国际经贸高级英语6

TEXTAWhiffofthe1930sINTHESPRINGof1931Austria’slargestbank,theCreditAnstalt,wasonthevergeofcollapse.TheAustriangovernmentcouldnotsimplystandbyandletitfail,butwhenitcametothebank’srescuewithlargesumsoffreshlyprinteddomesticcurrency,theresultingcapitalflightrapidlydepletedAustria’sgoldandforeignexchangereserves.Theobviousanswerwouldhavebeentoabandonthegoldstandardandletthecurrencyfloat.Butthissolutionwasunacceptable—notjustbecauseadropintheschilling’svaluewouldmagnifytheburdenofforeign-currency-denominateddebt,butbecauseacurrencydevaluationwoulddealadevastatingblowtotheconfidenceofacountrywhosememoriesofpost-WorldWarIhyperinflationwerestillfresh.Austriapleadedforhelpfromitsneighborsandthethen-newBankforInternationalSettlements,buttheofferedassistancewastoolittle,toolate.Intheend,thedesperategovernmentresortedtocapitalcontrols.UnitSixTheReturnofDepressionEconomics—PaulKrugmanItisafamiliarstorytoeconomichistorians.Itisalsoastonishinglymodern-sounding:iftheplotdoesnotexactlyfitanyoneoftoday’scrisis-riddeneconomiesaroundtheworld,itdoessoundverymuchlikeapasticheofrecenteventsinIndonesia,Malaysia,andBrazil.Themaindifferencenowisthatfinancialrescueattemptsfromtheinternationalcommunityhavebecomeroutine.WhenacountrygetsintroubletodayaSWATteamfromtheInternationalMonetaryFundandtheU.S.Treasuryquicklyarrivesonthescene.Suppose,however,thattheIMFcoulduseatimemachinetosenditsbestmoneydoctorsbacktothatViennaspringof1931,butwithouttheabilitytoofferahuge,no-questions-askedcreditlineonthespot.Whatwouldtoday’sexpertssay?WhatcouldtheytelltheAustriansthattheydidnotalreadyknow?UnitSixTheReturnofDepressionEconomics—PaulKrugmanMostmoderneconomists—totheextentthattheythinkaboutitatall—regardtheGreatDepressionasagratuitous,unnecessarytragedy.Theybelievethatwhatmighthavebeenanordinary,forgettablerecessionbecameanightmarishslumpthankstothestupidity(oratleasttheignorance)ofpolicymakers.IfonlytheFederalReservehadnotbeenpreoccupiedwithdefendingthegoldstandardinsteadoftherealeconomy;ifonlyHerbertHooverhadfollowedanexpansionaryfiscalpolicyinsteadoftryingtobalancethebudget;ifonlypolicyingeneralhadnotbeengovernedbya“liquidationist”philosophythatsawshort-runeconomicpainasanecessarypurgativeforpreviousexcesses—thenthecatastrophecouldeasilyhavebeenavoided.Andsinceweknowbetternow,itcannothappenagain.UnitSixTheReturnofDepressionEconomics—PaulKrugmanOrcanit?AslittleastwoyearsagoIandmostofmycolleagueswerequiteconfidentthatalthoughtheworldwouldcontinuetosuffereconomicdifficulties,thoseproblemswouldnotbearmuchresemblancetothecrisisofthe1930s—becauseeconomistsandpolicymakershadlearnedthelessonsofthatdecadeandwouldneveragainperverselytightenmonetaryandfiscalpolicyinthefaceofrecession.True,Mexicosufferedasevereslumpin1995andJapan’seconomyhadstagnatedsince1991,buttheseappearedtobespecialcases,easilyrationalizedastheresultofexceptionallymisguidedpolicy.Perhapsweshouldhaveknownbetterandrealized,forexample,thatthedilemmaAustriafacedin1931couldjustaseasilyariseinthemodernworld,andthatnowasthentherearenogoodanswers.Inanycase,thereisnomistakingthelessonoftheterrifyingeconomicandfinancialeventsofthelasttwoyears:UnitSixTheReturnofDepressionEconomics—PaulKrugmantheeconomiccrisisinAsia,itsspreadtoLatinAmerica,thedeepeningslumpinJapan,andthebriefbutominouspanicthatsweptbondmarketslastautumn.Thetruthisthattheworldeconomyposesmoredangersthanwehadimagined.Problemswethoughtweknewhowtocurehaveonceagainbecomeintractable,liketemporarilysuppressedbacteriathateventuallyevolvearesistancetoantibiotics.Morespecifically,theproblemofaggregatedemand—ofgettingpeopletospendenoughtoemploytheeconomy’sproductivecapacity—isnot,aswemighthavethought,alwaysaproblemwithaneasysolution.Whileitmayoftenbepossibleforcountries,especiallylarge,stable,self-sufficienteconomiesliketheUnitedStates,tohandlerecessionssimplybyprintingmoremoney,wearefindinganincreasingnumberofcasesinwhichcountriesfindeitherthattheycannotapplythatsamemedicineorthatthemedicineisineffectual.Thereis,inshort,adefinitewhiffofthe1930sintheair.UnitSixTheReturnofDepressionEconomics—PaulKrugmanThepointisnotthatallofthecurrenteconomicdifficultieswillnecessarilygetworse.Thereisareasonablechancethat1999willseesomeeconomicrecoveryinAsia,ifnotthebeginningofarealclimbbacktoeconomichealth.ThroughpromptFederalReserveaction(andluck),theUnitedStatesmanagedtoavoidafinancialpaniclastfall.EvenJapancoulddobetterin1999thanitdidin1998.Butevenifallthecurrentcrisesareweathered,themerefactthattheycouldhappen—andthatconventionalpolicyresponseshaveturnedouttobeeitherineffectualorunavailable—isanominouswarning.Theproblemsofthe1990shavedistinctsimilaritieswiththeproblemsofthe1930s;sodothesolutions.WehadbetterallstartrelearningourDepressioneconomics.UnitSixTheReturnofDepressionEconomics—PaulKrugmanIt’stheShortRun,StupidBEFORETHE1930smosteconomistsregardedthebusinesscycle—thealternationofrecessionsandrecoveries—asarelativelyminorissue.Whateverthecausesofsuchfluctuations,economistsbelievedthatslumpswereself-correctingandthattheeconomyalwaystendedtorestorefull