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本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：FinancingofSMEsAbstractThemainsourcesoffinancingforsmallandmediumsizedenterprises(SMEs)areequity,tradecreditpaidontime,longandshorttermbankcredits,delayedpaymentontradecreditandotherdebt.Themarginalcostsofeachfinancinginstrumentaredrivenbyasymmetricinformationandtransactionscostsassociatedwithnonpayment.AccordingtothePeckingOrderTheory,firmswillchoosethecheapestsourceintermsofcost.Inthecaseofthestatictrade-offtheory,firmschoosefinancesothatthemarginalcostsacrossfinancingsourcesareallequal,thusanadditionalEurooffinancingisobtainedfromallthesourceswhereasunderthePeckingOrderTheorythesourceisdeterminedbyhowfardownthePeckingOrderthefirmispresentlylocated.Inthispaper,wearguethatbothofthesetheoriesmissthepointthatthemarginalcostsaredependentoftheuseofthefunds,andtheassetsideofthebalancesheetprimarilydeterminesthefinancingsourceforanadditionalEuro.AnempiricalanalysisonauniquedatasetofPortugueseSME’sconfirmsthatthecompositionoftheassetsideofthebalancesheethasanimpactofthetypeoffinancingusedandthePeckingOrderTheoryandthetraditionalStaticTrade-offtheoryarerejected.ForSME’sthemainsourcesoffinancingareequity(internallygeneratedcash),tradecredit,bankcreditandotherdebt.Thechoiceoffinancingisdrivenbythecostsofthesourceswhichisprimarilydeterminedbycostsofsolvingtheasymmetricinformationproblemandtheexpectedcostsassociatedwithnon-paymentofdebt.Asymmetricinformationcostsarisefromcollectingandanalysinginformationtosupportthedecisionofextendingcredit,andthenon-paymentcostsarefromcollectingthecollateralandsellingittorecoverthedebt.SinceSMEs’managementandshareholdersareoftenthesameperson,equityandinternallygeneratedfundshavenoasymmetricinformationcostsandequityisthereforethecheapestsource.2.AssetsidetheoryofSMEfinancingIntheprevioussectionwehavesuggestedthatSME’sinPortugalarefinancedusinginternalgeneratedcash,cheaptradecredits,longandshort-termbankloansandexpensivetradecreditsandotherloans.Inthissectionthemotivesbehindthedifferenttypesoffinancingarediscussed.2.1.CheapTradecreditsThefirstexternalfinancingsourcewewilldiscussistrade-credits.Tradecreditsareinterestingsincetheyrepresentfinancialservicesprovidedbynon-financialfirmsincompetitionwithfinancialintermediaries.Theearlyresearchwithinthisareafocusedontheroleoftradecreditsinrelationtothecreditchannelorthesocalled“Meltzer”effectandinrelationtotheefficiencyofmonetarypolicy.Thebasicideaisthatfirmswithdirectaccesstofinancialmarkets,ingenerallargewellknownfirms,issuetradecreditstosmallfinanciallyconstrainedfirms.Themorerecentresearchbreakstheroleoftradecreditsintoastrategicmotiveandfinancialmotiveforissuingandusingthesecredits.StrategicmotivesThefirsttheorycentersonasymmetricinformationregardingthefirm’sproducts.Tradecreditsareofferedtothebuyerssothatthebuyercanverifythequantityandqualitybeforesubmittingpayments.Byofferingtradefinancethesuppliersignalstothebuyersthattheyofferproductsofgoodquality.Sincesmallfirms,ingeneral,havenoreputationthenthesefirmsareforcedtousetradecreditstosignalthequalityoftheirproducts.Theuseoftradecreditsisthereforedrivenbyasymmetricinformationoftheproductsandisthereforemorelikelytobeusedbysmallfirms,ifthebuyerhaslittleinformationaboutthesupplier,ortheproductsarecomplicatedanditisdifficulttoassestheirquality.Thesecondstrategicmotiveispricing.Offeringtradefinanceonfavorabletermsisthesameasapricereductionforthegoods.Thusfirmscanusetradecreditstopromotesaleswithoutofficiallyreducingpricesorusethemasatoolforpricediscriminationbetweendifferentbuyers.Tradecreditsaremostadvantageoustoriskyborrowerssincetheircostsofalternativefinancingarehigherthanforborrowerswithgoodcreditratings.Thustradecreditscanbeusedastoolfordirectpricediscriminationbutalsoasanindirecttool(ifallbuyersareofferedthesameterms)infavorofborrowerswithalowcreditstanding.Tradecreditsarealsousedtodeveloplongtermrelationshipsbetweenthesupplierandthebuyers.Thisoftenmanifestsitselfbythesupplierextendingthecreditperiodincasethebuyerhastemporaryfinancialdifficulties.Comparedtofinancialinstitutionssuppliershavebetterknowledgeoftheindustryandarethereforebetterabletojudgewhetherthefirmhastemporaryproblemsortheproblemsareofamorepermanentnature.Thelastmotiveinnotstrictlyastrategicmotivebutisbasedontransactionscosts.Tradecreditsareanefficientwayofperformingthetransactionssinceitispossibletoseparatebetweendeliveryandpayment.Inbasictermsthetruckdriverdeliveringthegoodsdoesnothavetorunaroundtofindthepersonresponsibleforpayingthebills.Thebuyeralsosavestransactionscostsbyreducingtheamountofcashrequiredon“hand”.FinancingmotivesThebasisforthisviewisthatfirmscompetewithfinancialinstitutionsinofferingcredittootherfirms.Thetraditionalviewoffinancialinstitutionsisthattheyextendcredittofirmswhereasymmetricinformationisamajorproblem.Financialinstitutionshaveadvantagesincollectingandanalyzinginformationfrom,inparticular,smallerandmediumsizedfirmsthatsufferfromproblemsofasymmetricinformation.Thekeytothisadvantageoverfinancialmarketsliesinthecloserelationshipbetweenthebankandthefirmandinthepaymentfunction.Thefi