企业融资成本探讨-外文文献

ABSTRACT.ThispaperexaminestheimplicationsfortheSMEfinancingmarketofApplicationcoststhatvarybetweenfirms,andofimperfectscreeningofapplicantsbyBanks.Undertheseconditions‘DiscouragedBorrowers’canexist.Thesearegoodborrowerswhodonotapplyforabankloanbecausetheyfeeltheywillberejected.Thepapershowsthat,underarangeofassumptions,thescaleofdiscouragementinaneconomydependsuponthescreeningerrorofthebanks,thescaleofApplicationcostsandtheextenttowhichthebankinterestratediffersfromthatchargedbythemoneylender.Discouragementisshowntobeatamaximumwherethereissome,butnotperfect,information.1.IntroductionThecentralissueaddressedintheliteratureonfinancingSMEsisthatofcreditrationingstemmingfromasymmetricinformation(StiglitzandWeiss,1981;DeMezaandWebb,1987).Thesepapersarguethat,inequilibrium,marketsareimperfectsincecreditisallocatedbyrationing,ratherthanbyprice.Thedifferencebetweenthetwopapersisthat,whereasStiglitzandWeiss’assumptionsleadtocreditrationing,thoseofDeMezaandWebbleadtoover-supply.Thetheoret-icalissuesaddressedinthesepapersunderpinahugeraftofempiricalpapersoncreditrationinginmanycountries,ofwhichthosebyBergerandUdel(1992)andbyPetersenandRajan(1994)areexamples.StiglitzandWeissdiscussadverseselectionandincentive(moralhazard)effectsandsay“Botheffectsderivedirectlyfromtheresidualimper-fectinformationwhichispresentinloanmarketsafterbankshaveevaluatedloanappli-cations”(ouremphasis)Thecurrentpaperhasadifferenttheoreticalfocus.ItexaminestheimplicationsfortheSMEfinancingmarketofApplicationcoststhatvarybetweenfirmsandofimperfectscreeningofapplicantsbyBanks.Applicationcostscanbeconsideredasfinancial,in-kind,orpsychic.WeshowthatpositiveApplicationcostsmeanthatagoodborrowermaynotapplyforaloantoabank,becausetheyfeeltheywillberejected.ThisisdefinedasaDiscouragedBorrower.Suchbor-rowersareignoredintheStiglitz-Weissmodelsincetheydonotmakeapplicationstothebank.Untilveryrecently,thistopicgeneratedlittleinterestamongstscholarsbutisnowrecognizedasimportantinthefinancingofsmallbusinessesindevelopedandlessdevelopedeconomies.Forexample,RaturiandSwamy(1999)quantifyitssignificanceinZimbabwe,1whilstLevensonandWillard(2000)examineitfortheUSA.Importantly,inthecurrentcontext,thelatterpaperfindsmorethantwiceasmanysmallfirmsare“discouraged”asarerejectedforloansfromfinan-cialinstitutionsintheUnitedStates,implyingthat“discouragement”ismoreimportantthancreditrestrictionsoftheStiglitz-Weissform.Thispaperprovidesatheoreticalbasefor“dis-couragement”,usinganinstitutionalframeworkthatis,inprinciple,applicabletoadevelopedoralessdevelopedeconomy,althoughgenerallywepredictdiscouragementtobehigherinlessdevel-opedcountries.AstandardstaticadverseselectionATheoryofDiscouragedBorrowersSmallBusinessEconomics21:37–49,2003.2003KluwerAcademicPublishers.PrintedintheNetherlands.Finalversionacceptedon1November2001Y.KonFacultyofManagementandEconomicsAomoriPublicCollegeAomori030-0196JapanE-mail:[e-mail]kWarwickBusinessSchoolCentreforSmallandMediumSizedEnterprisesCoventryCV47AL,UKE-mail:[e-mail]tsisextendedtoincorporatetwoelements;Applicationcostsforborrowersandimperfectscreeningbybanks.Weformulatetheapplicationbehaviouroffirmsandtheloangrantingdecisionbybanksinapoolingequilib-riumwherebothdiscouragementandrejectionofloanapplicationsappear.Weexamineconditionsunderwhichdiscouragedborrowersexist,andconsidertheimpactofpolicieswhichgovernmentsmightimplementtominimizediscouragement.Webeginwithadiscussionofthekeyassumptionsthatunderlietheanalysisintheremainderofthepaper.22.AmodelofimperfectscreeningunderasymmetricinformationAssumetherearetwotypesoffirms;Good(G)andBad(B),andeachfirmrequiresoneunitoffundingforhis/herinvestment.Thenumberoffirmsofeachtypeisexogenouslygivenas,NGandNBrespectively.Wenowintroducethefollowingtenassumptions,anumberofwhicharesubse-quentlyrelaxed.•[A.1Informationasymmetry]:Firmsknowforcertainwhethertheirinvestmentwillbeasuccess,whereasthebankdoesnot.Thisassumptionislatermodified.•[A.2HomogeneousGandB]:GoodfirmsandBadfirmsarehomogeneousineachtype.Thisassumptionisrelaxedlater.•[A.3ReturnofGfirms]:Thereturnfrominvest-mentforGfirmsiscertain,XG,anditisalwaysprofitableforthebanktolendtosuchfirms.•[A.4ReturnofBfirms]:ThereturntothebankfrominvestmentinBfirmsisrisky.ThereturnontheBfirmisXBifthebusinesssurvivesandzeroifitfails.TheprobabilityofaBfirmbeingsuccessfulispB.TheexpectedvalueofloanstoBfirmsbythebankisassumedtobenegative.TheuncertainreturnexplainsthedemandforloansbyBadfirms.3Intheabsenceofcollateral,Badfirmswillchoosetoborrowonthegroundsthatiftheirprojectissuccessfultheywillbenefit,butifnot,theywillincurnoloss.GAandBAdenotethenumberofgoodandbadapplicantsforabankloanrespectively.Thisisendogenousbecauseweassumeiffirmsrequireexternalfundingtheycaneitherborrowfromabankorfromanalternativesource,whichwecalltheMoneyLender.4ThechoicebythebusinesstoapproachthebankortheMoneyLenderdependsonApplicationcosts,5screeningerror,andinterestrates.Weassume,•[A.5Applicationcost]:TheApplicationcosto