控股股东主导下上市公司竞争性要约收购研究

上海交通大学博士学位论文控股股东主导下上市公司竞争性要约收购研究姓名：赵鸣雷申请学位级别：博士专业：企业管理指导教师：欧阳令南20041231III12III345IV67PerryWolfstetterZamir2000PovelSingh2004VŒŽ‘ABSTRACTVIStudyonCompetitiveTenderOfferofListedCompaniesWhereControllingShareholderDominatesABSTRACTItiswellknownthatgreatachievementshaveattainedinChinesesecuritymarketwithconstructionsmorethantenyears.However,manyproblemsemergedduringdevelopment.Themostoutstandingproblemisexcessivelyhighproportionandnon-tradablecharacterofstate-ownedsharesinmostoflistedcompanies,whichcausesnegotiatedacquisitionbeingdominantpatternincorporatecontrolmarketoflistedcompanies.Thoughnegotiatedacquisitionhasmanyadvantages,itsconsoverweighprosonthewhole.Moreover,theproblemsonpriceandinformationreleaseareprominentinnegotiatedacquisition.Withthestrategicadjustmentofstate-ownedeconomyinnextperiod,itisextensionfortransferofstate-ownedsharesinlistedcompanies.Facingthosetransfersactivitiesofstate-ownedsharesinthefuture,Chinesesecuritymarketseeksnewcontroltransferpatternoflistedcompaniesthatismoremarketableandovercomingtheshortcomingsofnegotiatedacquisitioneffectively.Theauthorthinksthatthenewpatternmustsolvethemainproblemsaboveeffectively.Comparingwithnegotiatedacquisition,tenderofferhasdistinctadvantagesinpricedeterminationmechanismandsufficiencyofinformationdisclosure.Since1980s,tenderofferprevailedincapitalmarketsofdevelopedcountriesespeciallyinUS,whichincreasedoperationefficiencyoflistedcompaniesvastlyandpromoteddevelopmentofcorporatecontrolmarkets.Thereasonthattenderoffersucceededbenefitsfromshareholdingstructurewasverydisperseinthoselistedcompanies.Bycomparison,mostofChineselistedcompaniesareexclusivelystateholding,whichdeterminedthespecialpatternfortenderoffermustbeadoptedbecausethosesucceededinUSwouldfailinChinaforcertain.TheproperwayistocomprehendandVIIinnovate.Therefore,tostudyanddesigntenderofferpatternaccordingtothesituationofChinahasquiteimportantvalueinboththeoryandpractice.Thenewpatternmustfocusontwokeyfactors:ononehand,themostdistinctcharacterofChinesesecuritymarketisthatmostoflistedcompanieshaveabsolutecontrollingshareholders,whichdominateacquisitionprocess.Soitmustbeemphasizedinthenewpattern;ontheotherhand,thekeyproblemexistedinnegotiatedacquisitionisthepricedeterminationmechanism.Thesolutionistoreplaceitwithmoremarketablemechanism.Therefore,thisdissertationputsforwardcompetitivetenderofferpatternproposedbycontrollingshareholdersandmorethanonebidderenrolled.Theessentialofthispatternistheprocedurethatcontrollingshareholderscollectpotentialbidders,thelattersendacquisitionofferandcompetitivelybidonsharesownedbycontrollingshareholderswhocouldaffectbiddersandprocess.Contrastwithtenderofferintraditionalsense,competitivetenderofferundercontrollingshareholdersdominatedcouldkeepalltheadvantagesoftenderoffer.Moreover,thecompetitionassuredfairnessoftakeoverpriceandoptimalconfigureofcontrollingsharesunderinfluenceofcontrollingshareholders,whichcouldhelpcontroltransferefficiently.Thispaperfocusesontheaspectthatcontrollingshareholdersdominatethetenderofferprocess.Onthebasisofparticipatorsintenderoffer:controllingshareholdersandbidders,thispapermainlystudiestheinfluencemodeofformerandreactionactivityoflatter.Thispaperhasninechapters;followingarethemaincontents.1.Itcomparesnegotiatedacquisitionandcompetitivetenderofferwherecontrollingshareholdersdominated.First,itintroducestheconceptandcharacteristicofnegotiatedacquisition,andthenanalyzesthestatusinquoofnegotiatedacquisitionandrelatedlawsinChineselistedcompanies.Onthebasisofformeranalysis,itsummarizesmainproblemexistedinnegotiatedacquisition.Subsequently,itproposestheconceptandcharacteristicofABSTRACTVIIIcompetitivetenderofferbasedonthedescriptionoftenderoffer,thenanalyzesthestatusinquooftenderofferinChineselistedcompaniesandrelatedlaws.Finally,itcomparesandanalyzesnegotiatedacquisitionandcompetitivetenderofferfromseveralaspects,whichreflectstheparticularadvantagesofthelatter.2.Itcomparestherelationshipbetweencompetitivetenderofferoflistedcompanieswherecontrollingshareholdersdominatedandauction.First,itintroducesbasictheoryofauction,andthenstartscomparisonfromtheroleofcontrollingshareholders,competitivetenderofferwithdifferentmotivesandtenderofferprocesswiththecorrespondingpartsofauctioneers,auctionswithdifferentkindofvaluesandauctionprocess.Thenitillustratesspecialroleofcontrollingshareholdersfrompriceandquantitydimension.Finally,itproposestheframeworkandcontentonhowtouseauctiontheorytostudycompetitivetenderofferwherecontrollingshareholdersdominated.3.Itmainlystudiestheproblemofcontrollingshareholdershowtoaffecttheentrynumberofbidders.Undertheassumptionofdifferententrycosts,itstudiestheequilibriumentrystrategyofbidders,theoptimalcutoffstrategyofcontrollingshareholdersandtheeffectoftoolsthatcouldaffectbidders’entryincompetitivetenderofferundersymmetricandasymmetricsettings.Theresultshowsthatthereexistedcutofftypeequilibriuminbidders’entrydecisionandtheoptimalcutoffentrycostsofcontrollingshareholdersisnotequaltothatofbidders.Entryfeesandreservepricemakedi