中国海军现代化：对美国海军能力的影响

ChinaNavalModernization:ImplicationsforU.S.NavyCapabilities—BackgroundandIssuesforCongressRonaldO'RourkeSpecialistinNavalAffairsNovember23,2015CongressionalResearchService7-5700’snear-seasregion.ObserversofChineseandU.S.militaryforcesviewChina’simprovingnavalcapabilitiesasposingapotentialchallengeintheWesternPacifictotheU.S.Navy’sabilitytoachieveandmaintaincontrolofblue-wateroceanareasinwartime—thefirstsuchchallengetheU.S.NavyhasfacedsincetheendoftheColdWar.Morebroadly,theseobserversviewChina’snavalcapabilitiesasakeyelementofanemergingbroaderChinesemilitarychallengetothelongstandingstatusoftheUnitedStatesastheleadingmilitarypowerintheWesternPacific.ThequestionofhowtheUnitedStatesshouldrespondtoChina’smilitarymodernizationeffort,includingitsnavalmodernizationeffort,isakeyissueinU.S.defenseplanning.China’snavalmodernizationeffortencompassesabroadarrayofplatformandweaponacquisitionprograms,includinganti-shipballisticmissiles(ASBMs),anti-shipcruisemissiles(ASCMs),submarines,surfaceships,aircraft,andsupportingC4ISR(commandandcontrol,communications,computers,intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance)systems.China’snavalmodernizationeffortalsoincludesimprovementsinmaintenanceandlogistics,doctrine,personnelquality,educationandtraining,andexercises.ObserversbelieveChina’snavalmodernizationeffortisorientedtowarddevelopingcapabilitiesfordoingthefollowing:addressingthesituationwithTaiwanmilitarily,ifneedbe;assertingordefendingChina’sterritorialclaimsintheSouthChinaSeaandEastChinaSea;enforcingChina’sviewthatithastherighttoregulateforeignmilitaryactivitiesinits200-milemaritimeexclusiveeconomiczone(EEZ);defendingChina’scommercialsealinesofcommunication(SLOCs);displacingU.S.influenceintheWesternPacific;andassertingChina’sstatusasaleadingregionalpowerandmajorworldpower.Consistentwiththesegoals,observersbelieveChinawantsitsmilitarytobecapableofactingasananti-access/area-denial(A2/AD)force—aforcethatcandeterU.S.interventioninaconflictinChina’snear-seasregionoverTaiwanorsomeotherissue,orfailingthat,delaythearrivalorreducetheeffectivenessofinterveningU.S.forces.AdditionalmissionsforChina’snavyincludeconductingmaritimesecurity(includinganti-piracy)operations,evacuatingChinesenationalsfromforeigncountrieswhennecessary,andconductinghumanitarianassistance/disasterresponse(HA/DR)operations.PotentialoversightissuesforCongressincludethefollowing:whethertheU.S.NavyincomingyearswillbelargeenoughandcapableenoughtoadequatelycounterimprovedChinesemaritimeA2/ADforceswhilealsoadequatelyperformingothermissionsaroundtheworld;whethertheJointConceptforAccessandManeuverintheGlobalCommons(JAM-GC),previouslyknownasAir-SeaBattle(ASB),representsagoodapproachforcounteringChina’sA2/ADsystems;whethertheNavy’splansfordevelopingandprocuringlong-rangecarrier-basedaircraftandlong-rangeship-andaircraft-launchedweaponsareappropriate;whethertheNavycaneffectivelycounterChineseASBMsandsubmarines;andwhethertheNavy,inresponsetoChina’smaritimeA2/ADcapabilities,shouldshiftovertimetoamoredistributedfleetarchitecture.ChinaNavalModernization:ImplicationsforU.S.NavyCapabilitiesCongressionalResearchServiceContentsIntroduction.....................................................................................................................................1IssueforCongress.....................................................................................................................1Scope,Sources,andTerminology.............................................................................................1Background.....................................................................................................................................2StrategicandBudgetaryContext...............................................................................................2ShiftinInternationalSecurityEnvironment.......................................................................2U.S.GrandStrategy............................................................................................................2U.S.StrategicRebalancingtoAsia-PacificRegion............................................................3DecliningU.S.TechnologicalandQualitativeEdge...........................................................3ChallengetoU.S.SeaControlandU.S.PositioninWesternPacific.................................4ImplicationsofMilitaryBalanceinAbsenceofaConflict................................................4China’s“Salami-Slicing”TacticsinEastandSouthChinaSeas........................................4RegionalU.S.AlliesandPartners.......................................................................................5LimitsonDefenseSpendinginBudgetControlActof2011asAmended.........................5OverviewofChina’sNavalModernizationEffort........................