1TwoDogmasofEmpiricismByWillardVanOrmanQuineOriginallypublishedinThePhilosophicalReview60(1951):20-43.ReprintedinW.V.O.Quine,FromaLogicalPointofView(HarvardUniversityPress,1953;secondrevisededition1961),withthefollowingalterations:“Theversionprintedheredivergesfromtheoriginalinfootnotesandinotherminorrespects:§§1and6havebeenabridgedwheretheyencroachontheprecedingessay,and§§3-4havebeenexpandedatpoints.”Transcribedintohypertext()byAndrewChrucky,Sept.12,1997.Modernempiricismhasbeenconditionedinlargepartbytwodogmas.Oneisabeliefinsomefundamentalcleavagebetweentruthswhichareanalytic,orgroundedinmeaningsindependentlyofmattersoffactandtruthswhicharesynthetic,orgroundedinfact.Theotherdogmaisreductionism:thebeliefthateachmeaningfulstatementisequivalenttosomelogicalconstructupontermswhichrefertoimmediateexperience.Bothdogmas,Ishallargue,areillfounded.Oneeffectofabandoningthemis,asweshallsee,ablurringofthesupposedboundarybetweenspeculativemetaphysicsandnaturalscience.Anothereffectisashifttowardpragmatism.1.BACKGROUNDFORANALYTICITYKant’scleavagebetweenanalyticandsynthetictruthswasforeshadowedinHume’sdistinctionbetweenrelationsofideasandmattersoffact,andinLeibniz’sdistinctionbetweentruthsofreasonandtruthsoffact.Leibnizspokeofthetruthsofreasonastrueinallpossibleworlds.Picturesquenessaside,thisistosaythatthetruthsofreasonarethosewhichcouldnotpossiblybefalse.Inthesameveinwehearanalyticstatementsdefinedasstatementswhosedenialsareself-contradictory.Butthisdefinitionhassmallexplanatoryvalue;forthenotionofself-contradictoriness,inthequitebroadsenseneededforthisdefinitionofanalyticity,standsinexactlythesameneedofclarificationasdoesthenotionofanalyticityitself.1Thetwonotionsarethetwosidesofasingledubiouscoin.Kantconceivedofananalyticstatementasonethatattributestoitssubjectnomorethanisalreadyconceptuallycontainedinthesubject.Thisformulationhastwoshortcomings:itlimitsitselftostatementsofsubject-predicateform,anditappealstoanotionofcontainmentwhichisleftatametaphoricallevel.ButKant’sintent,evidentmorefromtheusehemakesofthenotionofanalyticitythanfromhisdefinitionofit,canberestatedthus:astatementisanalyticwhenitistruebyvirtueofmeaningsandindependentlyoffact.Pursuingthisline,letusexaminetheconceptofmeaningwhichispresupposed.Wemustobservetobeginwiththatmeaningisnottobeidentifiedwithnamingorreference.ConsiderFrege’sexampleof‘EveningStar’and‘MorningStar.’Understoodnotmerelyasarecurrenteveningapparitionbutasabody,theEveningStaristheplanetVenus,andtheMorningStaristhesame.Thetwosingulartermsnamethesamething.Butthemeaningsmustbetreatedasdistinct,sincetheidentity‘EveningStar=MorningStar’isastatementoffactestablishedbyastronomicalobservation.If‘EveningStar’and‘MorningStar’werealikeinmeaning,theidentity‘EveningStar=MorningStar’wouldbeanalytic.2AgainthereisRussell’sexampleof‘Scott’and‘theauthorofWaverly.’AnalysisofthemeaningsofwordswasbynomeanssufficienttorevealtoGeorgeIVthatthepersonnamedbythesetwosingulartermswasoneandthesame.Thedistinctionbetweenmeaningandnamingisnolessimportantatthelevelofabstractterms.Theterms‘9’and‘thenumberofplanets’nameoneandthesameabstractentitybutpresumablymustberegardedasunlikeinmeaning;forastronomicalobservationwasneeded,andnotmerereflectiononmeanings,todeterminethesamenessoftheentityinquestion.Thusfarwehavebeenconsideringsingularterms.Withgeneralterms,orpredicates,thesituationissomewhatdifferentbutparallel.Whereasasingulartermpurportstonameanentity,abstractorconcrete,ageneraltermdoesnot;butageneraltermistrueofanentity,orofeachofmany,orofnone.Theclassofallentitiesofwhichageneraltermistrueiscalledtheextensionoftheterm.Nowparallelingthecontrastbetweenthemeaningofasingulartermandtheentitynamed,wemustdistinguishequallybetweenthemeaningofageneraltermanditsextension.Thegeneralterms‘creaturewithaheart’and‘creaturewithakidney,’e.g.,areperhapsalikeinextensionbutunlikeinmeaning.Confusionofmeaningwithextension,inthecaseofgeneralterms,islesscommonthanconfusionofmeaningwithnaminginthecaseofsingularterms.Itisindeedacommonplaceinphilosophytoopposeintention(ormeaning)toextension,or,inavariantvocabulary,connotationtodenotation.TheAristoteliannotionofessencewastheforerunner,nodoubt,ofthemodernnotionofintensionormeaning.ForAristotleitwasessentialinmentoberational,accidentaltobetwo-legged.Butthereisanimportantdifferencebetweenthisattitudeandthedoctrineofmeaning.Fromthelatterpointofviewitmayindeedbeconceded(ifonlyforthesakeofargument)thatrationalityisinvolvedinthemeaningoftheword‘man’whiletwo-leggednessisnot;buttwo-leggednessmayatthesametimebeviewedasinvolvedinthemeaningof‘biped’whilerationalityisnot.Thusfromthepointofviewofthedoctrineofmeaningitmakesnosensetosayoftheactualindividual,whoisatonceamanandabiped,thathisrationalityisessentialandhistwo-leggednessaccidentalorviceversa.Thingshadessences,forAristotle,butonlylinguisticformshavemeanings.Meaningiswhatessencebecomeswhenitisdivorcedfromtheobjectofreferenceandweddedtotheword.Forthetheoryofmeaningthemostconspicuousquestionisastothenatureofitsobjects: