米什金货币金融学(商学院版)第8章课件

Copyright©2010PearsonAddison-Wesley.Allrightsreserved.Chapter8AnEconomicAnalysisofFinancialStructureCopyright©2010PearsonAddison-Wesley.Allrightsreserved.8-2SourcesofExternalFinanceinU.SCopyright©2010PearsonAddison-Wesley.Allrightsreserved.8-3FIGURE1SourcesofExternalFundsforNonfinancialBusinesses:AComparisonoftheUnitedStateswithGermany,Japan,andCanadaSource:AndreasHackethalandReinhardH.Schmidt,“FinancingPatterns:MeasurementConceptsandEmpiricalResults,”JohannWolfgangGoethe-UniversitatWorkingPaperNo.125,January2004.Thedataarefrom1970–2000andaregrossflowsaspercentageofthetotal,notincludingtradeandothercreditdata,whicharenotavailable.Copyright©2010PearsonAddison-Wesley.Allrightsreserved.8-48.1EightBasicFacts1.Stocksarenotthemostimportantsourcesofexternalfinancingforbusinesses2.Issuingmarketabledebtandequitysecuritiesisnottheprimarywayinwhichbusinessesfinancetheiroperations3.Indirectfinanceismanytimesmoreimportantthandirectfinance4.Financialintermediaries,particularlybanks,arethemostimportantsourceofexternalfundsusedtofinancebusinesses.Copyright©2010PearsonAddison-Wesley.Allrightsreserved.8-5EightBasicFacts(cont’d)5.Thefinancialsystemisamongthemostheavilyregulatedsectorsoftheeconomy6.Onlylarge,well-establishedcorporationshaveeasyaccesstosecuritiesmarketstofinancetheiractivities7.Collateralisaprevalentfeatureofdebtcontractsforbothhouseholdsandbusinesses.8.DebtcontractsareextremelycomplicatedlegaldocumentsthatplacesubstantialrestrictivecovenantsonborrowersCopyright©2010PearsonAddison-Wesley.Allrightsreserved.8-68.2TransactionCostsandFinancialStructureTransactioncostshinderflowoffundstopeoplewithproductiveinvestmentopportunitiesFinancialintermediariesmakeprofitsbyreducingtransactioncosts1.TakeadvantageofeconomiesofscaleExample:MutualFunds2.DevelopexpertisetolowertransactioncostsExplainsFact3Copyright©2010PearsonAddison-Wesley.Allrightsreserved.8-78.3AsymmetricInformationAdverseSelection:1.Beforetransactionoccurs2.PotentialborrowersmostlikelytoproduceadverseoutcomesareonesmostlikelytoseekloansandbeselectedMoralHazard:1.Aftertransactionoccurs2.Hazardthatborrowerhasincentivestoengageinundesirable(immoral)activitiesmakingitmorelikelythatwon’tpayloanback•AgencytheoryanalyseshowasymmetricinformationproblemsaffecteconomicbehaviorCopyright©2010PearsonAddison-Wesley.Allrightsreserved.8-88.4AdverseSelectionandFinancialStructure8.4.1LemonsProbleminSecuritiesMarkets1.Ifcan’tdistinguishbetweengoodandbadsecurities,willingtopayonlyaverageofgoodandbadsecurities’values.2.Result:Goodsecuritiesundervaluedandfirmswon’tissuethem;badsecuritiesovervalued,sotoomanyissued.3.Investorswon’twanttobuybadsecurities,somarketwon’tfunctionwell.ExplainsFact2andFact1.AlsoexplainsFact6:Lessasymmetricinformationforwellknownfirms,sosmallerlemonsproblemCopyright©2010PearsonAddison-Wesley.Allrightsreserved.8-98.4.2ToolstoHelpSolveAdverseSelectionProblem1.PrivateProductionandSaleofInformationFree-riderprobleminterfereswiththissolution2.GovernmentRegulationtoIncreaseInformationExplainsFact53.FinancialIntermediationA.Analogytosolutiontolemonsproblemprovidedbyused-cardealersB.Avoidfree-riderproblembymakingprivateloansExplainsFact3and4Copyright©2010PearsonAddison-Wesley.Allrightsreserved.8-104.CollateralandNetWorth--Collateral,propertypromisedtothelenderiftheborrowerdefaults,reducestheconsequencesofadverseselectionbecauseitreducesthelender’slossesintheeventofadefault.ExplainsFact7•--Networth,thedifferencebetweenafirm’sassetsanditsliabilities,canperformasimilarroletocollateral.•“Onlythepeoplewhodon’tneedmoneycanborrowit!”Copyright©2010PearsonAddison-Wesley.Allrightsreserved.8-118.5MoralHazardinEquityContracts•CalledthePrincipal-AgentProblem–Principal:lessinformation(stockholder)–Agent:moreinformation(manager)•Separationofownershipandcontrolofthefirm–ManagerspursuepersonalbenefitsandpowerratherthantheprofitabilityofthefirmCopyright©2010PearsonAddison-Wesley.Allrightsreserved.8-12Principal-AgentProblem:Solutions1.Monitoring:productionofinformationButthemonitoringprocesscanbeexpensiveintermsoftimeandmoney.Andthefree-riderproblemdecreasestheamountofinformationproduction.2.GovernmentregulationtoincreaseinformationExplainsFact5Governmenthavelawstoforcefirmstoadheretostandardaccountingprinciplesthatmakeprofitverificationeasier.Theyalsopasslawstoimposestiffcriminalpenaltiesonpeoplewhocommitthefraudofhidingandstealingprofits.Partlyeffective.Copyright©2010PearsonAddison-Wesley.Allrightsreserved.8-133.FinancialintermediationExplainsFact3Venturecapitalfirmcanhelpsreducethemoralhazard.4.DebtcontractsMoralhazardariseswithanequitycontract.Fordebtcontracts,onlywhenthefirmcannotmeetitsdebtpayments,isthereaneedforthelendertoverifythestateofthefirm’sprofits.ExplainsFact1:WhydebtusedmorethanequityCopyright©2010PearsonAddison-Wesley.Allrightsreserved.8-148.6MoralHazardinDebtMarketsMoralhazard:borrowerwantstotakeontoomuchriskToolstoHelpSolveMoralHazard1.NetworthandcollateralMakethedebtcontractincentive-compatible.2.Monitoringandenforcementofrestrictivecovenants1)Covenantstodiscoura