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ShouldSalesTaxesbeImposedonE-Commerce?SamiDakhliayRobertP.Strausszthisversion:August2,2011AbstractWestudytheimpactofE-commerceacrossstatelinesintheU.S.ontaxrevenue,publicgoodprovision,andrealincome.Inparticular,inlightoftheunenforceablenatureofinterstatetaxation,weevalu-atethepotentialgainsfromcoordinatingsalesandincomestatetaxesamongsovereignjurisdictions.Wendthattherevenueatriskissmallandthatthewelfaregainsorlossesofanycountervailingpolicymeasures,inparticularthoseassociatedwiththeStreamlinedSalesTaxProject(SSTP),areevensmaller.JELClassication:H2,H7,C68,F1WearegratefultoMarcusBerliant,MarcoCastaneda,MiguelGouveiaandCharlieSawyerforveryhelpfulcommentsonpreviousdrafts.yESCEParis-LaDefense,[e-mail]-MellonUniversity,[e-mail]11IntroductionE-commercehasprovidedunprecedentedconvenience,improvedselection,andreducedtransactionscostsforawiderangeofproductsandforagrow-ingshareofconsumers.Theseprimarybenets,imputabletotechnologicalprogress,mustbeclearlydistinguishedfromthepurelyincidentalbenets,atleasttobuyersandsellers,thatstemfromthestates'jurisprudentialanddefactoinabilitytoenforcethecollectionofsalestaxesfromout-of-stateretailers.Indeed,U.S.statesarefederallyrestrainedinhowtheytaxsalesacrosstheirborders.ItissettledU.S.federalconstitutionallawthattherateoftaxationonimporteditemscanbenohigherthanonitemspurchasedwithinthestate.Similarly,ifanimporteditemistaxable,thenitsdomesticallypur-chasedcounterpartmustalsobetaxable.Moreover,remotevendorswithoutaphysicalpresenceinthedestinationstateareundernolegalobligationtocollectandremitusetaxes.ItisforthisreasonthatcatalogsalesandsalesfromotherremotevendorssuchasQVCortheHomeShoppingChannelintoastatedonotobligatethevendortocollectandremitusetaxestotheDepart-mentofRevenue,aclearsalesandmarketingadvantage.Whileresidentsarelegallyresponsibleundercurrentstateusetaxlawtopaytheusetaxdirectlytotheirdepartmentofrevenueonsuchpurchasesfromremotevendorsiftheitemis,infact,taxable,itiswellknownthatindividualtaxpayercompliancewiththisobligationisweaktonon-existent.Goolsbee(2000)estimatesthatenforcingexistingsalestaxesonInternetpurchasescouldreducethenumberofonlinebuyersbyasmuchas24percent,whereasAlmandMelnik(2005),whoassumeamuchlowerown-pricedemandelasticityforInternetpurchases,predictamere6percentreduction.Morerecently,BallardandLee(2007)estimatethataonepercentagepointincreaseinthesalestaxrateleadstoasignicant0.208increaseintheprobabilityofshoppingonline,aresultthatisconsistentwithGoolsbee's.Clearly,theinabilitytoenforcecompliancewithexistingstateandlocaltaxlaws,aswellastheconstitutionalhurdlespreventingfederalintervention,haveledtoanerosionofthesalestaxbase.BruceandFox(2000,2001,2004)estimatethate-commercecauseda$7billionrevenuelosstostateandlocalgovernmentsin1999anda$15.5billionlossin2003.Thiscontroversyhasgiventheissueofoptimaltaxdesignamongthestatesanewurgency.Alargenumberofstatesarecurrentlypushingfortheso-calledStream-linedSalesTaxProjectorSSTP,areciprocaltaxagreementamongthestates,1thatwouldharmonizetheStates'varioustaxcodesandthusmakeiteasierandlessonerousforavendortocollectsalestaxesonbehalfofherout-of-stateclient.Sofar,thebillhasbeenrepeatedlyvoteddownbyCongress.Despitetheso-farsuccessfulcounter-lobbyingbymailorderande-commercecompanies,proponentsofSSTPmayeventuallyprevailandpassarevisedversion.Whilethetaxationofe-commerceoughttobedetrimentalforremotevendorsandbenecialforthestates'revenues,thequestionremainstowhatextentsuchtaxationwouldaectthewelfareofthestate'srepresentativecon-sumer.WhileRasmussen(2004)showsthatataxexemptionofe-commercecanactuallybewelfareimprovingwhenitcanforcemonopolisticallycom-petitivelocalretailerstoundercutonlineprices,thestandardliteratureonoptimaltaxationfailstoprovideanunambiguousanswer.FollowingBruce,Fox,andMurray's(2003)lead,wereviewthestandardarguments:1.AccordingtotheRamsey(1927)rule,agoodshouldbetaxedatthesameratewhetheritispurchasedonlineorlocally,ifinfacttheelasticityofdemandfortheonlinegoodisthesameastheelasticityofdemandforthelocalgood.Totheextent,however,thatthetwogoodsarenotconsideredidenticalbytheconsumer,theywillgenerallyfacedierentdemandschedules.Theconsumptionofagoodpurchasedonlineisdelayedbythetimetoship,forexample,whereaslocalshoppingtakesmoretimeandeort.2.ThegeneralizedRamseyrulewithnon-homogeneousconsumersrecom-mendshighersalestaxesforconsumerswithalowermarginalutilityofincome,thatis,formoreauentconsumers.IfamajorityofInternetpurchasesaremadebyrelativelymoreeducatedconsumerswithhigherdisposableincome,thecasecouldbemadethatInternetsalesshouldbetaxedatahigherratethanlocalsales.3.Finally,itiswellunderstoodthatgovernmentsshouldimposeahighertaxoncomplementsratherthansubstitutestoleisuretoreducethein-eciencyassociatedwiththelackofataxonthelatter.However,aspointedoutbyBruce,Fox,andMurray(2003),goodstypicallypur-chasedonlinedonotfallsquarelyintoeithercategory.11SeminalreferencestooptimaltaxationincludeCorlettandHague(1953),McLure(1969),DiamondandMirrlees(1971),Feldstein(1976);onoptimalityinamulti