公司管理与产权.

PresentedbyHuilingTancasecenter1CorporatemanagementandpropertyrightsArmenA.AlchianUniversityofCalifornia,LosAngelesPresentedbyHuilingTancasecenter1阿尔奇安，也译“阿尔钦”(ArmenA.Alchian)•1914年出生于美国加利福尼亚•1936年获斯坦福大学经济学学士学位•1944年再获斯坦福大学经济学博士学位•1947—1964年，作为一名经济学家，他在桑特·芒尼克·兰德公司任职，此后，他一直在洛杉矶的加利福尼亚大学任教授，是蒙特·佩尔兰学会会员•1974年担任美国西部经济协会会长•1978年被选为美国文理研究院院士PresentedbyHuilingTancasecenter3学术成就阿尔奇安的主要贡献在于通货膨胀对普通债券价格影响的分析，财产权制度的影响，竞争过程的长期含意等几个方面。主要代表作有：《产权：一个经典注释》《生产、信息成本与经济组织》与H.德姆塞茨合著等Whyshouldexchangeofcorporatepropertyrightsbepermittedonlyunderrestrictedconditions,whereasexchangesofnoncorporaterightsarenotequallyregulated?SecuritiescompanyMadepublic;theturnoverofidenticalrightsislarge;potentialcostswillbereducedHousescompanyNottobeopen;theturnoverofidenticalrightsissmall;potentialcostssavingsareinsufficienttojustifythecostsPresentedbyHuilingTancasecenter4IntroductionWhatisthereaboutcorporaterightsthatcallsfordistinctivetreatment?Anotherargumentforcompulsorydisclosure:ThereductioninfluctuationinsecuritypricesSeparationofownershipandcontrol“Competitionistoberestrictedbythemarketpoweroflargecorporationsastochangetheroleofcompetition”“behaviorbymanagersandemployersissoinsulatedfromthewealth-increasinginterestsoftheownersthattheconventionalviewofmanagersoperatingtoincreaseowners’wealthisnolongergermane.”PresentedbyHuilingTancasecenter5IntroductionReasons:ThedispersionofstockholdingsinourlargestcorporationsCombinedwithmanagementadvantagesinaproxyfight.“Separationofownershipfromcontrol”hadreplacedtheexpression“dispersionofstockholdings.”PresentedbyHuilingTancasecenter6IntroductionAnecessaryattributeofownershipisthebearingofthevalueconsequencesofresources.Controlmeanstheauthoritytocontroldecisionsthatwillaffectthevalueofresources.Thismayrestontwofactors:(1)knowledgeofnegligenceorinefficiencybyanagentwillbemoreexpensivetodisperseoveramajority.(2)theknowledgeofharmfulmanagerialdecisionswillbelessinfluentialoneachstockholdersissmallerandthenumberofstockholdersisgreater.PresentedbyHuilingTancasecenter7IntroductionOneempiricallymeaningfulinterpretationoftheexpressiongreaterseparationofcontrolfromownershipCorporatevotingmechanismsarefrequentlyalludedtobothasaprincipalcauseas“evidence”ofaseparationofstockholdersfrom“control”.Ifamanagementgroupisexploitingstockholdersbyoperatinganenterpriseinadiversionarymanner,withinthegroupopportunitieswillariseforsometogainpersonallybyeliminatingthat“inefficient”behavior.PresentedbyHuilingTancasecenter8IntroductionInsum,demonstrationofgreaterdispersionofstockholdings,alongwithourproxysystem,doesnotestablishthatbearing-of-valueconsequenceshavebeenseparatedfromtheeffectivecontrolofthedecision-maker,northatthewealthofthestockholderislesswellguarded.PresentedbyHuilingTancasecenter9IntroductionⅠ.Managerswhoselecttheinnovativeusesarethosewhobearorshouldbearconsequentvalueeffects.Whetherornottheydodependsuponprearrangedcontractualrelationshipswithrespecttopropertyrights.Thefactthatdelegatedagentsarepaidtoproducevaluechangesingoodsbythewaytheyusethem,doesnotinanysenseimplythattheagentsdeserveorwillobtainpartofthatvaluechange.PresentedbyHuilingTancasecenter10WeaknessesintheoryofnewcorporateeconomyCreatingprofitsforowners≠SharethoseprofitsTheconceptofprofitsreferstoaparticularvaluephenomenon-unpredictedvaluechanges.Managersdonotbearthoserealizedprofitgainsorlosses,ownersdo.PresentedbyHuilingTancasecenter11WeaknessesintheoryofnewcorporateeconomyReasons:MarketvaluationignoredinmisinterpretationoftheroleofprofitsItisignoredalsointhecontentionthatthemodernstockholder’swealthislesswellprotectedinthedispersedthanintheconcentratedownershipcorporation.Inacorporationwithdispersedownership,ifanyoneknewhiswealthwouldbegivenlessdiligentinterestbycorporatemanagers,hewouldpayless.PresentedbyHuilingTancasecenter12WeaknessesintheoryofnewcorporateeconomyⅡ.Ignoringordenyingtheforcesofopencompetitivemarketcapitalization.Resolutionofthesetwoconflictinginterpretationsliesinthepossibility.TheallegedgreaterdiversionaryactivityisnotexistedThedispersedlargecorporationissoadvantageousinotherrespectsthatdiversionarytacticsofthemanagersarefinancedoutofthoseadvantageswhilethestockholdersgetasmuchastheywouldinlessdispersedcorporations.PresentedbyHuilingTancasecenter13WeaknessesintheoryofnewcorporateeconomyPresentedbyHuilingTancasecenter14WeaknessesintheoryofnewcorporateeconomyAdvantage:Managersdonotreapsomespecialoradditionalgainoreconomicrentfromtheirabilitytoengageindiversionarytactics.Thedispersedownershipcorporationimpliesadifferenceinthevectororformofpaymentstomanagersandemployees.Inlarge,dispersed-ownership,for-profitcorporations,weshouldexpectdifferenttypesofmanagerialandemployeebehaviorandrewardsthaninsmallcloselyheldcorporations.Theinternalshiftingofpersonnelwithin,aswellasamong,firmsismarketcompetition.Whenthesefunctionsareperformedwithinthefirm,thecompetitivemarketforcesarehiddenfromobviousviewandmistakenlyignoredbycarelessanalysts.PresentedbyHuilingTancasecenter15Weaknessesintheoryofnewcorporateec