转轨时期我国银行信贷合约的设计

上海大学硕士学位论文转轨时期我国银行信贷合约的设计姓名：刘凌云申请学位级别：硕士专业：金融学指导教师：张梅琳20050601转轨时期我国银行信贷合约的设计作者：刘凌云学位授予单位：上海大学参考文献(112条)1.AghionP.PBoltonyAnincompletecontractsapproachtofinancialcontracting1992(59)2.AllenF.DouglasGOptimalSecurityDesign1989(02)3.AndersonWFinancialContractingunderExtremeUncertainty:AnAnalysisofBrazilianCorporateDebentures2004(51)4.AndersonRW.SureshSDesignandValuationofDebtContracts2001(09)5.BarroRJ.KLefflerTheRoleofMarketForcesInAssuringContractualPerformance1981(89)6.BarroRJTheloanmarket,collateralandratesofinterest1976(08)7.BergerA.GUdellSomeEvidenceOntheEmpiricalSignificanceofCreditRationing2002(100)8.BesankoD.AVThakorCollateralandRationing:SortingEquilibrialinmonopolisticandcompetitivecreditmarkets1987(28)9.BesankoD.AVThakorcompetitiveequilibriuminthecreditmarketunderasymmetricinformation1987(42)10.BesterH.ScreenongVsRationinginCreditMarketsWithImperfectInformation1985(75)11.BlinderAlanSCreditRationingandEffectiveSupplyFailures1987(97)12.BarclayMJ.CliffordWSthePriorityStructureofCorporateLiabilities199513.BerkovitchE.RonenIOptimalBankruptcyLawsAcrossDifferentEconomicSystems2003(12)14.BernheimBD.MichaelDWIncompleteContractsandStrategicAmbiguity1998(88)15.BesterHelmutTheRoleofCollateralinaModelofDebtRenegotiation1994(26)16.BoltonPatrick.DavidSATheoryofPredationBasedonAgencyProblemsinFinancialContracting2003(80)17.BoltonPatrick.DavidSOptimalDebtStructureandtheNumberofCreditors1996(104)18.BootA.StuartGReputationandDiscretioninFinancialContracting2004(83)19.BrownDTClaimholderIncentiveConflictsinReorganization1989(20)20.BesterH.MHellwig.GBanberg.KSpremannMoralHazardandEquilibriumCreditRationing198721.BencivengaVR.SmithBDFinancialintermediationandendogenousgrowth1991(58)22.CantilloMiguel.JulianWrightHowdoFirmsChooseTheirLender?AnEmpiricalInvestigation2000(13)23.CarletonWillardT.JamesMNelson.MichaelSWeisbachTheInfluenceofInstitutionsonCorporateGovernancethroughPrivateNegotiations:EvidencefromTIAA-CREF1998(LⅢ)24.ChanYOnthePositiveRoleofFinancialIntermediationinAllocationofVentureCapitalinaMarketwithImperfectInformation1983(38)25.ChangchuntheDynamicStructureofOptimalDebtContracts1990(52)26.DavidCWebbTheImportanceofIncorporateInformationInExplatingTheExistenseofCostlyBankruptcy1987(54)27.DiamondDW.DybvigPHBankruns,DepositInsuranceandLiquidity1983(03)28.DiamondDWFianancialIntermediationandDelegatedMonitoring1984(51)29.DiamondDWReputationAcquisitioninDebtMarkets1989(97)30.DiamondDWSeniorityandMaturityofDebtContracts1993(33)31.DuffeeGREstimatingthePriceofDefaultRisk1999(02)32.Demarzo.DarrellALiquity-basedModelofSecurityDesign1999(67)33.Duffee.GregoryREstimatingthePriceofDefaultRisk1999(02)34.DuffeeDarrell.KennethJSingletonModelingtermstructuresofDefaultableBonds1999(02)35.DeangeloHarry.LindaDeangeloDevidendPolicyandFinancialDistress:AnEmpiricalInvestigationofTroubleNYSEFirms2004(XLV)36.EberhartAC.WilliamTMoore.RodneyLRoenfeldtSecurityPricingandDeviationfromtheAbsolutePriorityRuleinBankruptcyProceedings1990(XLV)37.FrajaStrategicdebtinverticalrelationships:theoryandevidence2004(58)38.FaureGrimaud.AntoineThomasMariottiOptimalDebtContractsandtheSingle-CrossingCondition1999(65)39.GortonGary.JamesKahntheDesignofBankLoanContracts2000(13)40.GrahamLiamModellingnominaldebtcontractsandfixedratedebt2005(88)41.HarrisMThedesignofSecurities1989(24)42.HartOliver.JohnMooreDebtandSeniority:AnAnalysisoftheRoleofHardClaimsinConstrainingManagement1995(85)43.HealyPaulM.KrishnaGPalepuEffectivenessofAccounting-basedDividendCovenants1990(12)44.HolmstromB.TiroleJModelingaggregateliquidity1996(86)45.InnesRobertDLimitedLiabilityandIncentiveContractingwithEx-anteActionChoices1990(52)46.JensonMichaelC.WilliamHMecklingTheoryofTheFirm:ManagerialBehavior,AgencyCostsandOwnershipstructure1976(03)47.JaffeeD.FModiglianiAtheoryandtestofcreditrationing1969(59)48.JaffeeD.TRussellImperfectinformation,uncertainty,andcreditrationing1976(90)49.JosedephEStiglitz.AndrewWeissCreditRationing:Reply1987(77)50.KrepsD.RWilsonSequencialEquilibrium1982(50)51.KimJ.KrishnaRamaswamy.SureshSunderesanDoesDefaultRiskinCouponsAffecttheValuationofCorporateBonds?:AcontingentClaimsModel199352.KleinB.KLefflerTheroleofmarketforcesinassuringcontractualperformance1981(89)53.Laporta.Rafael.FlorencioLopiz-de-Silanes.AndreiShleiferLawandFinance1998(106)54.LaportaRafaelFlorencioLopiz-de-Silanes,AndreiShleifer.InvestorProtection:Origins,Consequences,Reform199955.LelandHayenECorporateDebtValue,BondCovenants,andOptimalCapitalStructure1994(XLIX)56.LelandHE.PyleInformationalAsymmetries,FinancialStructureandFinancialIntermediation1977(32)57.LonghoferStanleyD.StephonRPetersProtectionforwhom:CreditorConflictandBankruptcy58.MaskinEric.JeanTiroleUnforeseenContingenciesandincompletecontracts1999(66)59.MaskinEric.JohnMooreImplementationandRenegotiation1999(66)60.MituschKAggregateliquidityandbanking:Theroleofloancommitmentsandliquidityconstraints1999(155)61.MorganDPBankcreditcommitments,creditrationing,andmonetarypolicy1994(26)62.ParkCheolMonitoringandStructureofDebtContract200063.RonaldMahieu.ArjenMu