保险中介委托代理法律制度的激励性研究

对外经济贸易大学博士学位论文保险中介委托-代理法律制度的激励性研究姓名：王艳玲申请学位级别：博士专业：国际贸易学指导教师：陈欣20050401II---------------III----------F84D90-AbstractIVAbstractAsymmetricinformationtheoryisthecoreissueintheinformationeconomics.Thequestionsoccurredbecauseoftheinformationasymmetryandinformationincompletionamongcontractorsduringissuingandperformingaretheattractivefieldsforeconomicresearchers.Theinsuranceintermediariesprincipal-agentmarketisthetypicalmarketwiththepropertyofinformationasymmetryandinformationincompletion,whichiswiththreeformsofinformationproblems:themoralhazardoftheparticipants,theadverseselectionoftheparticipants,andtherent-seekingoftheparticipants.Thesearethekeyproblemstobesolved.Basedontheforegoneresearchliteraturesandresearchresults,someworkhasbeendoneinthisdissertation.Fromthebehavioraleconomics,theinstitutionaleconomics,theinformationeconomics,andthelegaleconomics,theinformationproblemsintheinsuranceintermediariesprincipal-agentmarketarestudied.Therelationshipsamongtheinformation,thebehavior,andtheeconomicefficiencyperformanceofthelegalinstitutionarefound.Basedonthecivillawfamily,thecommonlawfamily,andthelegalinstitutionofChina,severalaspectsabouttheinsuranceintermediariesprincipal-agentlegalinstitutionarestudied,includingthedefinitionsandthenatureofprincipalpart,thepower-liabilityrelationship,theliabilityundertakingbecauseofbreachingoffaith.Suitableincentivesmechanismshouldbeestablishedduringboththeenactingandtheperformingoftheinsuranceintermediariesprincipal-agentlegalinstitution.Breakthroughthelimitationofconventionaltheoryofincentives,whichonlydiscusstheincentivesproblemsproducedbytheprincipalstotheagents,thebehavioralselectionofeachoneoftheparticipantsintheinsuranceintermediariesAbstractVprincipal-agentmarketarestudiedfromtheeconomics.Thefeasibleconditionsandtherealizableconditionsoftheincentivesmechanism,whichhaveeffectsontheefficiencyperformanceofeachoneoftheinsuranceintermediariesprincipal-agentparticipants,arederived.Fromthescienceoflawandtheeconomics,theeffectsontheefficiencyperformanceofeachoneoftheinsuranceintermediariesprincipal-agentparticipantsbytheinsuranceintermediariesprincipal-agentlegalinstitutionarestudied.Effectivesupervisionandincentivesareimportanttotheinsuranceintermediariesprincipal-agentlawexecutors.Fromthebehavioraleconomicsandtheinformationeconomics,thecreditstandingmechanism,asasupplementtotheinsuranceintermediariesprincipal-agentlegalinstitution,isstudied.Thecreditstandingmechanismhascloserelationshipwiththelegalinstitution.Theynotonlysupplementeachotherbutalsoinfluenceeachother.Whenestablishingtheinsuranceintermediariesprincipal-agentincentivesmechanism,itshouldsuitablymakeoverallplansandtakeallfactorsintoconsiderationaboutboththecreditstandingmechanismandinsuranceintermediariesprincipal-agentlegalmechanism.Theresearchcontributionsofthisdissertationaresignificanttoprovidetheoryfoundationforestablishingtheinsuranceintermediariesprincipal-agentincentivesmechanism,includingboththeinsuranceintermediariesprincipal-agentlegalinstitutionandcreditstandingmechanism,withoptimalsocialefficiencyperformance.JELclassification:G14;P48Keywords:AsymmetricInformationTheory;InsuranceIntermediariesPrincipal-Agent;LegalInstitution;IncentivesMechanismI20021111.1-[1,2][3-22][23-26]-[27-31]1.2-:[32-35]--12----[36-55]1.3-[56-60]1.413[61-65]1.5---1.6141.7123--4---5---62522.1asymmetricinformation11J.Hirshleifer:“EconomicsofAsymmetricInformation”,St.Martin’sPress,NewYork,1997.262.22AdamSmith1776323Barnard,193841963Arrow,19635Wilson,1968Ross,2J.Schumpter:“HistoryofEconomicAnalysis”,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1954.3A.Smith:“TheWealthofNations”,TheModernLibrary,NewYork,1776.4C.Barnard:“TheFunctionsoftheExecutive”,HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,1938.5K.Arrow:“ResearchinManagementControls:ACriticalSynthesis.”InManagementControls:NewDirectionsinBasicResearch,eds.C.Bonini,R.Jaediche,andH.Wagner,McGraw-Hill,NewYork,1963,p.317~327.27197363076R.Wilson:“TheTheoryofSyndicates”,Econometrica,1968,p.119~132S.Ross:“TheEconomicTheoryofAgency:ThePrincipal’sProblem”,AmericanEconomicReview,1973,p.134~139.7J.J.Laffont,andJ.Tirole:“ATheoryofIncentivesinProcurementandRegulation”,MITPress,Cambridge,1993.282.3898H.Jack:“EconomicBehaviorinAdversity”,UniversityofChicagoPress,Chicago,1987.9D.NelsonandE.Silberberg:“IdeologyandLegislatorShirking”,EconomicInquiry,1987,p.15~25.29101110J.J.Wallis,D.D.North:“MeasuringtheTransactionSectorintheAmericanEconomy”.InLong-TermFactorsinAmericanEconomicGrowth,eds.S.L.EngermanandR.E.Gallman,UniversityofChicagoPress,Chicago,1986.11.2102.4211()“”“”“”“”“”“”“”212()()()()“”()“”“”“”()()“”“”“”21312()122142.5-1-13-153--3.1UaAUbB1UaUb=1UbUa=1AB2UaUb=0Ub/Ua=0AB30UaUb10UbUa1AB3-16—-XnXmXnXmXnXn131985131994p233-17-3-183.2--3-193-201414OE.WilliamsonTheEconomicInstitutionsofCapitalismFreePressNewYork(1985)p673-211515OE.WilliamsonTheEconomicInstitutionsofCapitalismFreePressNewYork(1985)p113-223-23--4-244-16----4.116Cp74-25\17\\174-26184.2----1918194-27--1202019001942“”1387-1400“”4-28(1)(namedprincipal)(2)(unnamedprincip