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大学英语四级考试模拟试题(四)PartIWriting(30minutes)Directions:Forthispart,youareallowed30minutestowriteacompositiononthetopicTOEFLInternet-BasedTest.Youshouldwriteatleast120wordsfollowingtheoutlinegivenbelowinChinese:1.托福考试改为网考；2.网考的利与弊。PartIIReadingComprehension(SkimmingandScanning)(15minutes)Directions:Inthispart,youwillhave15minutestogooverthepassagequicklyandanswerthequestions.Forquestions1-7,markY(forYES)ifthestatementagreeswiththeinformationgiveninthepassage.N(forNO)ifthestatementcontradictstheinformationgiveninthepassage.NG(forNOTGIVEN)iftheinformationisnotgiveninthepassage.Forquestions8-10,completethesentenceswiththeinformationgiveninthepassage.Theclimateproblemcanbyandlargebesolvediftheeighttotenlargestcountriesintheworldcanagreeoneffectiveclimatemeasures,saysProfessorJonHovi.OneofthethemesatarecentclimateconferencearrangedbytheNorwegianresearchprogramRENERGIwashowwecanachieveaneffectiveinternationalclimateagreement.ProfessorofpoliticalscienceJonHoviattheUniversityofOsloandCICEROhasstudiedthistopicforyears.Hearguesthatalthoughtheinternationalcommunityfacesmanyobstaclesindealingwiththeclimateproblem,solutionsarepossible.ContinuetheKyotoProcess?HovidoubtswhetheranagreementthatwouldbasicallyextendtheKyotoProtocolforanothercommitmentperiodisthewaytogotoachievemoreeffectiveclimatecooperation.TheKyotoProtocolhasbeendescribedasacautiousfirststep,onethatwillmakeitpossibleforotherstojoininlater.ButkeycountriesliketheUnitedStateshavelittleinterestinjoininganinternationalclimateagreementbasedontheKyotoProtocol,saysHovi.Onesuggestionforincreasingtheinterestforothercountriestojointheclimatecooperationistolinktheclimateissuetootherareasofinternationalcooperation,suchastechnology,trade,ordevelopmentassistance.ButHovidoesnotbelievethatsuchissuelinkagewillbereliable.Forexample,itisnotinthebestinterestsoftheKyotocountriestounderminetheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)byintroducingtraderestrictionsagainstcountriesthatdonotparticipateinKyoto—suchastheUnitedStates.Moreover,theWTO’snondiscriminationprinciplesmakeitdifficulttointroducetraderestrictionsagainsttheUnitedStatesandAustraliabutnotagainstdevelopingcountries,whichalsodonothavebindingemissionstargets.Besides,historyshowsthatthiskindofpressurerarelyworksonasuperpowersuchastheUnitedStates,saysHovi.Anotherobstacleisthatdevelopingcountriesprotecttheirowneconomicdevelopment.TheywillnotacceptbindingemissionstargetsuntiltheUnitedStatesalsoreducesitsowngreenhousegasemissions.Atthesametime,theUnitedStatesisunwillingtoendangerthecompetitivenessofitsownbusinessandindustry,andthusdoesnotwishtoparticipateinaninternationalagreementthatdoesnotalsoincludethedevelopingcountries.Toovercomethisparticularobstacle,weshouldfocusonclimatemeasuresthatdonotthreateneconomicdevelopment,advisesHovi.TheUnitedStatesisalsodoubtfulabouttheUNsystem,andHovibelievesthatanalternativeinternationalclimateagreementshouldnotnecessarilybeputtogetherwithintheUNframework,astheKyotoProtocolis.PointofDepartureinAmericanClimatePolicy?Hovibelievesthatinthelongrun,awaytoreengagetheUnitedStatesmightbetobaseafutureclimateagreementonfederalU.S.climatepolicy.TheUnitedStatesisoftenmorewillingtocooperatewhenitalreadyhasanationalpolicyinplace.Forexample,'MontrealProtocolonSubstancesthatDepletetheOzoneLayer’inmanywaysrepresentedaninternationalextensionofaregulatoryframeworkthatalreadyexistedintheUnitedStates.ThusU.S.businessandindustryactedasapusherintheefforttobuildaninternationalagreement.ButtheproblemwiththispolicyisthattherecurrentlyisnosimilarU.S.climatepolicyatthefederallevel.Whateverpolicyexistsisfragmentedandformativeatbest.TheKyototargetsarecostlytomeet.Kyotothusdependsoneffectiveenforcement.TheenforcementmechanismthatwasintroducedthroughtheMarrakeshAccordsisprimarilybasedonasystemwherebycountriesthatdonotmeettheirtargetsduringthefirstcommitmentperiodaresanctionedbyhavingtoreduceevenmoreduringthesecondperiod.Theproblemisthatthereisnothingtostopanonobedientcountryfromputtingoffthisadditionalemissionsreduction—perhapsindefinitely.Inaddition,innocentthirdpartiessufferwhenthesanctionsarecarriedout.Asapotentialbuyerofemissionspermitsandamajorexporteroffossilfuels,Norwaywillbeparticularlyhardhit,becausecarryingoutthepunishmentwillcausethepriceoffossilfueltogodownandthepriceofemissionspermitstogoup.Finally,whereasthecompliancesystemwillpunishacountrythatisamemberandreducesemissions,butfailstoreachitsemissionstarget,itprovidesnobasisforpunishingacountrythatdeclinestobeamemberanddoesnothingtoreduceitsemissions.Thus,thecompliancesystemisarguablyunfair.Hovithinksthatinternationallyitispoliticallydifficulttoachieveaneffectiveenforcementmechanism.Forthisreason,itmaybeagoodideatofocusonanagreementthatdoesnotneedenforcement.AnAgreementthatEveryoneWantstoBePartof?ManyoftheproposedalternativestotheKyotoProtocolresembleKyotointhattheyrequireenforcement.Forexample,thisistrueforregionalclimateagreements,anagreementbasedonemissionsintensitytargets,andanagreementbasedonharmonizedcarbontaxes.Onetypeofagreementthatdoesnotdependonenforcementisanagreeme