工程项目供应链整合管理激励协调模型研究

华中科技大学博士学位论文工程项目供应链整合管理激励协调模型研究姓名：陈建华申请学位级别：博士专业：管理科学与工程指导教师：马士华20061030-I-Stackelberg-II-AbstractWithrespecttoresearchobjectofdomesticlarge-scaleinfrastructureconstructionprojects,bygenerallyapplyingsupplychainmanagementthoughts,incentivetheory,operationresearch,econometrics,gametheoryandinformationeconomicsandsomeothermethodsforsystemoptimizationanddecision-makingmodelling,theoreticalframeworkofconstructionsupplychainintegrationmanagementwasanalyzedqualitatively.Furthermore,fromperspectiveofincentivecoordination,coordinationmechanismsanddecisionmethodsofconstructionsupplychaininenvironmentofintegratedprojectmanagementwerestudiedthroughquantitativemodelling;someeffectivecoordinationmanagementtacticsforthemainprojectparticipants/partiesofconstructionsupplychainwereobtainedthroughsolvingandanalyzingthemodels.Themaincontentsandconclusionsareasfollows:Essenceofthesupplychainwasanalyzedandconceptofthesupplychainwasextendedfirstly.Then,bycomparativeanalysisofindustryenvironment,marketmanagementsystemandlarge-scaleinfrastructureconstructionprojectsmanagementmodeoftheconstructionindustryindomesticandoverseas,aviewpointthattheProjectCorporationshouldbethecorememberofconstructionsupplychainwaspresented.Then,anet-chainstructureofconstructionsupplychainandanintegratedelementsframeworkofconstructionsupplychainintegrationmanagementwereconstructedfromproject’slifecycleperspective.Consideringdifferentorganizationalrelationshiplevelsandintegrationlevels,basedonstaggeredcharacteristicsofsupplychainintegrationinstrategiclevelandhierarchicalrelations&spiredadvancingprocessofintegratedelementsinoperationallevel,thebasicallianceconstructingprocessandanintegratedoperationframeworkmodelofconstructionsupplychainwerepresented,correspondingoperationthoughtsandinternalfactorsofcoordinationmechanismswereanalyzed.FromperspectiveoftheProjectCorporationandthecontractorintheconstructionsupplychain,optimizationproblemofprojectdurationcoordinationdecision-makingbetweentheProjectCorporationandonecontractorthroughexplicitrevenueincentivecontractwasconsidered;aStackelbergrevenueincentivecontractmodelwiththeProject-III-Corporationastheleaderandthecontractorasthefollowerwassetupbasedonthegametheoryandbi-levelprogrammingmethod.BackwardinductionwasappliedandcorrespondinggeneticalgorithmswasdesignedtosolvesubgameperfectNashequilibriumsolutionofthenonlinearprogrammingmodel.CombiningwithaNumericalstudy,sensitivitiesofrelativefactorsinfluencingtheapproximateoptimalequilibriumsolutionwereanalyzed.TheresearchresultsshowedthattherevenueincentivemechanismcanhelptoactualizecoordinationoptimizationofprojectdurationandParetoimprovementofrevenueobjectforthetwopartiesincontract.Furthermore,basedontheincentivetheoryandprincipalagentmodel,arevenueincentivemodelformulti-objects(projectdurationandquality)coordinationequilibriumimprovementbetweentheProjectCorporationandthecontractorwasconstructedandsolvedbythefirst-orderapproach.Theresearchresultsshowedthat,thecontractorcanbepromotedtoimproveitseffortlevelandtoallocateitsresourcesrationallyinmulti-objectssoastorealizecoordinationequilibriumimprovementamongthemulti-objectsthroughprovidingabalancedincentivecombination.Anumericalstudyalsotestifiedvalidityofthemodel.Finally,atwo-stagedynamicrevenueincentivemodelwasputforwardthroughanextendedstudy.Basedonthewholemarketenvironmentoftheconstructionindustry,consideringwiththelong-termmechanismandimplicitreputationincentivefactor,atwo-stagedynamicincentivecontractmodelintegratingtheimplicitreputationincentivemechanismwiththeexplicitrevenueincentivemechanismwasestablished.ConditionsofeffectiveequilibriumandParetoimprovementofthereputationincentivemechanismwereobtained.Throughanumericalstudy,factorsinfluencingeffectofthereputationincentivemechanismwereanalyzed.Thereafter,someconclusionsweregeneralizedtoanundatedsituation;existenceofimplicitreputationincentivemechanismanditsincentiveeffecttotheagentsintheconstructionindustrymarketwerediscussed.KeywordsProjectmanagementSupplychainmanagementConstructionsupplychainSupplychainintegrationCoordinationmechanismIncentivecoordination_____-1-11.11.1.12070ConstructionIndustryDelaGarza,1994197519991%197519963%Vrijhoef&Koskela,200012%Agapiouetal.,1998bLim&Alum,199520045.7%20035.5%2.2%20032.3%Proverbs&Holt,2000Daintyetal.,2001bYeo&Ning,2002CII1/3Anderson,199012.4%Cox19995%8%52%Conlin&Retik,19972090CIIA,1996APCC,1997DISR,1999Mohamed&Tucker,1996Client/OwnerDesigner/EngineerContractorSupervisorConsultant/Plant/MaterialSupplierAuthorityProjectParticipants/PartiesAdversarialNgetal.,2002Loveetal.,20042005,2002Briscoe&Dainty,2005Hong-Minhetal.,2001Dainty,2004Win-WinXueetal.,2005Wong&Fung,1999Akintoyeetal.,2000Ofori,2000Wang,2000Liuetal.,2004DISR,1999Olsson,2000Egan,1998C-21-SC,1999Tang,2001CollaborationIntegrationCommunicationCoordinationLoveetal.,2004,20052090,2004SupplyChainManagement,SCMManufacturingIndustryKoskela1992Koskela,1997,2000Akintoye1995JITBertelsen1993O'BrienFischer1993,1995Construc