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1外文翻译原文ExecutivecompensationandcorporatevaluetherelationshipMaterialSource:JournalofBusinessandPsychology1992(4)Author:MarkA.WilsonandChacko&CharlesBandShrader.EllenMullenAstudyexamininglongitudinaldataobtainedfromtheDisclosuredatabasefor390largeAmericanfirmsyieldedcomplexandunclearpatternsofcorrelationsbetweenfirmperformanceandexecutivepay.Anexaminationofthedataindicatesthattherelationshipbetweenfirmperformanceandexecutivecompensationmaybenonlinear.Amongperformancemeasures,totalassetswasfoundtohavethestrongestassociationwithexecutivepay.Itwasconcludedthatthescaleofdiscretionaryresourcesavailabletothefirmbetterpredictsexecutivepaythanprofitabilityorefficiencyratios.Debateoverexecutivecompensationhasescalatedinrecentyears(Ehrenberg,1990).Attheheartofthisissuearechiefexecutiveofficers(CEOs)oflargecorporationsandtheperceptionoftheirrapidlyincreas-ingwealth.PubliccriticismofCEOremunerationaboundsasmanyfindtheirpaytoohigh,especiallyincomparisontotheiremployees.OthersarguethatCEOsarewortheverycenttheyget(Murphy,1986)andthatinacompetitiveeconomytopexecutivesareentitledtobepaidwhattheyareworth(Sethi&Namiki,1986).In1987,theCEOsof24Americancompaniesearnedinexcessof$5million,includingbonusesandstockoptionprofits.Atleast300CEOsearned$1millionormore.Yetonly30chiefexecutivesofEuropeancompanies,andevenlessinAsiancompanies,hadseven-figureearningsthatyear(Tully,1988).PerhapsAmericanCEOsalariesareaculture-specificphenomenondrivenbythenation'shistory,socialnorms,andgovernmentpolicies.WhileAmericanCEOsareenjoyinglargefinancialgains,thecompaniestheyleadmaybestrugglingorevenlosingground.SethiandNamiki(1986)contendthattheprevailingcompensationsys-teminU.S.industry,particularlyinlargecorporations,hasproducedexecutiveswhoare2failingeithertobettereconomicvaluesforstock-holdersortomakeAmericanindustryinternationallycompetitive.Clearly,itisnolongerasignofthiscountry'seconomicdominanceintheworldmarketplace.Regrettably,executivecompensationhastraditionallybeenbasedonrelativestatusratherthancontributionormerit(Kanter,1987).Criticsofthecurrentmagnitudeofexecutivecompensationincludeemployeesfurtherdowntheranks,unionofficials,andstockholders,aswellasthegeneralpublic.AccordingtoMurthyandSalter(1975),corporateAmericahastraditionallyemphasizedthebottomlineper-formance(i.e.,profit).Inotherwords,changesinacompany'stop-levelcompensationshouldberelatedtochangesinitsprofit.Atnoleveloftheorganizationispayforfirmperformancemorejustified,sinceatnootherleveldoestheemployeehaveasmuchcontroloverthefirm'sper-formance.Theclaimthatmotivationwillsufferifpayisattachedtofirmperformancefactorsbeyondtheemployee'scontrolisnotrelevantfortopexecutives.Whiletheycertainlyarefacedwithsomeuncertain-tiesinthemarketandtheenvironment,theyunquestionablyhavecon-troloverandresponsibilityfortheorganization.MostCEOs,whenaskedhowtheyshouldbepaid,saytheirpayshouldbebasedontheirperformance(Crystal,1989).Thisbeliefisbasedontheassumptionthatbehaviorwhichisreinforcedorrewardedtendstoberepeated.Executiveperformancethatenhancesfirmandstockholderwealthandinterestscanbeexpectedwhenrewardsareat-tachedtosuchbehavior.WhetherCEOsrewardsareactuallylinkedtoperformanceisnotsoclear.Arecentanalysisoftherelationshipbetweenexecutivepayandfirmperformancerevealedthemadnessofthesystem(Loomis,1982,p.42).Results,however,havebeenmixed,withsomeshowingapositiverelationship,someshowingnorelationship,andotherssuggestingthatfirmperformancedependsonvariousotherfactors,suchasthetypeofindustryororganizationalstrategy.Insupportofthecurrentlevelsofexecutivecompensation,Murphy(1986)found,inasampleofnearly1,200largeU.S.corporationsovertenyears,thattopexecutives'payandperformancearestronglyrelated.Heclaimsthatperformancebasedcompensationsystemsarejustifiedsincetheytypicallydomotivateexecutivestoactonbehalfofstock-holders,andthatthepublicviewiswrong.Additionally,LewellenandHuntsman(1970)reportedresultsindicatingstrongsupportforthehy-pothesisthatCEOpayisheavilydependentonthegenerationofprofit,andnotonthesizeofthecorporationasmeasuredbysales.Morerecently,Finkelsteinand3Hambrick(1989)reportapositiverelationshipbetweenpayandperformanceaswell.TheirresultssuggestthatCEOcompensationisinfluencedbyacomplexsetoffactors,includingfirmperformance,size,andcomplexity,andCEOexperience.Anumberofstudies,usingavarietyofmeasuresofCEOperformance,have,ontheotherhand,foundlittleornorelationshipbetweenexecutivepayandfirmperformance.MurthyandSalter(1975)claimthatinmanyfirmsthecompensationofexecutiveschangeswithoutregardtochangesinprofits,returnonequity,orearningspershare.PlattandMcCarthy(1985)foundthat,ratherthanbeingrelatedtothefirm'spastoranticipatedfinancialperformance,payisafunctionoftheCEO'stenureinthatposition,age,andbusinessbackground.Iftopexecutivesareindeedworthwhattheyget,andassumingexecutiveperformanceisreflectedinstockprice(Coughlan&Schmidt,1984)thenthehighestpaidexecutivesshouldbefoundincompaniesprovidingthelargestreturnstostockholders.Executivesactingresponsibly(i.e.,asagentofthestockholders)shouldtreatthosestockholders'moneyas