《公司反收购法律制度研究》(1)

RESEARCHREPORT1231hostiletenderoffertenderoffer2structuralbarrierstechnicalbarriers34AcquisitionAcquisitionMergerAcquisitionM&AMergerMergerConsolidationConsolidationAssetAcquisitionStockAcquisitionAllorSubstantiallyAllCash-for-AssetsAcquisitionStock-for-AssetsAcquisitionCash-for-StockAcquisitionStock-for-StockAcquisitionBulktransferCreeping5acquisitionTenderofferTenderofferExchangeofferFriendlyAcquisitionHostileTakeoverBulktransferCreepingacquisitionTenderofferLeveragedbuyoutSubordinateJunkBond16SharkRepellentPoisonPillBlankCheckCrownJewelPreventiveActive7statutoryacquisitiontechniquesnonstatutoryacquisitiontechniques28Wellmanv.DickinsonMinimumdurationAll-holdersruleUnocalBest-priceruleWithdrawalrightsProportion9WilliamsActVanGorkomintrinsicvalueRevlonHouseholdLeveragedbuyout10mandatoryofferpartialoffer11takeoverbid12TheInternalMarketsCommission13righttobreak-through14OfferControl15161718301920OpportunitylossStructuralcoercionSubstantivecoercion21sharkrepellents22StaggeredBoardClassifiedBoardtwo-tierofferfreezeoutmergerEscapeclausesBoardoutclausespoisonpill23shareholderrightsplanflip-inelementflip-overelementredemptionprovisionblankcheck24deadhandpillnohandpillpre-offplanningsmelltestearlywarningsystemdefensiveacquisitionsdualclassstockplansstockrepurchases25lock-upsstocklock-upoptionsassetlock-upsoptionscrownjeweloptionsmanagerialistviewshareholderchoicejustsayno26CheffprimarypurposetestUnocalenhancedbusinessjudgmentRevlonauctiontestIPOstructuralcoercionsubstantivecoercion27BargainingPowerHypothesis2829passivity3031livedoortakeoverguidelines32adaptivedevice333435363738VS39VSVSVS40VSVSVS414243344454647200148495051shareholderchoicemanagerialchoiceauthority52voteorsell5354555657·5834AndreaGuaccero,RecentDevelopmentsinEuropeanTakeoverandCorporate,CardozoJournalofInternationalandComparativeLaw,Summer,2004.35.AvivPichhadze,Mergers,Acquisitions,andControllingShareholders:CanadaandGermany,Banking&FinanceLawReview,June,2003.36.ChristianKirchner,RichardW.Painter,TakeoverdefensesunderDelawareLaw,theProposedThirteenEUDirective,theNewGermanTakeoverLaw:ComparisonandRecommendationsforReform,theAmericanJournalofComparativeLaw.37.CurtisJ.Milhaupt,IntheShadowofDelaware?TheRiseofHostileTakeoversinJapan,ColumbiaLawReview,November,2005.38.DaleA.Oesterle,TheLawOfMergersandAcquisitions,(St.Paul,Minnesota:WestGroup,1999).39.ErnestoHernandez-Lopez,BagWarsandBankWars,TheGucciandBanqueNationalDeParisHostileBids:EuropeanCorporateCultureRespondstoActiveShareholders,FordhamJournalof59Corporate&FinancialLaw,2003.40.GuhanSubramanian,BargainingintheShadowofTakeoverDefenses,YaleLawJournal,December2003.41.HuiHuang,China'sTakeoverLaw:AComparativeAnalysisandProposalsforReform,DelawareJournalofCorporateLaw,2005.42.Hwa-JinKim,LivingWiththeIMF:ANewApproachtoCorporateGovernanceandRegulationofFinancialInstitutionsinKorea,BerkeleyJournalofInternationalLaw,1999.43.Hwa-JinKim,Markets,FinancialInstitutions,andCorporateGovernance:PerspectivesfromGermany,LawandPolicyinInternationalBusiness,Winter,1995.44.JenniferArlen&EricTalley,PrecommitmentandManagerialIncentives:UnregulableDefensesandThePerilsofShareholderChoice,UniversityofPennsylvaniaLawReview,December,2003.45.JohnC.Coates,ExplainingVariationinTakeoverDefenses:BlametheLawyers,CaliforniaLawReview,October,2001.46.JohnElofson,LieBackandThinkofEurope:AmericanReflectionsontheEUTakeoverDirective,WisconsinInternationalLawJournal,Fall,2004.47.KatsumasaSuzuki,FutureProspectsofTakeoversinJapanAnalyzedfromtheViewofShare-ownershipStructuresandLawsinComparisonwiththeUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanUnion,ColumbiaJournalofTransnationalLaw,2004.48.Kwang-RokKim,TheTenderOfferinKorea:AnAnalyticComparisonBetweenKoreaandtheUnitedStates,PacificRimLaw&PolicyJournal,May,2001.49.LewisD.Solomon,DonaldE.Schwartz,JeffreyD.Bauman,ElliottJ.Weiss,Corporations,LawandPolicy,MaterialsandProblems,3rdEdition,(St.Paul,Minn.:WestPubilshingCo.,1994).50.LucianAryeBebchu,ManagementandControloftheModernBusinessCorporation:CorporateControlTransactions:TheCaseAgainstBoardVetoinCorporateTakeovers,UniversityofChicagoLawReview,Summer,2002.51.LucianAryeBebchuk,TowardUndistortedChoiceandEqualTreatmentinCorporateTakeovers,HarvardLawReview,June,1985.52.LucianAryeBebchuk,Investors'Choices:WhyFirmsAdoptAntitakeoverArrangements,UniversityofPennsylvaniaLawReview,December,2003.53.LucianAryeBebchuk,JohnC.Coates&GuhanSubramanian,ThePowerfulAntitakeoverForceofStaggeredBoards:Theory,Evidence,andPolicy,StanfordLawReview,May,2002.54.LucianAryeBebchuk,JohnC.Coates&GuhanSubramanian,ThePowerfulAntitakeoverForceofStaggeredBoards:FurtherFindingsandaReplytoSymposiumParticipants,December,2002.55.MarcelKahanandEdwardB.Rock,HowILearnedtoStopWorryingandLovethePill:AdaptiveResponsestoTakeoverLaw,UniversityofChicagoLawReview,Summer,2002.56.MartinLiptonandPaulK.Rowe,Pills,PollsandProfessors:AReplytoProfessorGilson,DelawareJournalofCorporateLaw,2002.6057.MiriamP.Hechle,TowardsAMoreBalancedTreatmentofBidderandTargetShareholders,ColumbiaBusinessLawReview,1997.58.NicholasL.Georgak