基于交易信用的供应链协调策略研究

上海交通大学硕士学位论文基于交易信用的供应链协调策略研究姓名：范笑燕申请学位级别：硕士专业：企业管理指导教师：任建标20080101-1--2-,-3-RESEARCHONSUPPLYCHAINCOORDINATIONWITHTRADECREDITABSTRACTInrealcommercialactivitiessupplychainmembersarealwaysprimarilyconcernedwithoptimizingtheirownbenefitwhentheymakedecisionsfortheyareindependentofeachother.Usuallytheobjectivetooptimizethebenefitofsupplychainsystemasawholeisdifferentfromtheobjectivesofseparatemembers,sometimesevenconflictwiththem.Wheneachmembertriestooptimizetheirownbenefittheperformanceofthewholesupplychainwillinevitablybehurt.Supplychaincoordinationistomaketheobjectiveofeachmemberalignedwiththegoalofthewholesupplychainsystem,i.e.wheneachmemberachievetheobjectiveofbenefitoptimizationthewholesystemcanalsorealizeitsoptimalperformance.Thesupplychaincoordinationcontractistheimportantmeantoencouragethememberstotakeactionsaccordingtothegoalofthewholesystemoptimization.Tradecreditisthecreditofferedintheexchangeofgoodsorservices.Ifatimelapsebetweenthedeliveryofgoodsorserviceandthereceiptofpaymentthecreditisoffered.Tradecreditallowsthebuyerstodelaythepaymentorallowthesellerdelaythedeliveryofgoodsorservice.Itisanincentivetobothparties.Soiftradecreditcontractiswelldesigneditcaninducethetwosides’actionalignedwiththewholesupplychain’soptimizationobjective.First,inthesecondchapterbasedonthetheoreticalandempiricalresearchfindingsinfinance,strategicmanagementandmarketingthepaperfindsevidencetousetradecreditasincentiveincoordinationcontract.Thenthethirdchapterreviewstheliteratureonsupplychaincoordinationwithcontractsfromwhichthegeneralresearchmethodis-4-synthesized.Thefourthchapterbuildsamodelbasedontradecreditcontract.Optimalactionsinthismodelareidentified.Theperformanceofsupplychainwithtradecreditcontractindecentralizedcontrolsystemiscomparedwiththatunderprice-onlycontractandalsowiththatincentralcontrolsystem.Themethodofadjustingparameterstodividethesupplychain’sprofitamongthefirmsisalsofound.Finally,theresearchfindingsarevalidatedbysimulation.Thedissertationprovedtradecreditcontractcancoordinatethesupplychain.Thecontractalsohasflexibilityallowingforlimiteddivisionofthesupplychain’sprofitamongthefirmsbyadjustingparameters.Suggestionisgivenincontractparameterssettingandthemethodtoidentifythereasonablescaleoftheparameterswhichprovidesomereferencetocontractsettingpractice.KEYWORDS:SupplyChainCoordinationContractTradeCredit,NewsvendorModel,StackelbergGame-1-11.1-2-RajanZingales19951199118%25%70%55%1.21-3-23451.3-4-1Figure1ResearchProcessCentralcontrolSelfservingfocusDecentralizedcontrol-5-StackelbergGameWqW1oq2()()W|qargmaxWqR*π=()()Wq,Wmax*Sπ*W()()***Wq,W3*W()o**qWq=-6-BackwardInduction1.4-7--8-22.1,,,,,,,,-9-2.280%/2-10-Figure2TheoriesofTradeCredit2.2.1Smith(1987)2MianandSmith19923PetersenandRajan(1997)4Smith(1987)2PikeandCheng(1996)5PetersenandRajan6(1994,1997)-11-PetersenandRajan(1997)6WilsonandSummers(2002)7-12-2.2.2Smith(1987)2MianandSmith(1992)38-13-2.2.3-14-33.13.23.2.1-15-3cqwwD-16-3Figure3SimplifiedSupplyChainStructure3.2.2cwpmin[q,D]qqDcwPDq-17-3.2.312cπdπcdππcπ3dπ-18-3.2.41wqpquantityfixingcontractq2w33ws,S4-19-5678-20-3.33.3.1StackelbergGamewqVoluntaryCompliance-21-ForcedCompliance3.3.2DD0FFFF(0)=0F1F−=µE[F]µ=p~c~,p~c~0Lc~v~c~v~v~qD)min(q,S(q)=∫∫−=+−=q0q0F(x)dxqxf(x)dxF(q))q(1S(q)3-1E+−)Dq(∫−=−=q0S(q)qx)f(x)dx(qI(q)3-2E+−)qD(∫∞−=−=qS(q)µq)f(x)dx(xL(q)3-3-22-∫∞=0xf(x)dxµT~T~-µc~qv~)S(q)c~v~p~(T~L(q)c~I(q)v~S(q)p~(q)~LLLR−++−=−−+=π3-4qc~-T~(q)~S=π3-5µc~(q)~(q)LRR+=ππ3-6Lc~v~p~p+−=3-7Lc~()v~p~−v~c~c−=3-8v~()v~c~−qv~T~T−=3-93-63-73-83-93-43-5TpS(q)(q)R−=π3-10cqT(q)S−=π3-11cqpS(q)(q)(q)Π(q)SR−=+=ππ3-12oq(q)maxargqoΠ=FΠ(q)pc1)F(qo−=3-13-23-NashEquilibrium3.4.13.43.4.1WholesalePriceContractPrice-onlyContract-24-Spenler(1950)9QuantityDiscountsContractwwqw)(q,Tw=3-14*Rq(q)maxargqπR*R=w)(q,πRq0w)(qpS'*R=−3-15(q)S'qw=co*Rqq=012-25-3-16pw1)q(F*R−=Fw*Rq)q(wq)q(Fp)q(w=3-16()()()()qcqwqw,qS−=π3-17()()()()cqq'wqwqqw,qS−+=∂∂π3-18()()()()()cqFqqf1qwqqw,qS−−=∂∂πc()qw()()qFqqf1−()()qFqqfIncreasingGeneralizedFailureRate∗*Sq()*Sqw*Sq∗IncreasingGeneralizedFailureRateIGFRX()xF()xf()()()()()xFxxfxF-1xxfxg==GeneralizedFailureRateGFR()xg()xg()xF()()xFxfLarierePorteus2000-26-()()*S*SSqw,qπ()()*S*SRqw,qπ()()*R*RRqw,qπ()()()()0qqpfqqw'qqw,qR=−=∂∂πqw=cwc()qwqo*SqqΠoq()o*sqqq∈1()()o*SqqΠΠ2()()()*S*S*SSqqwqΠπ()[]()1,0q0kqqFk∈=()()()2kk1k11+++−()()2k1k++()()212kk−+kkk∞011-27-1Table1WholesalePriceContractPerformanceWhenDemandFollowsaPowerDistributionwithParameterkk()()o*SqqΠΠ()()()*S*S*SSqqwqΠπµσ0.273.70%54.50%1.510.473.90%58.30%1.020.874.60%64.30%0.671.676.20%72.20%0.423.279.10%80.80%0.253.4.2(BuybackContract)ReturnContractPasternmack198510EmmonsGilbert199811Wang200412wbb)q(wbS(q)bI(q)wqb)w,(q,Tb−+=−=3-19wb≤(0,1]λ∈{}b,wbλpbp=−λcbwb=−λΠ(q)b)q(wb)S(q)(pb),w(q,bbR=−−−=π3-20o*Rqq=-28-λ{}b,wbλoqλ)Π(q)(1cqb)q(wbS(q)b),w(q,bbS−=−−+=π3-21oqoqqoqoqqPorteus(2000)13PadmanabhanPng(1995)143.4.3(RevenueSharingContract)Mortimer2000157%CachonLariviere(2000)16-29-GerchakChoRay200117CachonLariviere200218Giannoccaro200319rwφφ1−φ)pS(q)(1qwφ),w(q,Trrr−+