我国上市公司独立董事激励与约束机制研究

华侨大学硕士学位论文我国上市公司独立董事激励与约束机制研究姓名：郭焕申请学位级别：硕士专业：企业管理指导教师：叶民强20090501200911223420093AbstractChina'sindependentdirectorsystemforlistedcompaniesisonlybudding,therearestillmanyproblemsintheoryandpractice,andmanyofthesecanberesolvedwiththeincentiveandrestraintproblem.Theeffectiveincentiveandrestraintmechanismscanhelptheindependentdirectorsystemreallyplayarole,andcanbemeaningfultoprotecttheinterestsofminorityshareholders,torestrainttheinternalcontrolling,toimprovethegovernancestructureoflistedcompaniesandtopromotehealthydevelopmentofthestockmarket.Thispapersmaincontentconcludes:Aroundtheincentiveandrestrictivesystemofindependentdirectors,first,onthebaseoftheanalysisoftheindependentdirectorsspecificity,analyzingtheincentiveandrestrictivemechanismofindependentdirectorsthroughco-agentgame;Secondly,onthebasisthestakeholdertheoryfunctionsofindependentdirectorsaswellastherelatedperformanceevaluationmethodsandtheories,constructingtheperformanceevaluationindexsystemofindependentdirectors;Finally,cometothesolutionoftheplightofdoublethinking,andtoexplorethesystemdesignofincentiveandrestraintmechanismsaswellastheAbstract4organizationalmodelfortheindependentdirectorsoflistedcompaniesofChina's.Themainconclusionsinclude:1Theincentiveandrestrictivemechanismssystemshouldincludecompensationmechanismreputationmechanismlegalmechanismsriskaversionmechanismcontrol-powermechanismappointmentandremovalmechanismandevaluationmechanism.Thesemechanismscanbedividedintointernalmechanismsexternalmechanismsandmixedmechanisms,onlyasystematicalusingofthesethreetypesofmechanismscanachievethebalancebetweenencouragementandindependence.2Independentprofessionalandpart-timearethethreemajorcharacteristicsofindependentdirectorsoflistedcompaniesinChina.Comparedwiththetraditionalagencymodel,thecommonagentmodelcouldbemoreappropriateforthesimulationoftherealityofindependentdirectorsincentives,andmorepowerfultoexplaintheproblemsofit.3Byanalysisofthereputationmodelofindependentdirectorsbasedoncommonagency,wecandrawthattomakethereputationmechanismplaysarole,weneedtopromotethetransmissionofinformationbetweentheclientsinthemechanismdesign;weshouldestablishareasonableanduniform20095standardfortheperformanceevaluationoftheindependentdirectors;whenonlyconsiderthereputationmechanism,weshouldchoosesomeonewithgoodreputationastheindependentdirector;independentdirectorshavethemotivetomakeuseoftheirreputationinthefinalstage,sothelistedcompaniesshouldestablishcompensationmechanismforindependentdirectorsandsoon.4Forthespecialnatureofindependentdirectors,weshouldnotchooseasingleassessmentsubject,butawiderangeofassessmentsubjectsintheperformanceassessment,combininginternalevaluationexternalevaluationandself-evaluation;whatsmore,weshouldchooseawiderangeofassessmentdimension,toformtheevaluationindexsystemincludingthesupervisionevaluationgovernanceresourcingimagefunctionsandsoon.Innovationsofthispaperliein:Ontheonehand,basedontheanalysisofthethreemajorcharacteristicsofindependentdirectors,Iintroduceinthecommonagenttheorytoresearchtheindependentdirectorsincentiveandrestraintmechanisms,itcannotonlyhelpustounderstandthesystemofindependentdirectorsincentiveproblems,butalsohelpustoexplorenewresearchideastoresolveindependentAbstract6directorsrelatedissuesandothersimilarissues.Ontheotherhand,astheresearchesindomesticandforeigncountriesonindependentdirectorsincentiveandrestrictivemechanismsaremostlyconfinedtorewardmechanismreputationmechanismandthelegalmechanism,thispaperpresentstheperformanceevaluationmechanismintothemandmanagestoexploreamorecomprehensivesystemoftheincentiveandrestrictivemechanismsofindependentdirectorsoflistedcompaniesinChina.Keywords:ListedCompaniesIndependentDirectorsIncentiveMechanismRestraintMechanismPerformanceAssessment22009111.11.1.1[1]CEO200181620026302003630[2]200217[3]20901.1.212200712(AB)15508.09%116[4]1.212200931.11.1(1)14(2)1.3(1)20042000AggarwalNanda(2004)[5](2)200952622.1RosensteinWyatt(1990)[6]Zenner(1997)[7]FridaySirmans1998[8]REITREIT50%50%HossainPrevostRao(2001)[9]1993(2002)[10](2003)[11]DailyDalton(1993)[12]David1990[13]QAgrawalKnoeber(1996)[14]Sanjai20097Black(1998)[15]BhagatBlack(1999)[16]CoreandLarcker1999[17](2002)[18]412.22.2.1AnilShivdasani(1993)[19]RobertandMoon(2000)[20]LinnandPark(2003)[21]1/32080Yermack(2004)[22]NikosVafeas(2000)[23]28Lorsc[24]20[20]2.2.2FamaJensen(1983)[25]Holmstrom(1982)[26]Holmstrom(1993)[27]Gilson(1990)[28]19791985111Harford(2003)[29]200992.2.3Core(1997)[30]Black(2004)[31]6D&O(DirectorsandOfficers)Black(2004)[31]196820041212001620025210()[32]2.32.3.1(1)200220022003(2)20022002200620072007(3)200120022003200420052006(4)200220022007200620072005(5)200520052007200420062005200620062007(6)2004200620072009112.3.2[2][3]2.42122.4.12.4.2200913[33]31433.120013.1.1independentdirectors20non-employeedirectorsdisinteresteddirectors[2]2009153.13.1Executivedirectors3.1.2[1]316[2]153-13-1(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(1)(2)(3)0.5%(4)(5)(6)2009173-1(1)(2)1070(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(1)1%(2)1%(3)(4)(1)(2)(3)20(4)(SEC)(significantrelationship)(1)2(2)2(3)220220(4)