmembersisexplained;whencooperationrelationisfurther,theeffectivenessismoreevident.Inthesameway,whenthechannelprofitreachesthemaximum,weallocatetheprofitbetweenthemembersbyintegratingandoptimizingthetwomethodsabove.Thentheallocationresultistestifiedandanalyzedthroughanexample.Theinnovationsofthisdissertationare:onthebasisofdeformationdemandfunctiondevelopingacooperativeprofitgamemodelofthethree-stagemuti-directionprincipal-subordinatesupplychainanddoingaserieseconomicanalysis;Theanalysisofthetwo-stagemodelandthethree-stagemodelandthecomparationoftheexternaleconomicABSTRACTanalysisofthecostimprovementtothethree-stagesupplychainmodelan