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LocalGovernmentAccountabilityforServiceDeliveryinNigeriaStutiKhemani1DevelopmentResearchGroup,TheWorldBank1818HStreetNW,Washington,DC20433skhemani@worldbank.orgPreliminaryDraft:March16,20041ThispaperisbaseduponsurveyworkundertakenjointlywithMonicaDasGuptaandVarunGauri(DasGupta,Gauri,andKhemani,2004).IthankJoshuaAdeniyi,MonicaDasGupta,VarunGauri,OritseweyimiOgbe,OladimejiOladepo,MuyiwaSanda,AgnesSoucat,AdedoyinSoyibo,andtheNigeriacountryteamattheWorldBankforusefulcommentsandsuggestionsduringthecourseofthiswork.MatiasBerthelonandSinaKevinNazemiprovidedexcellentresearchassistance.Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthispaperareentirelythoseoftheauthor,anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheWorldBank,itsExecutiveDirectors,orthecountriestheyrepresent.1.IntroductionHowaccountablearelocallyelectedgovernmentsforthedeliveryoflocalpublicgoods?Whatistheimpactofintergovernmentalfiscalrelationsonlocalaccountability?Thesequestionsareofincreasingimportanceasseveraldevelopingcountriesarebeginningtodecentralizeresponsibilityforlocalpublicservicestolocalinstitutions,and,intheabsenceofsufficientlocalrevenuepotential,toexplorewaysoffinancingthisdecentralizationthroughintergovernmentaltransfers.Nigeriaisoneofthefewcountriesinthedevelopingworldtohavesignificantlydecentralizedbothresourcesandresponsibilitiesforthedeliveryofbasichealthandeducationservicestolocallyelectedgovernments.2LocalgovernmentsinNigeriaareconstitutionallyentitledtoashareofabout20percentoffederalrevenues,whichinrecentyearsofoilpriceboomshasimpliedsubstantialresourceflowstolocalgovernments.Localgovernmentresponsibilityforprimaryhealthcareservices,inparticular,isemphasizedinarecentlyrevisedhealthpolicydocumentformulatedinthe1980s.However,thereislittlesystematicevidenceonhowtheseinstitutionsofdecentralizationworkinpractice.ThispaperpresentsevidenceonlocalaccountabilityforhealthservicesdeliveryfromasurveyoflocalgovernmentsandprimaryhealthfacilitiesinthestatesofKogiandLagos,anddrawsgenerallessonsforthedesignofintergovernmentalfiscalrelationstopromoteaccountability.Asurveyof30localgovernments,252publicprimaryhealthfacilities,andover700healthcareproviderswascarriedoutinthestatesofKogiandLagosinthelatterpartof2002.3Themoststrikingphenomenonuncoveredbythissurveyistheextensivenon-paymentofsalariesofpublichealthpersonnelinthestateofKogi42%ofstaffrespondentsreportnotreceivinganysalaryfor6monthsormoreinthepastyearatthe2Althoughrecentlymanydevelopingcountrieshaveimplementedorareimplementingdecentralizationreforms,theNigeriaexperienceisrareintermsofboththelengthoftimethatlocallyelectedgovernmentshaveexisted,andintermsofsubstantialrevenuedevolutiontolocalgovernmentsforthedischargeoftheirresponsibilities.India,forexample,whichhasalongerstandingdemocracythanNigeria,adoptedaconstitutionalamendmentasrecentlyas1993tocreatelocallyelectedgovernments,comparedtoNigeriawherelocalgovernmentswereconstitutionallyrecognizedin1976;Indiahasstillnotprovidedsystematicsourcesofrevenuetoitslocalgovernments,whereasNigerianlocalgovernmentsareconstitutionallyentitledtosubstantialuntiedgrantsfromthefederalgovernment.3AdeniyiandOladepo(2003)describethesurveyindetail.TheAppendixtothispaperprovidesabriefsummarydescription.timeofthesurvey.ThisproblemappearstobeanendemiconeforbasicservicedeliveryinNigeria(withasimilarproblemofnon-paymentofprimaryschoolteachersalariescreatingapublicoutcryinthe1990s),andhasbeenarguedtobetheresultoffederalinstitutionalarrangementswherelocalgovernmentsareoverwhelminglydependentonfederalrevenuetransfersforthedischargeoftheirresponsibilities.Whilesomearguethattheproblemislackofadequateresourcetransferstolocalgovernmentstofinancetheirexpenditureresponsibilities,othersarguethatover-dependenceoflocalgovernmentsonfederaltransfershasunderminedlocalaccountabilityandcreatedperverseincentivesatthelocalleveltomisallocatepublicresources(OlowuandErero,1995;EkpoandNdebbio,1998;TheWorldBank,2002).Analysisofthesurveydatarevealsthatthereisnocorrelationbetweennon-paymentofstaffsalariesandlocalgovernmentrevenuesorbudgetedspendingonstaffsalaries.Regressionanalysisshowsthatpercapitalocalgovernmentrevenuesandperfacilitylocalgovernmentspendingonhealthpersonnelarenotabletoexplainvariationinnon-paymentofsalariesacrosslocalgovernments.Usingthesurveydata,actualstaffcostsperfacilityineachsampledlocalgovernmentinKogiwasestimatedandcomparedtowhatthelocalgovernmentreportedasactualspendingtowardsstaffsalariesperfacilitywithinitsjurisdiction.Thiscomparisonshowsthatevenwhenbudgetallocationsweresufficienttocoverestimatedactualcosts,thestaffsurveyrevealednon-paymentofsalariesforseveralmonthsintheyearbeforethesurvey.Thepaperarguesthatthepatternofevidenceshowsthatnon-paymentofsalariescannotbeexplainedbylackofresourcesavailabletolocalgovernments.Theevidencethereforesuggeststhatthereisageneralproblemofaccountabilityatthelocalgovernmentlevelintheuseofpublicresourcesthataretransferredfromhighertiersofgovernment,andaboutwhichlocalcitizensmaynotbewellinformedsincetheyarenotthetax-payers.Thesurveyda