欧洲债务危机英文分析GREECE

Europe'sAchellisheel——thedebtcrisisinGreeceEuropeansovereign-debtcrisisBriefIntroduction：TheEuropeansovereigndebtcrisisisanongoingfinancialcrisisthathasmadeitdifficultorimpossibleforsomecountriesintheeuroareatore-financetheirgovernmentdebtwithouttheassistanceofthirdparties.Fromlate2009,fearsofasovereigndebtcrisisdevelopedamonginvestorsasaresultoftherisinggovernmentdebtlevelsaroundtheworldtogetherwithawaveofdowngradingofgovernmentdebtinsomeEuropeanstates.Concernsintensifiedinearly2010andthereafter,Whilesovereigndebthasrisensubstantiallyinonlyafeweurozonecountries,ithasbecomeaperceivedproblemfortheareaasawhole.Thethreecountriesmostaffected,Greece,IrelandandPortugal,collectivelyaccountfor6%oftheeurozone'sgrossdomesticproductTheAchillisHeelIntheearlymid-2000s,Greece'seconomywasoneofthefastestgrowingintheeurozoneandwasassociatedwithalargestructuraldeficit.Astheworldeconomywashitbytheglobalfinancialcrisisinthelate2000s,Greecewashitespeciallyhardbecauseitsmainindustries——shippingandtourism—wereespeciallysensitivetochangesinthebusinesscycle.Thegovernmentspentheavilytokeeptheeconomyfunctioningandthecountry'sdebtincreasedaccordingly.TheAchillisHeelTheAchillisHeelChartdescription：Theabilityofanationtopayitspublicdebtisafunctionofthegovernment'sfinancialpositionaswellaseconomicgrowthandinterestratesonthedebt.Creditratingagenciesassignacreditratingtothedebtthatreflectstheirassessmentofnumerousriskfactors.Notethischartcovers'publicdebtonly,whichrepresentstheobligationsofeachcountry'sfederalgovernment.Externaldebtisthesumofpublicandprivatedebtowedtoforeigners.Someofthesecountrieshaveexternaldebtsfarlargerthantheirpublicdebt.Theabilityofthenation'sindustriestopaytheprivateportionoftheexternaldebtrelatestotheircompetitiveness,thenation'seconomicgrowth,andemploymentlevels,amongmanyotherfactors.TheAchillisHeelOveralltheshareofthepopulationlivingatriskofpovertyorsocialexclusiondidnotincreasenoteworthyduringthefirst2yearofthecrisis.Thefigurewasmeasuredto27.6%in2009and27.7%in2010(onlybeingslightlyworsethantheEU27-averageat23.4%),[butfor2011thefigurewasnowestimatedtohaverisensharplyabove33%.InFebruary2012,anIMFofficialnegotiatingGreekausteritymeasuresadmittedthatexcessivespendingcutswereharmingGreece.TheAchillisHeelFirstBailoutOn23April2010,theGreekgovernmentrequestedaninitialloanof€45billionfromtheEUandInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF),tocoveritsfinancialneedsfortheremainingpartof2010.AfewdayslaterStandard&Poor'sslashedGreece'ssovereigndebtratingtoBB+orjunkstatusamidfearsofdefault,inwhichcaseinvestorswereliabletolose30–50%oftheirmoney.StockmarketsworldwideandtheEurocurrencydeclinedinresponsetothedowngrade.TheAchillisHeelOn1May2010,theGreekgovernmentannouncedaseriesofausteritymeasurestosecureathreeyear€110billionloan.ThiswasmetwithgreatangerbytheGreekpublic,leadingtomassiveprotests,riotsandsocialunrestthroughoutGreece.TheTroika(EU,ECBandIMF),offeredGreeceasecondbailoutloanworth€130billioninOctober2011,butwiththeactivationbeingconditionalonimplementationoffurtherausteritymeasuresandadebtrestructureagreement.Abitsurprisingly,theGreekprimeministerGeorgePapandreoufirstansweredthatcall,byannouncingaDecember2011referendumonthenewbailoutplan,buthadtobackdownamidststrongpressurefromEUpartners,whothreatenedtowithholdanoverdue€6billionloanpaymentthatGreeceneededbymid-December.On10November2011Papandreouinsteadoptedtoresign,followinganagreementwiththeNewDemocracypartyandthePopularOrthodoxRally,toappointnon-MPtechnocratLucasPapademosasnewprimeministerofaninterimnationaluniongovernment,withresponsibilityforimplementingtheneededausteritymeasurestopavethewayforthesecondbailoutloanTheAchillisHeelTopreventthisfromhappening,thetroika(EU,IMFandECB)eventuallyagreedinFebruary2012toprovideasecondbailoutpackageworth€130billion,conditionalontheimplementationofanotherharshausteritypackage,reducingtheGreekspendingswith€3.3bnin2012andanother€10bnin2013and2014.Forthefirsttime,thebailoutdealalsoincludedadebtrestructureagreementwiththeprivateholdersofGreekgovernmentbonds(banks,insurersandinvestmentfunds),tovoluntarilyacceptabondswapwitha53.5%nominalwrite-off,partlyinshort-termEFSFnotes,partlyinnewGreekbondswithlowerinterestratesandthematurityprolongedto11–30yearsSecondBailoutTheAchillisHeelExit?TheAchillisHeelSomeeconomicexpertsarguethatthebestoptionforGreeceandtherestoftheEU,wouldbetoengineeran“orderlydefault”,allowingAthenstowithdrawsimultaneouslyfromtheeuro-zoneandreintroduceitsnationalcurrencythedrachmaatadebasedrate.However,ifGreeceweretoleavetheeuro,theeconomicandpoliticalimpactwouldbedevastating.AccordingtoJapanesefinancialcompanyNomuraanexitwouldleadtoa60%devaluationofthenewdrachma.AnalystsatFrenchbankBNPParibasaddedthatthefalloutfromaGreekexitwouldwipe20%offGreece'sGDP,increaseGreece'sdebt-to-GDPratiotoover200%,andsendinflationsoaringto40%-50%.AlsoUBSwarnedofhyperinflation,abankrunandevenmilitarycoupsandpossiblecivilwarthatcouldafflictadepartingcountry.TheAchillisHeelHowmuchdoGreeceandtherestofEuropestandtolose?Exit:IfthelifelinefromtheEFSFwerecutoffbyit