工程管理英文翻译

英文翻译姓名：王婵娟学号：1102090218指导教师：白芙蓉专业：工程管理班级：1102班时间：2015年4月25日工程管理系-1-工程管理系英文翻译评价表学生姓名王婵娟性别女学号1102090218外文文献标题DoBuyerIncentivesWorkforHousesduringaRealEstateDownturn?外文文献出处#SpringerScience+BusinessMediaNewYork2012以下内容由指导教师填写（打勾“√”选择）评价项目评价结论打勾评价结论打勾评价结论打勾是否外文期刊文献是否与本人论文相关完全相关一般不相关翻译工作量超负荷饱和不饱和翻译态度认真一般不认真翻译进度按计划执行一般未按计划执行翻译训练效果优良中差综合评语（是否完成了规定任务、效果是否符合要求等）指导教师签名：2015年4月25日注：此表与翻译文本一起装订-2-英文原文Title：DoBuyerIncentivesWorkforHousesduringaRealEstateDownturn?KennethW.Soyeh&JonathanA.Wiley&KenH.JohnsonPublishedonline:31October2012#SpringerScience+BusinessMediaNewYork2012AbstractTheimpactofincentivesonmarketingdurationisexaminedforresidentialrealestateusingdatafromtheMultipleListingServiceduringarealestatedownturn.Thefocusisonincentivesoffereddirectlybysellerstopotentialhomebuyers.Theevidencesuggeststhatincentivesarenotcapitalizedintothesellingpriceduringthesoftenedmarketconditions.Alternatively,incentivesarefoundtohaveasignificantreductioninmarketingtime,howeverthisisfoundtobetrueonlyforclosingcostsandnotforotherincentiveclassifications.Thebenefitofreducedexpectedmarkettimefromofferingincentivesisquicklydiminishedwhenthesellerinitiallyoverpricesthelistingbyalargeamount.【Keywords】Incentives;Brokerage;Residential;Transactions;OverpricingIntroductionInmid-2010,theWallStreetJournalreportedanationwideinventoryexcessintheU.S.housingmarketsofapproximately2.4millionunits(Whelan2010).Thehomeownershipvacancyrateatthesamepointintimewas2.6%forthenation.Thiswaswithin30basispointsofthehighestlevelofvacancysincetrackingthisstatisticbeganin1956.1Thereisnoevidencethattheeffectsofthisrecentsupplyshockhavelessenedinscalesincethen.Isitpossiblethatthisscaleofexcesssupplyofhousingunitsintensifiescompetitionamongsellersandlimitsthepotentialbenefitsfromaggressivepricingstrategiesandotherbuyerincentives?Thepurposeofthisstudyistodirectlyinvestigatethisquestion.Abetterunderstandingoftheefficacyofbuyerincentivesshouldhelpsignificantlyasthenation’sexcesshousinginventoryisclearedfromthemarket.Morespecificallyinthisstudy,theimpactofhomesellerincentivesonmarketingoutcomesisexaminedusingasampleoftransactionsfromtheMultipleListingService(MLS)dataset-3-inBocaRaton,Florida.Thefocusinthisstudyisontheuseofincentivesofferedbysellersdirectlytohomebuyers,whichareindividuallyidentifiedinthedatacollection.Theprimaryinterestisontheeffectivenessofincentivesandtheirabilitytoimpactbothpropertytransactionpriceandpropertydurationspan.Thesampleperiodcovers2009through2011,whichcoincideswithdepressedrealestateconditionsinthesubjectmarketandissimilartomarketconditionsaroundthecountryatthesametime.Incentivesforhomebuyerscomeinanumberofforms,includingfinancingpremiums,closingcosts,creditsforrepairs,homeownerassociation(HOA)fees,homewarranties,andothersthatincludeperkswhichareunrelatedtothefinancing.Theexpectedimpactdependsonwhichpremiumisproposed.Financingpremiumsincludeinterestratebuy-downs,suchasdiscountpoints,orbelow-marketfinancingintheformofassumablemortgagesandsellerfinancing.Potentialhomebuyerswhousedebtfinancingmaybewillingtopayahigherpriceforapropertywithfinancingpremiumsincluded,uptotheamountoftheirindividualvaluationforthatpremiumandsubjecttoconstraintsofincreasedcashrequirementsforsettlementatahigherprice.Anindividualvaluationofthefinancingpremiumwillbelessthanthecosttothesellerwhenthebuyerhasahouseholdcostofcapitalthatisgreaterthantheinterestcostonthemortgagedebtorwhentheindividualdoesnotexpecttoholdthepropertyforthedurationofthemortgageterm;bothofwhicharelikelytobethecasegiventhatmortgagedebtistypicallythelowestcostsourceofcapitalforahouseholdandtheexpectedholdingperiodisoftenlessthanthetermofthestandardmortgageinstrument.Forthesereasons,financingpremiumsarenotexpectedtobefullycapitalizedintothesellingprice.Ifasellerofferingfinancingpremiumsasincentivesdoesnotrequireahigherprice,thenthefinancingpremiumshouldresultinareductionintheexpectedmarketingduration.Therequiredpricebythesellercanbesignaledthroughthelistingprice.Ifthelistingpriceisincreasedsubstantiallyincombinationwiththefinancingpremium,thenthepotentialimpacttothemarketingdurationisreducedinexchangeforanattempttocapitalizethefinancingpremiumintothetransactionprice.Theutilityofthefinancingpremiumforbuyerscanbevaluableduringperiodsofhighinterestrates.However,weakenedrealestatemarketconditionstendtocoincidewithperiodsoflowinterestrates,whichlimitsthepotentialeffectivenessoffinancingpremiumsduringrealestatedownturns.Forthesampleconsideredinthisstudy,financingpremiumsdonotappeartobeofferedatallasincentivesforpotentialhomebuyers.Bycomparison,whenasellerofferstopaysomeportionofthebuyer’sclosingcosts,thatamountisdeliveredatclosingandundiscountedsothatitsvaluationdoesnotrelyonanindividualbuyer’s-4-discountrate.Inaddition,prospectivehomebuyerswhodonotusedebtfinancinginthehomepurchasecanbenefitfromthecashpaymentatclosing.Thebenefitfromclosingcostsisimmediateandindependentoftheinterestrateenvironmentwithappealtoabroaderbaseofpotentialhomebuyers,providingthisconcessionwithdistinctadvantagesduringweakenedmarketcond