德意志银行报告－国家竞争力

ResearchNotesEconomicsAdvisoryCommitteePeterCorneliusShellInternationalProf.SoumitraDuttaINSEADProf.Dr.MichaelFrenkelWHUKoblenzProf.Dr.HelmutReisenOECDDevelopmentCentreProf.Dr.NorbertWalterDeutscheBankResearchDeutscheBankResearchFrankfurtamMainGermanyInternet:@db.comFax:[phone]ManagingDirectorNorbertWalterNovember19,2004No.16ResearchNotesWorkingPaperSeriesCorporatePracticesandNationalGovernanceSystems:WhatdoCountryRankingsTellUs?•Nationscompeteforinvestmentcapital,andtheassurancesinvestorsseekastheydecidetoprovidethatcapitalareuniversal.Thequalityofinstitutionsmatter.Thelegalsystemplaysaparticularlyimportantrole,withstronginvestorprotectionlawsgenerallylinkedwithbroaderanddeepercapitalmarkets,amoredispersedshareholderbase,andamoreefficientallocationofcapitalacrossfirms.Arguably,goodcorporategovernanceatthefirmlevelmayatleastpartlycompensateforperceivedweaknessesintheinstitutionalandlegalframework,whichhasledtoarisingdemandforaglobalbenchmarkofcorporatebehaviour.Inresponsetothisgrowingdemand,theFinancialTimes(FT),inpartnershipwithInstitutionalShareholderServices(ISS),hasrecentlyproducedapilotindex,whichattemptstoassessthequalityoffirm-levelgovernanceinthe23largestcapitalmarkets.•Inthispaper,wecomparetheFT/ISSindexrankingswithsurveyevidencefromtheWorldEconomicForum’sGlobalCompetitivenessReport.Wethenjuxtaposetheperceivedqualityofcorporategovernanceatthefirmlevelwiththequalityofthelegalandinstitutionalframeworkinwhichcompaniesoperatein.Basedonthisanalysis,weidentifyoverachieverswhotranscendlocalpracticeaswellasunderachieverswhosepracticesaresub-par.Finally,wediscusscorporategovernanceintheEUaccessioncountriesandtheextenttowhichthequalityofgovernancehasaffectedthemodeofentryforforeigninvestment.•Wedrawthreebroadconclusions:First,althoughperceptionsaboutthequalityofcorporategovernanceatthecompanylevelappeartobeconsistentwiththepropositionsofthe“lawmatters”school,otherfactorssuchaspoliticsandculturalandhistoricalrootsseemtoplayanimportantrole,too.Second,thereisarelativelyclosecorrelationbetweenthemeasured,aswellasperceivedqualityofcorporategovernanceatthecountrylevelandthecompanylevel.However,thereexistimportantoutliers.Importantly,thereareseveralcountrieswhosecompaniesonaverageappeartofollowbetterpracticesthanthequalityoftheirlegalandregulatoryenvironmentswouldsuggest.Goodcorporategovernanceatthecompanylevelmaycompensateforweakframeworkconditions,suggestingthatasystems-focusedviewmayleadtoexcessiveriskaversion.Third,perceptionsaboutthequalityofcorporategovernanceatthecompanylevelarelargelyinlinewithmeasurableindicatorsemployedbytheFTSE/ISSindex,providingfurthersupportforthehypothesisthatacompany’sgovernancepracticesneednotbetiedorconstrainedbyitslocalenvironment.PeterCornelius,[phone]([e-mail])CorporatePracticesandNationalGovernanceSystems:WhatdoCountryRankingsTellUs?PeterCorneliusShellInternationalandVlerickLeuvenGentManagementSchoolAbstractNationscompeteforinvestmentcapital,andtheassurancesinvestorsseekastheydecidetoprovidethatcapitalareuniversal.Motivatedbythegrowingappetiteforaglobalbenchmarkofcorporatebehaviour,thispaperexaminestherelationshipbetweenthemeasuredqualityofcorporategovernanceatthefirmlevelandnationalcompetitiveness.Itbeginsbyanalyzingtheperceivedqualityofinstitutionsinthe23largestcapitalmarkets.Hypothesizingthatgoodcorporategovernanceatthecompanylevelmaycompensateforperceivedweaknessesintheinstitutionalframework,thepaperthenfocusesonthepilotgovernanceindexdevelopedbytheFinancialTimesandISSandcomparesitwithnewsurveyevidencefromtheWorldEconomicForum’sGlobalCompetitivenessReport.Finally,thepaperdiscussescorporategovernanceintheEUaccessioncountriesandtheextenttowhichthequalityofgovernancehasaffectedthemodeofentryforforeigninvestment.MailingAddress:DrPeterCorneliusShellInternationalShellCentreLondonSE17NAUnitedKingdomTel:[phone]Fax:[phone]Email:[e-mail]destsense,corporategovernancecanbedefinedasthestewardshipresponsibilityofcorporatedirectorstoprovideoversightforthegoalsandstrategiesofacompanyandtofostertheirimplementation.CorporateGovernancemaythusbeperceivedasthesetofinterlockingrulesbywhichcorporations,shareholdersandmanagementgoverntheirbehaviour.Theserulesrefertoindividualfirmattributesandthefactorsthatallowcompaniestomaintainsoundgovernancepracticesevenwherepublicinstitutionsarerelativelyweak.Suchfactorsmayincludeacorporation’sownershipstructure,itsrelationshipswithstakeholders,financialtransparencyandinformationdisclosurepracticesaswellastheconfigurationofitsmanagingboards.Inanygivencountry,thelegalsystemhelpssetsomecorporategovernancestandards.Thesemayvary,andwhileabsoluteconformityofcorporategovernancesystemsisbothunnecessaryandunlikelytobeveryhealthy,thereisnearuniversalrecognitionoftheneedtopreserveinvestorconfidencethroughtransparency,accountability,fairnessandresponsibility(vandenBerghe,2002).Thisrecognitionhasdrivenandcontinuestodriveconvergenceonnotionsofgovernanceandw