搜索
SHANDONGＵＮＩＶＥＲＳＩＴＹＯＦＴＥＣＨＮＯＬＯＧＹ外文翻译学院：商学院专业：会计系学生姓名：张成功学号：0711206342指导教师：胡红霞2011年6月SOEExecs:GetReadyForStockIncentivesTANWEIStockoptionincentiveplanwillsoonbeavailabletostate-ownedenterpriseexecutives,butwillitleadtogreaterprosperityornewproblems?Atrailblazingnewschemetoinfusestate-ownedenterprises(SOEs)withincentivestockoptionsisunderway.It’saplanthatmaybolstercompanyperformance,butit’snotwithoutrisks.OnAugust15,LiRongrong,MinisteroftheState-ownedAssetsSupervisionandAdministrationCommission(SASAC),disclosedthataftercarefulstudy,astockoptionincentivetrialplanwillbecarriedoutinthelistedSOEs.Accordingtothetrialplan,about102A-sharelistedSOEsareexpectedtobethetrialcompanies.Theshortlistofsomeofthoseexpectingtoparticipateincludes:ChinaUnicom,CiticGroup,KweichowMoutai,ChinaMerchantsBankandBeijingFinancialStreetHoldingCo.Stockoptionincentiveplanisdesignedtoenticeexecutivestoworkhardforthelong-termdevelopmentoftheircompanies.Asstocksrisebasedoncompanyperformance,theytoogainthroughthisprofitsharingarrangement.Thiskindofincentiveplanispopularinforeigncountries,especiallyintheUnitedStates,wherestockoptionscanaccountforashighas70percentofaCEO’sincome.Further,manyeconomistsbelievethestockoptionincentiveplanoptimizescorporategovernancestructure,improvemanagementefficiencyandenhancecorporatecompetitiveness.Ontheotherhand,aftertheMeasuresontheAdministrationofStockIncentivePlansofListedCompanieswasissuedearlythisyear,someofthecompaniesturnedouttohavemisusedtheincentivestockoptions.Theresultwasinsiderdealings,performancemanipulationaswellasamanipulationofthecompanystockprice.“Althoughthestockoptionincentiveschemeisafrequentlyusedtooltoencouragetopmanagement,itcouldalsobeadouble-edgedswordespeciallyinanimmaturemarketeconomy,”Lisaid.TheSASACisthereforetakingacautiousapproach,placingexplicitrequirementsoncorporategovernance,thetargetandextentoftheincentivemeasures,Liadded.Listatedthattheoverseas-listedSOEswouldbethefirstfewcompaniesthatwillimplementthemechanismbecauseoftheirsoundmanagementstructureandlaw-abidingnature.ThenthedomesticlistedSOEswillhavethechancetoembraceincentivestockoptions,whichwouldbepromotedifthetrialresultsweregood.Executiveface-liftAsformorethan900listedSOEs,thepersonnelstructureoftheboardsofdirectorswillprobablyfacesubstantialchange.That’sbecausetheplanstatesthatifthestockoptionincentivemechanismisgoingtobeimplementedinlistedSOEs,externaldirectorsshouldaccountforhalfoftheboardofdirectors.Thetrialplanintroducedtheconceptofexternaldirectorsforthefirsttime.TheexternaldirectorshouldbelegallyrecommendedbydirectorsoflistedSOEs,andshouldnotbeworkinginthelistedSOEsorinaholdingcompany,saidtheplan.However,currently,mostofboardsofdirectorsoflistedSOEsarenotincompliancewiththerequirement.Theyhavetoreadjustthestructureofboardofdirectorstofitinwiththenewmechanism.“FormostoftheSOEswhicharelistedintheA-sharemarket,theirboardsofdirectorsaremadeupofnon-externaldirectorsandindependentdirectors,whichmeansthatapartfromindependentdirectors,membersofboardofdirectorsareallworkingforthelistedcompanyorforthelargeshareholder,”saidZhuYongmin,aneconomistwiththeCentralUniversityofFinanceandEconomics.“Ifthestockoptionincentivemechanismistobecarriedoutinthosecompanies,alarge-scalerestructuringofboardofdirectorsisunavoidableandexternaldirectorsmustbeintroducedintotheboard.”ChinaSecuritiesRegulatoryCommission(CSRC)stipulatesthatanindependentdirectorisonewhodoesn’tholdanotherofficebeyondhisjobasadirector,andhasnosuchrelationswithmajorshareholderthatwouldinterferewiththeexerciseofindependentandobjectivejudgment.“Currently,theindependentdirectorsoflistedcompaniescanbecategorizedasexternaldirectors,”Zhusaid.“However,thedefinitionofexternaldirectorismuchbroaderthanindependentdirector.Thosewhoworkforacompanywhichhasbusinesstieswithalistedcompany,thoughtheydonotmeettherequirementsofbeinganindependentdirector,butcanbeconsideredanexternaldirector.”Additionally,thetrialplanalsostipulatesthatthesalarycommitteeoflistedSOEsthatexercisethestockoptionincentivemechanismshouldbecomposedofexternaldirectors.However,formostofthelistedcompanies,therearestillnon-externaldirectors.Asaresult,aconsiderablenumberoflistedSOEsneedtotransformtheirsalarycommitteetofulfilltheprerequisitesofthestockoptionincentivemechanism.Avoidingover-compensationOver-compensationissomethingthatthetrialstockplanistryingtoavoidaswell.Therefore,thetrialplanstatesthatdomesticlistedSOEs’executivesshouldreceivenomorethan30percentoftheirtotalsalary(includingoptionsanddividends).Butasfortheoverseas-listedSOEs,themaximumincentiveis40percentofthetargetsalary.Thetrialplanalsofixesthevolumeofincentivestockoptions.Thetrialplanstatesthatthevolumeofincentivestockoptionsshouldbefixedinaccordancewiththescaleofthelistedcompanyandthenumberofincentiveobjectives.Thenumberofshareallocatedmaynotexceed10percentofthecompany’stotalsharecapitalandnolessthan0.1percent.Infact,BeijingReviewwasinformedbytheCSRCthatsome20listedSOEsalsobeganexploringstockoptionincentiveschemesinthefirsthalfofthisyear.Butnoneofthemrecei