国际金融英文版(托马斯A普格尔著)---Chapter7

Chapter7InternationalLendingandFinancialCrisesInternationalLendingandFinancialCrisesAnanalysisofthebenefitsofinternationallendingandborrowing.Financialcrises–Whydidmanyfinancialcrisesoccur?–Howcanweresolvethem?–Whatmightwebeabletodotomakethemlessfrequent?InternationalLendingandFinancialCrisesIninternationalfinancialcapitalflows,thelenders(investors)givetheborrowersmoneytobeusednowinexchangeforIOUsorownershipsharesentitlingthemtointerestanddividendslater.Internationalcapitalflowsareconventionallydividedintodifferentcategoriesbytypeoflender(privateversusofficial),bymaturity(longtermversusshortterm),byexistenceofmanagementcontrol(directversusportfolio),andbytypeofborrower(privateorgovernment).InternationalLendingandFinancialCrisesPrivatelendingandinvestingofficiallendingandinvestingInternationalcapitalflowsShorttermLongtermDirectinvestmentloansPortfolioinvestmentSeep157formoredetailsLendingtoforeignborrowerPurchasingbondsissuedbyagovernmentoraforeignenterpriseInternationalLendingandFinancialCrisesInternationalcapitalflowscanbringtwotypesofbenefits.–First,itrepresentsintertemporaltrade,inwhichthelendergivesupresourcestodayinordertogetmoreinthefuture,andtheborrowergetsresourcestodaybutmustbewillingtopaybackmoreinthefuture.–Second,itallowslenderstodiversifytheirinvestmentsmorebroadly,sotheycanlowertheriskinessoftheentireportfolioofinvestmentthroughgreaterdiversification.Internationalcapitalflowscanbewell-behavedandbadly-behaved,thesearethemainpointsofthischapter.Gainsandlossesfromwell-behavedinternationallendingBasicassumptions:theworldisstableandpredictable,andborrowersfullyhonortheircommitmentstorepay.Gainsandlossesfromwell-behavedinternationallending010,0006000PercentyearPercentyear82MPKofU.S.AMPKofJapan546TUVSRdbacefgh42004800Gainsandlossesfromwell-behavedinternationallendingWithinternationalfinancialfreedom,worldproductismaximized.Thereasonforthisgainisthatfreedomallowsindividualwealthholdersthechancetoseekthehighestreturnanywhereintheworld.(seefigure7.1)Thegainsfromthefreecapitalflowsaresplitbetweenthecountries.(seefigure7.1)Butnoteveryoneinthecountriescanbenefitfromthecapitalflows,someoneareharmed.TaxesoninternationallendingIfacountryloomslargeenoughtohavepowerovertheworldmarketrateofreturn,itcanexploitthismarketpowertoitsownadvantage,attheexpenseofothercountriesandtheworldasawhole.(nationallyoptimaltax)seefigure7.1foranillustrationInternationallendingtodevelopingcountriesInternationallendingandborrowingbetweenindustrializedcountriesgenerallyiswell-behavedandprovidesmutualbenefits.Butinternationallendingbyindustrializedcountriestodevelopingcountriesisanotherstory.Thereareperiodicinternationalcrisesinwhichlendingfromindustrializedcountriestodevelopingcountriescannotbepaidback.Ifacountrycannotpaybackthemoney,wesayitdefaults.Internationallendingtodevelopingcountries:thesurgeininternationallending,1974-1982BeforeWorldWar1therewasalargeamountofinternationallending,withBritainasthemaincreditorandthegrowingnewlysettledcountriesasthemainborrowers.Toalargeextentthisinternationallendingwaswellbehaved.Duringthe1920s,alargenumberofforeigngovernmentsborrowedfromtheUnitedStates.Thedepressioninthe1930sledtomassivedefaultsbydevelopingcountries.Fromthenonlendingtodevelopingcountriesremainedverylowforfourdecades.Internationallendingtodevelopingcountries:thesurgeininternationallending,1974-1982Theoilshocksofthe1970sledtoasurgeinprivateinternationallendingtodevelopingcountries.Fourforcescombinedtocreatethesurge.–First,themajorinternationalprivatebanksgainedlargeamountsofpetrodollarstobelenttootherborrowers.–Second,therewaswidespreadpessimismabouttheprofitabilityofcapitalformationinindustrializedcountries.Attentionbegantoshifttodevelopingcountries,whichhadlongbeenforcedtoofferhigherratesofinterestanddividendstoattractevensmallamountsofprivatecapital.Internationallendingtodevelopingcountries:thesurgeininternationallending,1974-1982–Third,indevelopingcountries,the1970swasaneraofpeakresistancetoforeigndirectinvestment,inordertogainaccesstothehigherreturnsofferedindevelopingcountries,bankshadtolendoutrighttogovernmentsandcompaniesinthesecountries.–Fourth,“herding”behaviormeantthatthelendingtodevelopingcountriesacquiredamomentumofitsownonceitbegantoincrease.Internationallendingtodevelopingcountries:thedebtcrisisof1982InAugust1982,Mexicodeclaredthatitwasunabletoserviceitslargeforeigndebt.Dozensofotherdevelopingcountriesfollowedsuit.ThiswascalledtheDebtCrisisof1982.Whydidthecrunchcomein1982?Severalfactorsexplainwhythecrunchcamein1982.Thenominalinterestratesincreasedandthepricelevelplummeted,sotherealinterestratesincreased.Theindustrializedcountriessankintoasevererecession,thedevelopingcountries’exportsdeclined.Sothedebtors’abilitytorepayfelldramatically.Internationallendingtodevelopingcountries:thedebtcrisisof1982ReactionsofthebanksSmallerbanks(thoseholdingsmallsharesofallloans)headedfortheexitsandsoldofftheirloans.Largerbankshopedthatthecrisisisaliquidityproblemresheduledloanpaymentstoestablishrepaymentobligationsi