哈佛商学院案例投资金融

9-294-084REV:APRIL29,2011________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ProfessorJoshLerner,incollaborationwithProfessorPaulGompers,perparedtheoriginalversionofthisnoteasthebasisforclassdiscussion.ThisversionwaspreparedbyProfessorsJoshLerner,FeldaHardymon,andResearchAssociateAnnLeamon.Copyright©1994,1995,1998,2000,2001,2007,2011PresidentandFellowsofHarvardCollege.Toordercopiesorrequestpermissiontoreproducematerials,call1-800-545-7685,writeHarvardBusinessSchoolPublishing,Boston,MA02163,orgoto—electronic,mechanical,photocopying,recording,orotherwise—withoutthepermissionofHarvardBusinessSchool.JOSHLERNERFELDAHARDYMONANNLEAMONNoteonPrivateEquityPartnershipAgreementsVenturecapitalandleveragedbuyoutsarebynecessitylong-runinvestments.Consequently,thevastmajorityofU.S.privateequitytodayisraisedthroughprivatepartnershipswithalifespanoftenyearsormore.Togoverntheseinvestments,complexcontracts,somemorethan100pageslong,havesprungup.Thesecontractsprovideaninsightintothecomplexchallengeofraisingandmanagingaprivateequityfund.Therearethreecriticalaspectstothesecontracts:thestructureofthefunds,therestrictionsplacedontheiractivities,andtheincentivesofferedtotheprivateequityinvestors.Thisnoteconsiderseachoftheseaspectsinturn.1HowtheFundisStructuredPrivateequityfundstypicallyhavelimitedandgeneralpartners.Thelimitedpartnersareinstitutionalandindividualinvestorswhoprovidecapital.Thesearelimitedinthesensethattheirliabilityonlyextendstothecapitalthattheycontribute.If,forinstance,thefundinvestsinacompanythatproducesadrugthatkillssomepatients,thevictims’relativescannotsuethepartnership’sinvestorsfordamages.Thegeneralpartners—typicallytheprivateequityinvestorswhomanagethefund—mayhowever,bedirectlyliable.21ThissectionisbasedonAssetAlternatives,PrivateEquityPartnershipTermsandConditions,2ndedition,Wellesley,MA:AssetAlternatives,2001;JosephW.Bartlett,EquityFinance:VentureCapital,Buyouts,Restructurings,andReorganization,3volumes,NewYork:AspenPublishers,2010;PaulA.GompersandJoshLerner,“TheUseofCovenants:AnEmpiricalAnalysisofVenturePartnershipAgreements,”JournalofLawandEconomics,39(October1996)566-599;JackS.Levin,StructuringVentureCapital,PrivateEquityandEntrepreneurialTransactions,NewYork:AspenPublishers,2006;SCMStrategicCapitalManagement,2008AnnualReviewofPrivateEquityTermsandConditions,(Zurich:SCMStrategicCapitalManagementAG,February2009)and2009AnnualReviewofPrivateEquityTermsandConditions,(Zurich:SCMStrategicCapitalManagementAG,February2010);VentureEconomics,TermsandConditionsofVentureCapitalPartnerships,Needham:VentureEconomics,1989;andVentureEconomics,TermsandConditionsofVentureCapitalPartnerships--1992,Needham:VentureEconomics,1992.2Privateequityinvestorsprotectthemselves,atleastpartially,bynotservingdirectlyasthegeneralpartners.Rather,theycreateacorporationthatservesasthegeneralpartner,ofwhichtheyareshareholders.PurchasedbyHoanLee([e-mail])onMarch13,2013294-084NoteonPrivateEquityPartnershipAgreements2Aprivateequityfundistypicallyraisedinseveralstages.Initialinvestorsinafundareoftenanxioustoavoidopportunisticbehaviorbythegeneralpartnersastheyraiseadditionalfunds.Asaresult,aseriesofcontractualprovisionsgovernthefundraisingprocess.Thefirstoftheseprovisionsisaminimumsizeofinvestment.Generalpartnerswilltypicallysetaminimumsizeforinstitutionalinvestorsandasmallerminimumforindividualinvestors.Limitedpartnershaveatleasttworeasonsforbeingconcernedaboutthenumberofpartnersinvestinginthefund.UndertheInvestmentCompanyActof1940,fundswithmorethanafewhundredpartners(originally100)mustregisterasinvestmentadvisors.Thisimposescomplexregulatoryanddisclosurerequirements.Moregenerally,thecostsofadministeringaprivateequityfundincreasewiththenumberoflimitedpartners.Mostcontractsstipulateanexplicitminimumandmaximumsizeforthefund.Inmanycases,limitedpartnershavedistinctpreferencesaboutfundsizes.Ifthegeneralpartnersareunabletoattractadditionalcapitalfromotherinvestors,theinitialinvestorsmaypreferthatthefundbedisbanded.Thegeneralpartners’inabilitytoraiseadditionalfundsmayimplythatotherpotentiallimitedinvestorshaveadverseinformationthattheinitialinvestorsdonothave.3Theywillinmanycasesalsobeconcernedthatthefundshouldnotbecometoolarge,lestthesizestrainthemanagementskillsofthegeneralpartners.Inmanycases,thegeneralpartnersareallowedtoexceedthemaximumsizestatedinthecontractby10%or20%,aslongastheyexplicitlyobtainpermissionfromtheexistinglimitedpartners.Thelimitedpartnerswhoenterlatealmostalwaysarerequiredtopaythesameup-frontandorganizationfeesastheoriginallimitedpartners,andmayberestrictedfromashareoftheinterestearnedontheoriginallimitedpartner’sinitialcapitalcommitments.Ifdemandtoparticipateinafundexceedstheallowedamountofcapital,thefundissaidtobe“over-subscribed.”Priortothe1986TaxReformAct,thecontributionofthegeneralpartnerstothefundswasinvariably1%.Thisw