次顺位债券的发行与金融监督

I⊕II……IIIIVVAbstractThreeindependentmodelsarebuiltbasedoninformationasymmetrictoanalysisdisciplineeffectsbroughtbybanks`issuanceofsubordinateddebts.Theresearchresultsofferthetheoryofsubordinateddebtsdisciplineeffects.First,anadverseselectionmodelisbuilttoexaminebanks’policieswhenissuingsubordinateddebtsbasedonthebanks’creditrisks.Theresultshowsthatbankswithlowercreditrisksaremorelikelytoissuesubordinateddebts,sinceaftertheissuance,theyieldsofthesedebtsarelower.Whendepositorsobservetheloweryieldsofthesubordinateddebts,theywouldpresumethatthesebankshavelowercreditrisks.Asaresult,bankswithlowercreditriskscandecreasetheiroperationalcostsbyissuingsubordinateddebts.Thismodelhasdemonstratedthatthemarketcandisciplinebanksindirectlythroughtheissuanceofsubordinateddebts.Second,amoralhazardmodeltoshowthatissuingofsubordinateddebtsbybankscanbringdirectmarketdisciplineandindirectmarketdisciplinetomaketheirloanslessrisky.Thedirectmarketdisciplinemeansthattherisklevelofbankwillbeevaluatedbyprofessionalinvestors.Theinvestorswillrequirethattheyieldsaccordtothebanksrisk.Forloweringthecostofissuingsubordinateddebts,bankswillmaketheirloanslessrisky.Theindirectmarketdisciplinemeansthatthedepositorswouldtaketheyieldsofthesedebtsasasignificantsignalindicatingbanksrisklevels.TheVIdepositorswilldecidetowithdrawtheirsavingswhenthebanksignalsahigherrisk,andkeeptheirsavingwhenthebanksignalsalowerrisk.Iprovethatissuingofsubordinateddebtsbybankscanbringaboutthesetwokindsofmarketdiscipline.Themodelhasalsodemonstratedthatifthebanksupervisorcanutilizetheinformationofissuingsubordinateddebtseffectively,theywillachievehighersupervisorygoal.Third,areputationmodelisbuilttoshowthatforreputationconcerns,abankwouldchangeitsmonitoringdecisionsifitissuessubordinateddebts.Reputationeffectinbanksisdifferentindifferentscenarios.Whenthegoodbanksprobabilityofsuccessisveryhigh,reputationeffectwouldinducethebadbanktostartmonitorit`sborrowers,andtheeffortsofbadbanksmonitoringwouldbeincreasedbytime.Whenthebadbanksprobabilityofsuccessisverylow,reputationeffectwouldinducethegoodbankstartmonitoringitsborrowers.andtheeffortsofbadbanksmonitoringwouldbedecreasesbytime.Keywords:subordinateddebt,marketdiscipline,adverseselection,moralhazard,reputationVII............................................................................................................1............................................................................................1............................................................................................4................................................................................5....................................................................................................7............................................................................7..................13..................................................................18..................................................................20..................................................23..............................................................30..................................................................................30..........................................................35..........................................38..........................................................................................42..........................................44......................................................................45..........................................................49......................................55......................................64..........................................................................................66..........................................................67......................................68..................................................72......................................................................79..........................................................................85..........................................................................................89VIII..........................................................................................................91..........................................................................................91..........................................................................................92..........................................................................................9597................................................................................................102............................................................................105................................25........................271.1......................................................................................................63.1....................................................................................................324.1................534.2....60121342marketdiscipline51.161.1a.b.a.b7833912341011